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Tum' OS dit il et01t une fois que J€ 
pouvois te demander i'imposs!ble. 
Tu n' as pas supporte cette folie 
e/ementoire, pour to! II tout etre 
pres ou loin 
de Ia lettre ouverte. Mon 
gout du secret (o-b-s-o-1-u): Je ne 
peux JOuir qu·a cette condition, de 
cette condition MAIS, Ia 
JOUissonce secrete me prive de 
l'essentiel. Je voudro1s que toutle 
monde (pas toutle monde, Ia 
meilleure ilme te/escop1que de 
l'univers, oppelle <;o Dieu situ 
veux) soche, temoigne, ossiste. £t 
ce n'est pas une contradiction, 
· c'est pour <;o, en vue de <;o que 
j'ecrit quofld Je peux. Je JOue /e 
secret contre les temoins foibles, 
les temoins porticu/iers, meme s'lls 
sont foule, porce qu'll sont foule. 
C'est Ia condition du temoignoge-
ou du voyeurisme- en principe 
universe/, du non-secret obsolu, Ia 
f1n de cette v1e privee que 
flnoiement Je de teste et recuse: 
mo1s en attendant, du pnve II fout 
en TOJOuter. lmplocoblement, et du 
secret et de Ia crypte et de Ia 
reserve. Je ne refuse pas Ia 
publicite obsolue du temoignoge, Je 
recuse des temo1ns, certains 
temoins. Les uns opres les outres, 
c'est vroi )usqu'a present, et 
presque taus. Moi-meme porfois, 
c'est pour <;o que j'ecns un peu 
sons croire a rien, ni a Ia 
1/tteroture, n1 a Ia philosophle, ni a 
!'ecole, a l'utl/Versite, a l'ocodemie, 
au lycee, au college, ni au 
JOurnolisme. Jusqu'a present. 
C'est pour <;o que Je m'occroche un 
peu oux cortes postoles: si 
pudiques, ononymes, offertes, 
stereotypees, «retro» -et 
obsolument indechiffrobles, le for 
interieur /ui-meme que les 
focteurs, les lecteurs, les 
collectionneurs, les professeurs 
flnolement se possent de main en 
main les yeux, oui, bondes. 
le discord, le drome entre 
nous: non pas de sovo1r s1 nous 
devons continuer a vivre ensemble 
(pense oux fois innombrobles de 
notre separation, a choque 
outodofe), s1 nous pouvons vivre 
avec ou sans /'outre, ce qui o 
toujours posse notre decision, mois 
a quelle distance, se/on que/ mode 
de l'eloignement. £t Ia-
[J.D.] 
Lees maar, 
er staat niet wat er staat. 
(M. Nijhoff) 
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0. I We all know the game: 
[for P.P.] 
<<Le <<present>> essai n'est qu'un 
tissu de <<citations>>. Certaines sont 
entre guillemets. Generalement 
fideles .. >> 
which book would you take with you if you were to be deserted on an 
uninhabited island? It is only a game, it is never completely serious. But it 
says something about the one who is asked to make the choice. Many people 
would hesitate and might not be able or might not be willing to make a 
choice. Others spontaneously would say: the bible, Plato, the Greek tragedies, 
Shakespeare, one or other great novel or the work of a great thinker. I 
myself would take with me... the big dictionary of my language. Again, my 
saying so is not completely serious, it is only a game. 
Why the dictionary? In the first place because all texts and books that are 
written in Dutch, and that I would otherwise like to take with me, are written 
with words that one can find in the Van Dale. Het Groot Woordenboek 
der Nederlandse Taal. Texts are weaves or constructions, woven or built 
from material that is in the dictionary. An English text cannot be something 
other than a particular combination of English words, registered in the 
Oxford English Dictionary. Second, when you open the dictionary on 
any page -or, let me express myself more modestly- when I open that book on 
any page, I fall from one wonder into another. I am constantly referred to 
all sorts of different words. All sorts of memories come up and all sorts of 
expectations are raised. I suddenly see connections that I had never seen or 
suspected before, and whole narratives begin to outline themselves: all that 
on the pursuit of mere words. 
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Les mots, dans les 
In the stream of words different kinds can be discerned: dictionnaires, 
gisent, pareils ou 
there are difficult words and there are easy words, lovely de dates diverses, 
comme des 
words and dreary words, beautiful words and ugly words, sad stratifications. 
(St. Mallarme) 
and joyful words, dirty words and very pure and refined 
words, big, expensive and pretentious words, but also ordinary and most 
modest words. There are archaic words and there are modem words. Lonely 
and forgotten words that repel one another and that are hostile to one 
another, but also words that easily find one another, words that call one 
another forth in what Jean Baudrillard calls a catastrophe of charm, or that 
need one another's company, words that go together very well, albeit only 
because they rhyme or because they resemble one another. Every page of 
the dictionary is, for me, like an unintentional and unintended, and perhaps 
a -to risk that (big) word- postmodern piece of art that is quite fascinating. 
Even more so than a book on art with reproductions of, for example, the 
Sistine chapel or the work of Valerio Adami. For such books contain merely 
reproductions, while a page of a dictionary is not a reproduction since there 
is no original: each page is an instance or example of the thing itself. 
Perhaps you will ask: why have you chosen Derrida then as 'favourite', and 
not the dictionary? Well, my fascination for the dictionary is prompted by 
Derrida. He has pulled me to it, and what I have said up to now would not 
have been possible without him. Now Derrida might not have the Oxford 
English Dictionary, or the Van Dale, but he has the Littre, the French 
counterpart. That book, the Littre, is perhaps the most frequently cited 
book in Derrida's work, not to say anything of the implicit borrowings. He 
often copies sections from it, sometimes even respecting the particular 
typography. Derrida, like Heidegger, is very partial to dictionaries and he 
likes to play all sorts of games with them. If there is onev person who is well 
aware of the fact that philosophy and literature, but also science, is built up 
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out of words that are combined in all sorts of different ways, then it is 
Derrida. 
I looked in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and The Budget 
Macquarie Dictionary for the word 'favourite'. The 
word's context -which, in a dictionary, is insignificant, 
since the words are arranged according to a merely 
arbitrary principle, 
namely the alphabet which is in tum an arrangement 
to which, from childhood onwards, we have become 
Cf. Alan Bass, L before 
K ; cf. also Roland 
Barthes, A Lover's 
Discourse: Frag-
ments, p. 8, and Jean 
Baudrillard, Seduc· 
lion. pp. 137-38. 
accustomed, but in which there is no necessity at all,· that context, then, is 
already fascinating in itself. Around the word one finds: fashion, fat, fatal, 
fatuous, fauna, fauteuil, February, feces, foetus. With these words one could 
weave a whole story. Notice that one could expand the context in both 
directions. As is always the case with context, real ones as well as linguistic 
ones, the limits that one demarcates, or the delimitation from where one lets 
a text begin or end, are the result of an arbitrary decision or choice. Now 
what does one find under the entry 'favourite'? I read: ·(0 ED) A. sb. 1. A 
person or thing regarded with peculiar favour, one preferred above others 
1583; in Racing, etc. the competitor or competing animal "fancied", as being 
most likely to win 1813. 2. One who stands unduly high in the favour of a 
prince, etc. 1599. (So, in application to things, or by extension: a favourite 
piece of art, song, record &c .. ) 3. A curl or lock of hair hanging loose upon 
the temple: worn in the 17th and 18th centuries. [Cf. F. favoris whiskers.] 
1690. #4. = FAVOURER ·1591. B. adj. Regarded with especial favour, liking 
or preference 1711. [Fortunes' sj spoiled and favourite child BYRON 
-(B MD ) n. 1. a person or thing regarded with special 
favour or preference. 2. Sport. a competitor considered likely to win. 3. 
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Racing. the horse, dog, etc., which is most heavily backed. 4. a person treated 
with special (esp. undue) favour, as by a ruler. adj. 5. regarded with 
particular favour or preference. I add here that, in Dutch, the gendered 
word favoriete also is the most favoured concubine of an Eastern prince and, 
in cardgames, is the ace of trumps. If I had the talent and genius of Derrida I 
could write a whole essay on the dictionary's prompting. 
(B MD )Prompt: -v.t. 6. to assist (a person An essay that could be about love, 
speaking) by suggesting something to be said. 
7. Theat. to supply (an actor or reciter) with about cuddling, about rendering 
his cue from offstage if he has missed it, or his 
line if· he has forgotten it. -v.i. 8. Theat. to and receiving favours, about 
supply offstage cues and effects. I n 
application, cf. B. Pautrat, Versions du contests and competitions, about 
Soleil, pp. 156-57: Notre point de depart sera 
fait de deux fragments, l'un de 1872, I' autre de winning prizes 
1886-1887, qui resument une proposwon 
constamment avancee par Nietzsche dans sa 
critique du langage nature/. Dans le and laying wagers, about backing 
Philosophenbuch: <<Der Philosoph in den 
Netzen der Sprache eingefangen>>. Dans le something or someone and that, 
Nacblass: <<Nous cessons de penser lorsque 
nous voulons nous soustraire a la contrainte de backing, means -according to the 
la langue, nous parvenons a peine a penser que 
cette limite soit une limite reelle: la pensee 
rationelle est un interpreter (ein 
Interpretieren ) seton un schema que nous ne 
pouvons pas rejeter.>> Dans les deux cas, qu'il 
[aut penser ensemble, Ia langue -Ia Sprache, 
langage en general ou langue naturelle- est 
done determinee comme filet, lacet (ce dans 
qoui un oiseau se trouve pris), prison, lieu 
d' une contrainte et d' un asservissement 
(Zwang). [ ... ]; ne retenons de ces /ignes que Ia 
proposition philosophique qu' elles formulent d 
propos de Ia langue et de Ia philosophie: le 
rapport du philosophe d Ia langue est fait de 
servitude et de servitude necessaire. 
dictionary- expecting something 
from something or someone. It 
could also be about favoris and 
rules of attraction, sex and the 
imaginary world of eastern 
princes with their harems and 
veiled women, election and 
mutual jealousy. Finally, a word 
could be said on horses and cardgames, on the ace of trumps and the 
labyrinth of which each single game is a realization. And all this with 
reference to Jacques Derrida. I do not have the talent of Derrida and so I will 
not attempt such an essay. I will not enter a contest or competition with him. 
I know for sure that I would lose and that no one would back me. But I am 
convinced that if one looked in the dictionary for the several words I named, 
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one would be confronted with the most interesting discoveries and surprises, 
so that the essay would expand in all directions and could well run out of 
hand. I do not, however, want to follow that path. Let me instead formulate 
some considerations that have to do with Derrida and that are inspired, or 
prompted by him. 
The word 'favourite' means in the first place something like 'the favoured 
one'. It is the first meaning the dictionary gives. Now, as a matter of fact, 
Derrida does not need my or our favours, although no 
writer can do without readers and although I wish him 
toi, uniquement toi, 
mon amour ... La carte 
postale,p. 34. well, him, him more than anyone else. 
Otherwise, he would not be my 'favourite'. To be a 
Mandel a devient 
admirable pour avoir su favourite has something to do with admiration, with 
admirer. Et ce qu' il a 
su, il I' a su dans giving someone preference above others and that 
I' admiration. II fascine 
aussi, nous le verrons, 
pour avoir ere fascini!, 
'Admiration de Nelson 
Mandela ou Les lois de 
Ia reflexion', p. 454. 
means: electing. We can only admire, Derrida suggests, 
someone who admires. There are a lot of things, 
especially texts and the Law, which he admires. 
It is likely that one can only favour someone and give her preference if she, 
in one way or another, is in turn favoured, gifted and that again means 
elected. Here it is not about favours then which we render someone, or about 
gifts that we give, but about favour and gifts that come from elsewhere. 
Perhaps Heidegger would speak here of the favour, or 
Luce Irigaray, 
gift, of das Sein. In that sense Derrida is, in my eyes, a L'admiration (Lecture 
de Descartes. L e s 
favoured one and hence my favourite. 
is a 'choice' on my part. 
That, of course, passions de l'iime, art. 
53), p. 76: -admirer. 
L' admiration etant a Ia 
fois active et passive. 
To choose, then, and especially to choose in favour of 
8 
an author is, within philosophy, a life-sized problem. For philosophy aims to 
be a strictly rational discourse in which everything is rationally justified 
and in which something like subjective preference and aversion do not play 
a (decisive) part. Philosophy aims at formulating a knowledge that does not 
limit its pretension to a particular group but that is instead universally valid 
and that -at least in principle- is destined for all. As a believer or -perhaps-
as a sectarian you can choose in favour of a particular book, for example the 
bible, which you consider the book you want to follow, or you can choose in 
favour of a particular person, Christ, in whom you see an exemplar, a master, 
a (Immanuel Kant) Lehrer, or a guru. By so doing you join a particular, and 
that also means -again, according to the dictionary- a restricted community 
of followers or imitators. But philosophy is not a faith or sect and 
philosophers do not form a community, in this sense. So if some choice is 
involved in philosophy, then it should in principle be justifiable in all 
respects. If this is not the case, then the philosophy you choose must be 
dependent on accidental and precarious factors. To choose in favour of -or 
perhaps against- Derrida, in favour of or against Hegel, Heidegger, Witherall 
is to make a choice which cannot be completely justified. Of course, some 
reasons or justifications can be given, but they can never be sufficient. 
This problem -which philosophy is not very keen to face for it is 
threatening, making philosophy all too dependent on (seeming) 
contingencies- is taken very seriously by Derrida. According to him, an 
element of contingency which escapes our control and initiative is always 
involved, structurally, in philosophy. Moreover, this is true in all the 
sciences, and throughout the whole culture. Philosophy cannot stand this 
and attempts to avoid it, but as strategies of avoidance are never holeproof, it 
will attempt to hide contingency as much as possible. When Derrida reads 
texts he is especially attentive to those contingencies that are repressed, or 
hidden, but that nevertheless crop up in all manner of symptoms such as 
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hesitations, hitches, repetitions, citations, stylistic and rhetorical 
pecularities, promises, slips &c .. This reading is not meant as some sort of 
critique (in the philosophical sense of that word) of 
philosophy, on the contrary, the issue is to show how it 
could not have been otherwise. Any philosopher has 
her favourite[s] -even if this is, really, how it should not 
be. 
Another antinomy, 
perhaps. To be added, 
then, to /e programme. 
One can formulate the same problem in a different way, so that perhaps 
different aspects may come to the surface. Philosophy purports to articulate 
truth. We know -at least since the Enlightenment- that truth has something 
to do with universal validity. What is valid only for a small community, of 
followers, can only have the status of an opinion, a belief, or, perhaps, an 
ideology. One of the problems philosophy has to face is that one can never 
completely leave behind beliefs. Truth is important, for, as Augustine says, 
no one really wants to be deluded. That, as Nietzsche reminds us, some self-
deception is necessary in order to enjoy life and to survive is of course a 
problem in itself, but one can state that, generally speaking, everyone wants 
to know the truth and so everyone will feel that philosophy is -at least in 
principle- important. 
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For many extended stretches of time during the past 
four years, I have been intensely preoccupied with 
thinking and writing about philosophical matters. 
This cannot have been easy for my family [ ... ] yet 
throughout they have been remarkably tolerant and 
uncomplaining [ ... ] That I take such flights 
sometimes strikes me as absurd, anyway. Isn't it 
ludicrous for someone just one generation from the 
shtetl, a pisher from Brownsville and East Flatbush 
in Brooklyn, even to touch on the topics of the 
monumental thinkers? Of course it is. Yet is was 
ludicrous for them too. We are all just a few years 
past something or other, if only childhood. Even the 
monuments themselves, so serenely in command of 
culture and intellect, must have been children once 
and adolescents-so they too are immigrants to the 
realm of thought, R. Nozick, Acknowledgements, viii; 
cf. also l.B.Singer, The Spinoza from Market Street, 
and VI. Nabokov, The Art of Literature and 
Commonsense, p. 373: I remember a cartoon depicting 
a chimney sweep falling from the roof of a tall 
building and noticing on the way that a sign-board 
had one word wrong, and wondering in his headlong 
flight why nobody had thought of correcting it. 
[Human attention is apparently characterized by a 
profound instability depending on the essentially 
symbolic character of the significations to which it is 
directed. The constant shiftings, or asides, as VI. 
Nabokov puts it, have less than critical, or typically 
de-constructive effects. Our attachment to critical 
discourse too is liable to such asides; but then we 
And yet, as Robert Nozick 
remarks in Philosoph i ca I 
Ex p I a nat i on s , even the 
smallest accident can mean 
that we no longer find 
philosophy and truth 
important at all, and that 
they radically lose their 
significance. It is perhaps -
and one can read this in 
Derrida as well as in Nozick-
therein that the appeal of 
philosophy lies. Only things 
that can lose their 
significance can appeal. To 
could not be attached to it were this not so!] lay a wager or play a 
cardgame is arresting only if 
you want to win and can lose; more strongly, you can only want to win if it is 
possible to lose. Otherwise it would be indifferent. And indeed, philosophy is 
reminiscent of a game in which everything is put in play and in which the 
stakes are total. This game, philosophy, derives its appeal from the fact that 
you can lose and perhaps also from the awareness that, in the end, one 
always loses, as humans are finite and elected to death and oblivion. 
This brings us to cherishing and loving, which are related, as the dictionary 
suggests, to the choice of a favourite. Really to love someone and give 
her/him preference above all others -someone who pretends to love all 
people equally does not really love anyone at all- means to put oneself at 
stake, to risk both the loss of oneself and of the other. There can be no 
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question of love without the willingness to run that risk. And so to love has 
something to do with the awareness of being mortal and finite. 
What makes true human love possible is -as 
Anton Checkhov, Lady with 
Burov, Anna's lover realized- the recognition of Lapdog; cf. also Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Im grossen 
the fact that, one day, you and the other will be Schweigen, Morgenrothe, 
Filnftes Buch, section 423. 
no more. To choose someone, for example Jacques 
Derrida, as a 'favourite' means to love him in one way or another, and to give 
him preference above others. This does not mean that this preference is all-
exclusive. In the same way that one can love several people at the same time, 
one can have many favourites and that is what is normally the case -, if I can 
speak for myself. But always related to such a choice is a risk, and without 
this risk there could be no question of favouritism. You can try to avoid this 
risk by not loving anyone at all; or by spiriting your choice away in doing as 
if you choose for no one in particular. Perhaps the risk can be minimized 
by backing several horses at the same time or by choosing someone who is 
already favoured by almost everyone, who is heavily backed (and so for 
whom the odds of failure are low?), for instance a 'monumental' thinker like 
Aristotle or Plato. The risk of being mistaken and of backing the wrong 
horse seems to be reduced then. But one should not forget that this also is a 
choice, or once was, and that this choice was in fact made by only a small 
group of people. The majority of the world's population has never heard of 
Plato and Aristotle, and only an extremely small elite has ever read anything 
by those thinkers. Philosophers normally cannot imagine this, since those 
thinkers seem so important to them, that is: are so much their favourites, that 
it seems to them 'barbaric' not to know their names. Of course, this hasn't 
anything to do with barbarism but everything to do with just having other 
circles of preferred and elected ones. 
1a 
Choosing Derrida as my 'favourite' does not mean that he is, for me, the only 
one and definitely not, as far as I am concerned, that he is the greatest 
philosopher of the twentieth century. There are other thinkers and, what is 
more, other writers who command my admiration. But to choose Derrida as 
'favourite' means to love him, in one way or another, with all the related 
risks. What does it mean to love an author, a philosopher? More concretely: 
what does it mean to love Derrida? Answering this question involves, first of 
all, making a distinction that is essential and at the same time extremely 
problematic. 'Jacques Derrida' is a proper name, one of the many names that 
he bears and that bear him. It may be that there are other people around 
who bear the same name, just as the initials in the dedication can be and in 
fact are the initials of many people, Peter Pan, Paul Patton, Pol Pot, and so 
forth (Pleasure Principle). The name 'Jacques Derrida' first of all denotes a 
concrete person to whom one can point, into whom one can bump, whom one 
could invite to dinner, or befriend, who lives at a particular address, who has 
a phone number (so it seems) and who was born in a particular place, in fact 
on the 15th of July 1930 in a rather small place, El-Biar, in Algeria. This 
name also denotes a whole set of texts. 
rhetorical figure. The Van Dale gives 
'Derrida' is also a metonymy, a 
the following example of a 
metonymy: 'Ik lees Couperus'(I'm reading Couperus.' So I can say, as I often 
do, when prompted: 'I am reading Derrida', that is: a set of texts that are 
ascribed to him by himself and others, texts that bear his signature and that 
are, in some respect, his 'property.' A problem arises as to the relation 
between the man and the text. The concrete person is, amongst other things, 
also an author. Still, this is only one aspect of his existence. The set of texts 
by Derrida are part, and are not part of the concrete person. For instance, 
one can continue to read Derrida when he has ceased to be, when physically 
he is no more. Most of the authors read by philosophers are in fact dead. To 
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be sure, you cannot and may not simply identify Derrida with his texts. 
There is an irreducible difference, or 
inequality, here which is constitutive of a text 
as text. 
Cf.: s.e.c., Eperons, 
Limited Inc a b c &c. 
To choose Derrida as 'favourite' -does that mean to love him as a person or to 
love his work? I do not know Derrida; we are not friends. Does that matter? I 
think that, in this context, it is not important. Yet the notion of 'importance' 
is a rather relative one. What in a woman/man's life could be more 
important than friendship? Who could state adamantly that the personal 
events in someone's life -for instance Hegel's sorrow and concern with and 
for his family- are less important than his philosophy? As Nozick reminds 
us, we, finite and limited as we are, forget sorrow and concern. And can we 
be sure that memory retains the most important things? Supposing that one 
does not simply accept that the history of the world will always have the 
final say, then, perhaps, one can be attentive to the 'infinite' importance 
personal relationships can have. Let me say, for convenience's sake then, 
that when one speaks about Derrida as 'favourite', it is about his texts. 'By 
extension', as the dictionary might say. 
There is no doubt that one can love texts. You can love Shakespeare for 
example, or Flaubert, Couperus, or Plato, Heidegger, and even the dictionary. 
What does it mean, to love a text? It does not necessarily mean that you 
understand everything in it, nor that you agree with everything written 
there. But it has something to do with a certain love of reading, a hunger or, 
better, a desire to be occupied by it, to pay attention to it and to keep it in 
mind. Some people love to read, and Derrida is one of them. He reads with an 
enormous love. He is, as he puts it, jealously in love with the texts in the 
margins of which he scribbles. Still, there are people who do not like to read. 
Why it is, exactly, that someone loves to read is a question that occupies me 
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and to which no simple answer is possible. It is a question which Derrida also 
raises. An answer, I think, must be sought in the direction of the structure 
of human desire/desires; it may well have something to do with eroticism, to 
come back once again to the dictionary. It is however easier to see why 
people -a lot of people- do not love to read. Reading is demanding. Moreover, 
it supposes that you withdraw from the world 
surrounding you and isolate yourself. Cfr. M.Blanchot on /a solitude Perhaps essen tie II e in L ' e s p a c e 
one can listen to music together with other 
people, 
literaire; Ph. Sollers in 
Vision a New York, Preface 
p. 9, on writing: Plus j'ecris, 
plus je vois [ .. .] Annie apres 
annee, a quoi bon compter les 
but rather annees? Je sais que je n' ai pas reading is a solitary occupation 
vraiment dtcide cette vie-ltl, ce 
which requires that one isolate oneself and retrait-/d, ce ma/entendu 
permanent avec les autres. 
withdraws one's attention from others. A lot of 
people, in our culture, can hardly appreciate this. 
Amongst those who love to read some give preference to 'literary' above 
'philosophical' texts. The opposition between these two 'types' of texts is not 
at all clear. It is both essential and problematic, as Derrida has argued, 
indeed, on several occasions, for instance in La dissemination. 
But one could at least say that no philosophical text is able to put into words 
as many of the nuances and subtleties of human 
Cf. VI. Nabokov, Good Readers 
existence and human relationships as can a great and Good Writers, p.3. 
novel or a great short story. What one can read 
in a philosophical essay on the relationship man-woman is often nothing 
more than a concatenation of generalities and platitudes, compared with 
what is said about that relationship in, for example, Anna Karenin or 
Fe m me s; and what is said in a philosophy of language often hasn't that 
much to do with language, compared to what is revealed about language in, 
for example, Finnegans Wake or H. Yet in spite of this infirmity, 
philosophy, philosophical texts, exert an appeal of their own. The texts of 
Derrida exert a great appeal, at least on me. I like reading them. Derrida is, 
hence, my, or better, one of my 'favourites'. 
The appeal that emanates from Derrida consists in -among other things- the 
fact that he draws attention to what in fact takes place when you read and/or 
write. He can teach you how to read and especially how to enjoy reading, 
though I would doubt that he makes writing easier. Emmanuel Levinas once 
remarked that Derrida has put a bomb under every word so that it becomes 
extremely dangerous to use them any more. Vigilance is hence called for. 
And this awareness does not make writing easier. But Derrida has not made 
reading easier either, only more intense and appealing because he has 
taught us to pay attention to those things in and around the (philosophical) 
text, things which the reader usually fails to notice. For instance the 
elementary fact that a text is built up out of words, clauses and fragments 
borrowed from other texts, 
La carte postale, p. 410: L'emprunt est Ia loi. that is, that a text is built up 
[ .. ]Sans emprunt, rien ne commence, il n'y a pas de 
fonds propre. Tout commence par le transfer/ de out of 'citations' that can be 
fonds, et il y a inter~! a emprunter, c' est meme le 
premier interet. L' emprunt rapporte, il produit de explicit but that usually 
Ia plus-value, il est le premier moteur de tout 
investissement. On commence ainsi par speculer, en remain implicit. 
pariant sur une valeur a produire a partir de rien. Et 
toutes ces <<metaphores>> confirment, a titre de 
metaphores, Ia necessite de ce qu' elles disent. 
As regards citations and 
citing, matters stand strangely. Whoever has ever published something will 
usually feel flattered when she/he is cited by other people, at least when the 
citation concerns the publication in its general structure, for example when 
the publication is taken up in a bibliography, or when its basic idea is 
represented. But most of the time the author will feel extremely 
disappointed, when a particular phrase from the publication is cited, because 
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he/she will inevitably have the feeling that that phrase wasn't really that 
important, that it did not really correspond to what they meant to say, or that, 
anyhow, it always gets wrested out of its 'proper' context. Anyone who 
publishes and is cited has these feelings. These will also be the feelings of 
those writers whom I cite in writing these pages. So Derrida must, on the one 
hand, feel honored by the fact that his name crops up in so many 
publications; on the other hand it must be really horrible for him (and a 
little amusing too, depending on his mood) to be confronted with concrete 
citations -ll n'y a pas d' hors texte, for example. 
When philosophers cite -and they cite very frequently- the word 'idea' is, 
according to Derrida, a citation- they usually borrow from authors that are 
already dead. Fortunately, the dead need not suffer from it. Spinoza need not 
suffer from being cited affirmatively by deep ecologists, terrorists and 
marxists alike. To be dead, says Derrida, means at least this, namely: that no 
honoring nor dishonoring, whether calculated or 
Cf. Memoires: for Paul not, touches the bearer of the name; it only touches 
de Man, pp. 48-9. 
the name. 
Writing implies citing: already circulating words and already written or 
spoken phrases get taken up into a new concatenation of words and phrases. 
Writing also implies citationability or repeatability: what is written can in 
tum be taken up in other concatenations, it can be cited. 
So our words and phrases can function in concatenations that are no longer 
ours. Citing is always accompanied by a wresting of words out of the real and 
linguistic context in which they occur and therefore it is accompanied by an 
VI. Nabokov, Good Readers 
and Good Writers, p. 3: 
Curiously enough, one cannot 
read a book: one can only 
reread it. 
alteration of meaning. Citationabil i ty is 
constitutive of a text as text. 
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Maurice Blanchot, L'entretien infini, Note: 
This explains why Plato and so Ecrire, /'exigence d'ecrire: non plus /'ecriture 
qui s' est toujaurs mise (par une necessite 
many philosophers after him nullement evitable) au service de Ia parole ou 
de Ia pensee dite idea/is ante, c' est-a-dire 
shrank from writing -even if moralisante, mais /' ecriture qui, par sa force 
propre lentement liberee (force a/eatoire 
they also died at their writing d' absence), semble ne se consacrer qu' a e/le-
meme qui reste sans identite et, peu a peu, 
desk. Writing means or implies degage des possibilites tout autres, une faqon 
anonyme, distraite, differee et dis per see d' erre 
that no author can completely en rapport par laquelle tout est mis en cause, et 
d' abord /'idee de Dieu, du Mol, du Sujet, puis de 
command his/her texts or keep Ia verite et de /'Un, puis /'idee du Livre et de 
/'Oeuvre, en sorte que cette ecriture (entendue 
them under control, neither as dans sa rigueur enigmatique), loin d' avoir puor 
but /e Livre, en marquerait pluto/ Ia fin: 
regards their coming into being ecriture qu'on pourrait dire hors discours, 
hors langage. 
nor as regards their being 
understood: that is to say, 
qual quelle: /es sources de Valery, M352-53: Mais, s'il 
the effects they evoke. A y a un timbre et un style, en concluera+on pour aut ant 
que Ia source ici se pn!sente? Point. Et c' est pourquoi 
Je s'y perd, ou en tout cas s'expose dans /'operation de 
maftrise. Le timbre de ma voix, /e style de mon 
text always and inevitably 
gets out of hand. 
Any writer must relate 
ecriture, c' est ce qui pour (un) moi n' aura jamais ere 
present; Entre crochets. pp. !08-09: Meme si j' avais 
beaucoup a dire sur /e mode idiomatique de < <je suis 
mort>> qui me manoeuvre, ou avec lequel je ruse, 
que/que chose m' en reste abso/ument derobe, illisib/e, 
him- or herself to an du cote de ce que j' appel/e /e timbre ou /e style dans 
Hors livre, Dis s 42: 
S' il n'y a rien hors du 
texte, cela implique, 
avec Ia transformation 
du concept de texte en 
general, que celui-ci ne 
soil plus le dedans 
calfeutre d'une 
interiorite ou d' une 
identite iJ soi [ ... ]. mais 
une autre mise en place 
des effets d' ouverture 
et de fermeture. 
Qual Quelle: accessible seu/ement depuis Ia place de 
/'autre. Je /e suggere dans Glas: ce texte ne peut 
interesser que si, au de/a de toutes les ruses, de taus 
/es calculs imprenables, on est assure qu' iJ un certain 
point je ne sais pas ce que je fais, je ne vois plus ce qui 
me regarde. 
uncontrollable exteriority without which there would 
be no interiority; personal style is this 'impossible' 
relationship, rapport sans rapport. 
Generally speaking, philosophers, who usually do not 
think about themselves as being writers in the first place, find it much 
harder to relate to this exteriority in a creative and fruitful fashion. 
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Derrida has, furthermore, drawn attention to the fact that any text, in order 
to be a text, will exhibit empty spots, or blanks. These spots are even 
materially 'visible' as the margin or border, as the white space between the 
letters and words: that is to say, where in fact there is nothing written. 
Without these blanks a text could not be a text. To these spots there also 
belongs that which is not said. In every text there is much more that is not 
said than there is said. And -paradoxically- the little that can be said depends 
on the lot that can not be said, as Vladimir Nabokov confided to Alvin Toffler 
(Playboy, Jan. '64). He who would like to tell all at once and on the same spot 
cannot write. A text therefore always has a certain extension in time and 
space. Like the margin and the white spaces, the unsaid constitutes the 
condition of possibility for the coming into being and being understood of a 
text. They form -as it were- the frame or threshold of a text. It is from this 
bar or border onwards that a text becomes a text; yet that line can never be 
precisely drawn, since it is constantly 
transgressed. 
All this is related to Derrida's 
attentiveness to the rhetoric of a text. 
The rhetoric of a text exhibits all sorts 
Cl. Levesque, L' economie genera/e de /a 
lecture, pp. 162-63: Des /ors, /a limite 
d' un texte se perd, en que/que sorte: /a 
signe qui separe un texte de sa marge est 
impossible cl tracer d' une maniere 
precise et controlee. [ ... ]Le texte ne peut 
jamais s' absoluter dans une illusoire 
autonomie, se croire sans contexte, et ne 
of extremely subtle and hidden reposant que sur lui-meme, dans 
I' intimite inentamee d' un de dans en 
strategies aimed at winning the reader rupture absolue par rapport cl tout 
dehors. 
over to its side, aimed at raising his or 
her interest or letting it continue, eliciting 'opposition' in the sense of either 
approval or disproval, agreement or disagreement. This rhetoric, this 
calculus of seduction can take the form of a complex play of veiling and 
unveiling, of saying and not-saying, of making promises and calling up 
expectations. Through this play a certain captivating, mesmerizing tension is 
created or maintained. The play can take place through the choice of a title 
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[a preciser], a tone [apoca/ytique] and thematic, a certain division or 
construction of the material, and its elaboration and formulation. The 
distribution and choice of citations as well as the choice of words also plays a 
very important part. For it so happens that some words and expressions do 
make a greater impression in certain milieus, or are simply more familiar 
and therefore suggest an affinity or proximity. In certain philosophical 
milieus there may even So style is important; VI. Nabokov, The Gift, pp. 256-57: 
rest a taboo 
Chernyshevski' s "philosophy" goes back through 
on Feuerbach, to the Encyclopedists. On the other hand, 
particular 
applied hegelianism, working gradually left, went through 
words that same Feuerbach to join Marx, who in his Holy 
because of the Family expresses himself thus: 
contaminating 
connotations they may 
have acquired. So style 
is important. 
.... no great intelligence 
Is needed to distinguish a connection 
Between the teaching of materialism 
Regarding inborn tendency to good; 
Equality of man's capacities-
Capacities that generally are 
Termed mental; the great influence 
Exterior circumstances have on man; 
Omnipotent experience; sway of habit 
And of upbringing; the extreme importance 
Of industry; the moral right to pleasure, 
And communism. 
Even a strict 1 Y 1 have put it in blank verse so it would be less boring. 
scientific or formalized 
use of language is a stylistic matter. In certain circumstances scientific 
discourse will have more force of conviction than other forms of style. And 
simplicity, honesty and spontaneity can operate in a rhetorical mode. In any 
text a complex process of seduction is at work, a process of wanting to seduce 
and of wanting to be seduced. The sophist Gorgias (in whose eyes rhetoric 
represented the highest form of art) once remarked, regarding literature, 
and the Greek Tragedies in particular, that the one who seduces (the Greek 
verb here is apatan, to cheat, to outwit, to beguile; the Latin seducere also 
has the connotation of distracting something, a sign for instance, or 
someone, you, from its telos, from its truth or destination -and what comes to 
mind here is the pharmakon which, operating through seduction, makes 
au 
Socrates stray from his general, natural, habitual paths and laws). that the 
one who seduces, then, is more just than the one who does not; and that the 
one who allows herself to be seduced is wiser and better educated, better 
formed that the one who does not allow himself to be seduced. To a certain 
extent this holds for all sorts of texts. Derrida would subscribe to Gorgias' 
remark, 
M. Taylor, F o iIi ng 
Reflection, p. 57: one of though with the required nuance. This nuance 
the most important 
lessons Derrida has consists in the fact that we have the (philosophical) 
taught us: philosophical 
analysis is undeniably duty to unmask seduction as seduction; but that 
rhetorical. 
unmasking can only be an infinite, or interminable 
task in which any unmasking in turn partakes in the process of seduction. 
Some justification is hereby given for choosing Derrida, Jacques, as 
'favourite'. The choice is not made, however, without hesitation. To choose a 
favourite means, in a sense, to choose a master or exemplar. Now Derrida, 
like Nietzsche, has occupied himself intensively with education and, 
particularly, with education in philosophy -philosophy, that is, in Derrida's 
words, cet enseignement de l'inenseignable. In the education in philosophy 
a teacher or tutor is indispensable, but also superfluous. The mentor is both 
desirable 
and undesirable, both necessary and impossible. For philosophy is, 
according to Derrida, a knowing and a not-knowing, something determinate 
and indeterminate, with and without aims, a social and cultural institution 
and the breaking of all institutional borders, bound to space and time, to 
programs and timetables, and at the same time 
something completely other than that. There is an 
unresolvable tension between autonomy and 
heteronomy, between autodidactic and heterodidactic. 
Cf. Les antinomies de Ia 
discipline philoso-
phique .. pp. 13-17 in 
particular; cf. also 
Theologie de Ia 
traduction, pp. 172-73. 
at 
Philosophy stands under a double law, a double bind. To choose a favourite, 
within philosophy. is in effect to destroy this relation of tension and to reject 
the double -or divided- law. To do so would amount to the most blatant 
betrayal of Derrida's work ... 
-Yes, it is likely that all philosophers do have their favourites, but it can and 
should not be that way. And so Derrida is my favourite, my favourite with a 
huge question mark ... 
a a 
1./ A 
philosopher 
who is not 
Quit sequitur 
tene bris, dicit 
verba Christi, 
me non 
Dominus. 
qui bus 
ambulat in 
Haec sunt 
admonemur 
Ich wohne in meinem eigenen Haus, 
Hab Niemandem nie nichts nachge-
[macht 
Und -Iachte noch jeder Meister aus, 
Der nicht sich selber ausgelacht. 
Uber meiner Hausthur 
[Motto der Ausgabe 1887] Die 
frohliche Wissenschaft. 
quatenus 
imitemur, 
illuminari 
liberari. 
vitam eius 
si volumus 
et mores only succesful in writing difficult books 
veraciter 
et ab omni coecitati cordis but 
De Imitatione Christi. 
also in acquiring an international 
renown piques one's curiosity and spurs 
on the desire for initiation. Those who would like to be initiated are first of 
all looking for a reliable guide: someone who understands what the difficult 
philosopher means, who can transpose this understanding into an accessible 
and familiar idiom, thereby managing to keep himself modestly in the 
background I. Derrida evokes this traditional pattern of expectation, but he 
also disturbs it: he is difficult, and famous; however, he acts as a spoil-sport 
or jokervis a vis those who aim at offering a faithful interpretation or 
transcription of his work. For, by the way in which he discusses other 
(philosophical) writers, he has stripped the notion of 'faithful 
interpretation' of its usual supports. With concrete 
analyses Derrida demonstrates how uncertain and Archi Bunker: What's 
the difference? 
unsteady the distinction is between 'I mean what I say' 
and 'I am [only] doing as if.' 
John Sallis, Echoes, P· 6: In his readings of other writers he makes their 
human speech is itself 
acoustical; speech itself statements and claims echo in ways in 
echoes, echoes even itself. 
I Cf. G, p. 227: le redoublement efface et respectueux du commentaire. 
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which they would no longer recognize themselves, and although he seems to 
follow them [their writings] with a meticulous conscientiousness he leads 
them into places in which they would not want to dwell for a second. 
Derrida' s work, one could say, is dominated by the fascination for the 
falsification that menaces and haunts the 'proper' in its purity, and for the 
mask by which even the 'real face' itself emerges as a mask, eine Maske 
me hr. Without debunking the virtue of faithfulness and without glorifying 
betrayal, he unsettles the belief in the possibility of an undivided and total 
faithfulness. 
We can have the honest intention of expressing 
ourselves in what we say or write, and may want 
to be personally present in what we say or write. 
This desire manifests itself not only in the 
practice of an interior monologue but also in the 
composition of a poem and in the keeping of a 
diary. Even in a rather everyday conversation 
(the bakery) we usually expect some involvement 
on the part of the other to whom we present our 
linguistic constructions. Now, to the extent to 
which we can appreciate the other's 
attentiveness to our linguistic constructions a s 
an attentiveness to our own personality, we must 
Ja, ou le faux-bond, pp. 93-5: 
(encore que ... mais Ia je ne 
suis sar de rien et j' aime 
ecrire pricisiment d ce point 
ou le calcul se perd 
a b s o I u m e n t ) [ ... ] 
N aturellement, I' important 
(pour moi en tous cas), ce 
n' est pas de reussir ce calcul. 
J e n' en suis pas tout a fait 
responsable, le < <je> > n' en est 
pas tout il fait responsable, et 
le calcul ne reussit qu. a 
e c h o u e r . Puis j' ai peu 
d' illusions ou d' esperances a 
ce sujet. Mais je voudrais 
m' approcher de ce qui me 
pousse il faire ~a. Et d' ou. <;a 
je ne sais pas. Je sais pas 
mal de choses, je veux dire 
sur ce que j' ecris, mais ~a je 
ne sais pas et c' est ~a qui 
m'intiresse et me travail/e. 
consider these constructions as expressions or 
Entre 
Je le 
crochets, pp. !08-09: embodiments of our own personality. However, 
suggere dans Glas: ce 
texte ne peut interesser que 
si, au dela de toutes les 
ruses, de to us les calculs 
imprenables, on est assure 
qu' a un certain point je ne 
sais pas ce que je fais, je ne 
vois plus ce qui me regarde. 
our expressions can only be intimate, proximous 
or personal to the exact extent to which they are 
about to slide into something in which we would 
not or no longer recognize ourselves. 
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Because the signs are pregnant and so assume importance in their concrete 
materiality they remain always to some extent external: they never 
completely fall under our own control and are structurally able to circulate 
in ever new contexts, some of which will be estranging, meaningless or 
horrific to us: we can only express ourselves in that of which we do not have 
full control and in which, as a result, we also lose ourselves2. 
This paradoxical structure also commands the fashion after which our 
appearance -in the broad sense of that word: mimicry, gesticulation, 
intonation &c.- can be an expression of ourselves. Here too there is an 
irremediable and constitutive risk of contamination: we cannot control the 
effects our appearance will evoke: things inevitably get out of hand and, 
caught as we are in iterability, and folded accordingly, on est toujours 
1' imbecile de quelqu' un [Henry de Montherlant]. Sometimes it will so 
happen that we are much liked by someone simply because our appearance 
invokes, without our knowing it, a striking resemblance to a third person: 
with someone we might not 
even know but who symbolizes 
all sorts of sympathetic or 
unsympathetic characteristics 
in the eyes of the one who is 
taking in our appearance. We 
are not in command of our own 
imago and the impression we 
make on others to some extent 
Limited Inc a b c, p. 34: L'iterabilitt! altere, 
elle parasite et contamine ce qu' elle identifie et 
permet de rt!pt!ter; elle fait qu' on veut dire (deja, 
toujours, aussi) autre chose que ce qu' on veut 
dire, on dit autre chose que ce qu' on dit et 
voudrait dire, comprend autre chose que ... etc. En 
termes classique, I' accident n' est jamais un 
accident. Et le mis des misunderstandings 
[ ... ]do it avoir sa condition de possibilitt! 
essentielle dans Ia structure des marques; des 
marques remarquables ou [ ... ]des oral or written 
utterances. Limitant cela meme qu' elle autorise, 
transgressant le code ou Ia loi qu' el/e constitue, Ia 
graphique de I' itt!rabilite inscrit, de faqon 
irreductible I' alteration dans Ia rept!tition ( ou 
dans I' identification): a priori, toujours deja, 
sans allendre, at once, aussi sec [ ... ] Tels son/ les 
vices qui m'interessent: l'autre fois dans Ia 
2 Cf. St. Cavell's analyses of premiere fois d' un coup, at once. 
skepticism (of meaning) and the 
underlying anxieties, in particular the discussion on the private language argument, 
The Claim of Reason, pp. 343-54, in which he relates that phantasy (p. 1.) to the fear 
25 
always eludes our grip,- however desperately we might be calculating these 
effects. The fashion after which we relate ourselves to the inability 
(impouvoir) to control completely our imago in tum determines what or 
who we are. Our so-called personal style is a result of the way in which we 
can lose hold of our image: Le timbre de ma voix, le style de mon ecriture, 
c' est ce qui pour (un) moi n' aura jamais ete present. Je n' entends ni ne 
reconnais le timbre de ma voix. Si mon style se marque, c' est seulement sur 
une face qui me reste invisible, i//isible. Point de speculum: j'y suis aveugle 
a mon style, sourd au plus spontane de ma voix. [ .. ] Le spontane ne peut 
surgir comme initialite pure de /' evenement qu' a condition de ne pas se 
presenter lui-meme, a cette condition de passivite inconcevable et 
irrelevable ou rien ne peut se presenter a soi-meme3. 
Everybody has to relate herself to this 
de /' economie restreinte d 
reconomie generale, pp. 387_88: difficulty for which there is no algorithmic or 
Rapport absolument unique: 
d' un lang age d un silence general 
souverain qui ne to/ere aucun 
the artist rapport, aucune symmetrie avec 
ce qui s' incline et glisse pour 
solution and which is akin to the task 
se rapporter d lui. faces. What a poet or novelist 'means' can 
never totally be disconnected from the way in 
which he, or she, wields the language. The significance of her work will 
inevitably be determined by the external form, that is: by something that is 
never the transparant representation of her intention and that hence 
withdraws from her control. The associations which are set going by her use 
of the language no longer come under the management of the writer. 
of inexpressiveness, the fear that our expressions might at any time signify nothing, or 
too much. 
3 qual quelle, pp. 352-53. 
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Elements of the most [ .. ] enter into a contest of fashion and ideology. Cf. Ja, 
ou /e faux-bond, p. 119: J' ajoute, pour /'anecdote [ ... ]. 
personal use of words can qu' on a eu /a bonne idee, rt!cemment, de traduire 
<<aufgelost werden konnen>>, dans L'idio/ogie 
for instance- enter into a allemande, par <<peuvent etre deconstruites> >. 
[ ... ]Doubles benefice: Ia deconstruction est deja chez 
context of fashion and Marx, et deja dans L'ideologie allemande, et non 
seulement a l' <<flat pratique>> mais sous son nom; de 
ideology. surcroit, el/e y est denoncee comme insuffisante, 
seulement tht!orique ou ideelle, au-dessous de Ia 
<<subversion pratique>> (traduction tres in et post-
In his work Derrida does not soixante-huitieme pour <<den praktischen 
Umsturz>>); La carte postale, p. 285: Abbauen: 
only unfold a theoretical c' est le mot que certains heideggeriens franr;ais ont 
recemment traduit par <<deconstruire>>, comme si 
train of thought. He also tout titait dans tout et toujours devant Ia caravane. 
[ ... ] On met Ia main sur une marque et on rapplique 
knows how to strike a rather partout. On peut voir ainsi, de /'autre cote s' i/ on 
pouvait dire, /e mot <<deconstruction>> tomber du cie/ 
singular tone: through an dans le texte de Marx. Jusqu'ici, <<aufge/Ost>> titait 
fidelement traduit par <<resolu>> ou <<dissous>>. 
unusual combination of [etc .. ]; cf. also Lettre a un ami japonais, p. 392, and 
The ear of the other, p. 86. 
minute textual analysis and 
theoretical radicalism, through a continuous shifting from earnestness to 
frivolity, through a mixture of reserve and auto-biographical frankness, 
through a controlled transgression of current codes and genres, through a 
most adroit manipulation of texts which renders 
Ja, ou /e faux-bond, p. 89: r;a 
improvise toujours dans le 
dos de I' t!laboration Ia plus 
contro/ee, Ia plus 
maitrisante, r;a defait le 
travail. 
the distinction between stating and quoting 
unclear. .. Now, to the extent to which Derrida's 
own style (or styles) is an essential part 
P. de Man. The rhetoric of blindness, p. 
I 09: not only does the critic say 
something that the work does not say, but 
he even says something that he himself 
does not mean to say; cf. also V. 
Descombes, L'inconscient malgre 
lui, in which the author interprets the 
lacanian unconscious as the excess of 
what one says over what one means. 
of his undertaking, the significance of 
his work in part eludes his explicit 
aims or intentions: it is already lost on 
him, and so if we were to follow him 
faithfully in what we think we can 
reconstruct 
as his 'real aims', then ipso facto we would betray the work in which he 
expresses and presents himself. 
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Although what Derrida writes should not be read only as a theoretical 
exposition, it is indeed possible to extract from his writings interesting 
philosophical opinions, for instance: that only things that can lose their 
significance can appeal4. The idea that Derrida's work -to the extent 
precisely that style, rapport sans rapport, is important- cannot exhaustively 
be translated into theoretical theses, is itself a theoretical thesis which is 
brought to the surface in Derrida, in his texts. No contradiction can be 
spotted herein. The same text can both describe and produce certain effects 
of signification. Marcel Proust has not only expressed, in his writings, a 
longing for times past; he has also dealt with this longing, or desire, after a 
theoretical fashion. The thoughts on this 
The French philosopher 
Gilles Deleuze wrote a book 
longing in A Ia 
in 
on Proust called Proust et particular the 
recherche du temps perdu, 
last volume, Le temps 
les signes. 
retrouve, are in themselves worthy of further 
reflection and could certainly enter into an 
overtly philosophical discourse. But although Proust himself 
4 This proposition could be tended towards a remark of L. Wittgensteins. In 
Bemerkungen iiber Frazers Golden Bough Wittgenstein notes that k e in e 
Erscheinung ist an sich besonders geheimnisvo/1, den jede kann es uns werden (p. 7). In 
this context this remark can not only come to signal that the distinction between (say:) 
sacraments and sacramentalia might well be indecidable, or intenable ,a proposition 
which could be arrived at in a derridean analysis, but also that what constitutes the 
mysterious is a matter of formal distinctions that -although they institute a bond with 
the mysterious- also put it at stake. What institutes (and protects) the sphere of the 
mysterious remains resistant and inaccessible, exposing it, from within, to repetition 
and ridicule. The insight that the evocative, or signifying strength of the supplement 
that institutes a bond with the mysterious (or the sacred) has everything to do with this 
vulnerability of significations found tantalizing expression in Nabokov's scandalous 
(i.e. from a logical point of view) definition of artistic beauty: beauty is beauty plus 
pity ("The Metamorphosis", p. 251). 
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provides lengthy explicit interpretations of what is accomplished in his 
cycle of novels, it would of course be inappropriate to reduce the whole 
concrete richness of A Ia recherche du temps perdu to illustrations or 
applications of certain theoretical insights. A 'literary' text can have far 
reaching theoretical impact without, for that reason, being reducible to an 
(in principle substitutable) example of a general idea. Now, the theme itself 
of a text that in its singularity -diese Worte, in diesen Stellungen, as 
Wittgenstein would say5 withdraws itself from the generalities of theoretical 
thought, receives not only a theoretico-philosophico treatment in Derrida's 
work, but also a number of concrete literary realisations. One would be 
misguided to interpret these concrete realisations as the monotonous 
repetition, in different guises, of the same idea. That these realisations are 
more than applications or illustrations can easily be demonstrated: even if 
we would possess a plausible theory of the mechanism by which fiction can 
touch or fascinate us, this still would not mean that, from then onwards, we 
could only read novels and stories as illustrations of this theory. 
It follows that there is no reason to veil Derrida' s philosophical insights in 
the clouds of secrecy or mystery. For if his work also contains a coherent 
vision, then it must be possible to state this vision in a clear language. No 
doubt, it is possible that some theoretical insights can be considered as the 
pendants of a praxis or attitutde for which is required more than a 
theoretical insight. Nietzsche has unmasked vanity as a form of self-
deception6. Although this theoretical unmaking is convincing, it is clearly 
insufficient as a remedy. And the theoretical idea that our so-called personal 
style escapes the control of our intentions is in itself insufficient to prevent 
5 Philosophische Untersuchungen, I 532. 
6 Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I, section 89. 
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us from desperately calculating the effects of our 
linguistic constructions. The theoretical idea that the 
La 
212: 
carte postale, p. 
<<Avec 
text in which we express and present VOUS, on ne 
peut plus se 
ourselves is never in line with our explicit aims is by presenter> >' me 
dit une jeune 
no means sufficient to enable us to write such a text. Americaine (je crois). 
Apparently Derrida has not been willing, up to now, to 
present his theoretical insights in the form of a systematic exposition. This 
does not mean that any systematization would be impossible, in principle, but 
rather that Derrida (like Nietzsche before him) is not only interested in such 
communication only by means of theoretical exposition. He allows 
philosophical ideas to play a part in texts that in themselves do no longer 
belong to 'the' genre of theoretical exposition. In that way theoretical 
thinking gets implicated is some sort of intrigue which it no longer 
commands: A Ia conception frontale du theme Derrida oppose Ia silhouette 
textuelle ou le bias, le bifax, marque d' un double jeu. leu qui disseque les 
mots, les reinscrit dans des sequences qu' ils ne commandent plus. [ ... ] Aux 
themes, Derrida substitue I' inscription qui dejoue toute position 7. 
Derrida's mode of work for sure irritates and frustrates many a reader and 
one can rightfully feel that way; however, favouring a theoretical mode of 
exposition above the mixture Derrida practices cannot itself be grounded in 
theory -, non-verite etant Ia verite de Ia verite.8 
7 LsD, pp. 31-2. 
8 Cf. Spurs/Eperons, p. 50. 
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The theoretical insights which Derrida formulates, directly or indirectly, can 
-like all thoughts of whatever theoretician- be paraphrased9, criticized, 
elaborated, or expanded. In this respect Derrida's work does not pose totally 
new difficulties. But the 'usual' difficulties with which one has to come to 
terms in interpreting 
whatever philosophical texts 
are 'other' than one more 
commonly would represent 
them. Derrida has pointed 
out forms of undecidability, 
La cloture de Ia representation, p. 364: A enoncer 
ainsi les themes de l'infidelite, on comprend tres 
vite que Ia fidelite est impossible. II n'est pas 
aujourd' hut dans le monde de theatre qui reponde au 
desir d' Artaud. Et il n'y aurait pas eu d' exeption tl 
faire, de ce point de vue, pour les tentatives d'Artaud 
lui·meme: Ia <<grammaire>> du thedtre de Ia cruaute, 
dont il disait qu'elle halt <<tl trouver>> restera 
toujours /'inaccessible limite d'une representation 
qui ne soil pas repetition, d'une re-presentation qui 
soil presence pleine, qui ne porte pas en sol son 
of double comme sa mort, d' un present qui ne repete undeci-dable doubleness 
pas, c' est-a-dire d'un present hors du temps, d' un 
non-present. Le present ne se donne comme tel, ne 
s' apparaft, ne se presente, n' ouvre Ia scene du temps 
ou le temps de Ia scene qu' en acceuillant sa propre 
difjerence intestine, que dans le pli interieur de sa 
repetition originaire, dans Ia representation. Dans 
Ia dialectique. [ ... ] Le tragique n'est pas 
I' impossibilite mats Ia necessite de Ia repetition. 
by which the notion of 
'faithful interpretation' gets 
un-settled and faithfulness 
to a doctrine emerges as an 
impossible demand. 
9 Limited Inc a b c, p. 144: This paraphrastic moment, even If it appeals to aimal 
competence [ ... ]is already an interpretive reading. This moment, this laalready concerns 
interpretations and semantic decisions which have nothin unatural" or uoriginary" about 
them and which impose, subject to con that require analysis, conventions that henceforth 
are dominant [ .. ]. 
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It would be ludicrous strictly to identify the ideas of a philosopher with what 
she has explicitly stated in her publications or other writings. For if in the 
business of interpretation one would have to stick to the letter then no 
paraphrase and no understanding would be possible. Any philosophical text 
must time and again be translated, formulated, rewritten in terms of new 
controversies or situations and be grafted upon or related to other 
philosophical or non-philosophical texts! 0. How far can one go in doing 
so? Philosophers go at painstaking length in order to articulate their ideas 
as clearly and as distinctly as possible. Yet no philosopher can anticipate the 
ways in which in the future their ideas will combine or split themselves and 
how new philosophical positions and alliances will profile themselves on the 
basis of this passages. The fate of her thought is dependent upon historical 
contingency in which technological innovations 11 and socio-institutional 
and politico-economical factors play a part. No single big name in 
philosophy has ever been able to protect his ideas against effects that would 
strike him as strange, as unintelligible, ridiculous or roundly disgusting. 
This does not mean that those effects therefore rest on wrong interpretation. 
Baruch de Spinoza set himself the highest standards in formulating his 
10 Cf. D. McDonald, Foreword, p. xvi: Supplementarily applies in the history of ideas 
too. If one cannot really understand Derrida without reading Hegel, thenegel is at once 
outside and inside Derrida, a supplement made necessary by Derrida himself. To 
:introduce" the past, one must actually return to it. 
11 Cf. Fr. Kittler, The Mechanized Philosopher, p. 195: "Our writing instruments 
contribute to our thoughts." Friedrich Nietzsche, the first mechanized philosopher, was 
inspired by his brand-new typewriter to make this simple and scandalous statement. 
The statement, written on the very machine on which it is commenting, has itself never 
been commented on. Technical progress is sometimes too revolutionary to be recognized. 
Like Nietzsche's great thought, it arrives on doves' feet. 
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Cf. Saul Kripke, theories. Fortunately 
Wittgenstein on 
Rules and Private he need not know how 
Language: An 
Elementary badly he had been 
Exposition, p. 14; 
for a (lucid) estimation paid for that by 
of the 'critical 
differences' between history. 
Derrida and the 
skeptic-of-meaning cf. 
X John Llewelyn, Since an author can 
Derrida on the 
Threshold of Sense, never survey all the 
pp. 109-14; see also 
Limited Inc a b c. interesting 
pp. 136-37. 
possibilities of 
combination of what he has launched 
himself it is impossible to want to remain 
faithful to him. Even if we would situate 
ourselves as a God in the mind of Spinoza we 
would not be able to determine what Spinoza 
really meant or thought. 
This does not mean, however, that the 
interpretation of philosophical texts can 
only be determined by sheer arbitrariness. 
Only, the nature of the restrictions to which 
one has to comply cannot be fixed once and 
for all in the most general terms. For 
interpretation is itself a genre which 
Once I planned to make a survey of 
Kafka's precursors. At first I 
thought he was as singular as the 
fabulous phoenix; when I knew him 
better I thought I recognized his 
voice, or his habits, in the texts of 
various literatures and various 
ages. I shall record a few of them 
here, in chronological order. [ ... ] If 
I am not mistaken, the 
heterogeneous selections I have 
mentioned resemble Kafka's work: 
if I am not mistaken, not all of them 
resemble each other, and this fact 
is the significant one. Kafka's 
ideosyncracy, in greater or lesser 
degree, is present in each of these 
writings, but if Kafka had not 
written we would not perceive it; 
that is to say, it would not exist. 
The poem "Fears and Scruples" by 
Robert Browning is like a prophecy 
of Kafka's stories, but our reading 
of Kafka refines and changes our 
reading of the poem perceptibly. 
Browning did not read it as we read 
it now. The word uprecursor" is 
indispensable in the vocabulary of 
criticism, but one should try to 
purify it from every connotation of 
polemic or rivalry. The fact is that 
each writer creates his 
precusors. His work modifies our 
conception of the past, as it will 
modify the future2 . In this 
correlation the identity or 
plurality of men matters not at all. 
The first Kafka of Betrachtung is 
less a precursor of the Kafka of the 
shadowy myths and atrocious 
institutions than is Browning or 
Lord Duns any; J.L.Borges, K a[ka 
and his precursors; cf. La carte 
postale, p. 285. 
steadily develops and the pos-sibilities of which cannot completely be 
described in 
2 See T.S. Eliot, Points of View (1941), pages 25-26. 
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advance. So with regard to any philosophical text it cannot be detennined in 
advance what is and what is not acceptable or pennissable. A liberty which 
one cannot allow oneself within a particular context becomes acceptable and 
interesting in another context in which in turn different restrictions 
Even philosophers cannot always, if ever, be taken for their words. What 
they write or say is sometimes merely prompted by academic rivalry or by 
diplomatic care vis-a-vis an institution; and whatever they write or say will 
be informed by all sorts of conventions and contracts. Derrida frequently 
teases 13 his readers or his audience by pointing out that philosophical ideas 
too adopt themselves to the conventions and contracts of concrete contexts 
and circumstances. It follows that philosophers too impose limits onto their 
thinking. 
But then when and how ever to ascribe a conviction or idea to someone? 
There are no absolute, that is: no ahistorical or originary criteria to answer 
or settle this question, once and for all. What is decisive here are varying 
social conventions that are not absolutely anchored, not monolithic or self-
identicall4. 
12 Cf. Limited Inc a b c. p. 145. 
As just an example of such a generic 
innovation I mention that it was the 
Spanish Jesuit Francisco Soarez (1548-
1617) who introduced the genre of his 
kursus on Aristotle's Metaphysics, 
namely the tractatus which consequently 
replaced the quaestio disputata, the 
genre of the medieval commentary. 13 Limited Inc a b c, p 143: I realize that 
my answers have already been too long. For 
contingent reasons of time and space, and hence without rigorous justification, I will 
have to pay greater attention to the economy of my responses. 
14 Limited Inc a b c, p. 144. 
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Jenseits von Gut und 
Bose, 9, 289: Der Einsiedler De imitaione Derridae: a hermit 
glaubt nicht daran, dass 
La pharmacie de 
Platon, p. 71-2: 
Reservant . tou-
jours une sur~ 
prise a I' anatomie 
ou a Ia physio-
logie d'une criti-
que qui croirait 
en maftriser /e 
jeu, en survei/ler 
a Ia fois tous les 
fils, se leurrant 
aussi a vouloir 
jemals ein Philosoph -gesetzt, doubts whether a philosopher 
dass ein Philosoph immer 
vorerst ein Einsiedler war- could ever have final and 
seine eigentlichen und 
letzten Meinungen in Buchern e i gent li c he opinions. 
ausgedruckt habe: schreibt 
man nicht gerade Buchern, Signification are effects 
um zu verbergen, was man bei 
sich birgt?- ja er wird produced, leurres de 
zweifeln, ob ein Philosoph 
"letzte und eigentliche" reappropriation. There could regarder le texte 
Meinungen uberhaupt haben sans y toucher, 
k on n e, ob bei ihm nicht be no imitation apart from a sans mettre Ia 
main a I' <<objet>>, 
sans se risquer a 
y ajouter, unique 
hinter jeder Hohle noch eine 
tiefere Hohle liege, liegen 
musse- eine umfiinglichere 
certain rhetoric and policing: if 
fremdere reichere Welt uber there is undecidability, 
einer 0/Jerfliiche, eine 
Abgrund hinter jedem there need be contracts, 
then chance d' entrer 
dans le jeu en s'y 
laws, prenant les 
doigts, quelque Grunde, unter jeder 
"Begrundung". Jede institutionsl5 etc ... Which is to nouveau fil. 
Philosophie ist eine 
V o rde rg runds-P hil osophie-
Ajouter n' est pas 
say, of course, that there is no ici autre chose 
das ist ein Einsied/er-
Urthei/ [ ... ] Jede Philosophie mimetology: everything 
verbirgt auch eine 
Philosophie; jede Meinung ist with 
auch ein Versteck, jedes Wort 
auch eine Maske. 
15 Cf G. Deleuze, La pensee nomade. 
reproduction. 
que donner a lire. 
begins II [aut s' arranger 
pour penser cela: 
qu' il ne s' agit pas 
de broder, sauf a 
considerer que 
savoir broder 
c' est encore 
s'entendre a 
suivre /e fil 
donne. C' est-a-
dire, si I' on veut 
bien no us suivre, 
cache. 
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2./ Derrida investigates the 
[For Jo Vanhoenacker, 
who has arrived early] 
S' il y avail une definition de Ia J'ai essaye de 
remettre la philo-
sophie au scene, 
dans une scene 
qu'elle ne gouverne 
pas. 
differance, ce serait justement Ia limite, 
/'interruption, Ia destruction de Ia 
releve hegelienne partout ou elle 
s' opere. 
possibility of a limitation, and of a transgression 
or delimitation of philosophical knowledge that 
aspires 
Daran mitzuarbeiten, dass die 
Philosophie der Form der 
Wissenschaft ntiherkomme 
dem Zie/e, ihren Namen der 
Liebe zum Wissen ablegen zu 
to be an embracing knowledge. 
konnen und wirkliches 
Wissen zu sein ~. ist es, was 
ich [Georg W. Fr. Hegel, 
Involved is the Weltweisheits Doktor and 
amateur boxer] m i r 
question of the potence and impotence of vorgesetzt; Vorrede, p. 14. 
philosophical discourse, of what falls inside the 
system of philosophical knowledge and what escapes it, of the limit or bar 
between the interior and the exterior. Derrida has never formulated this 
problematic in such 
La carte postale, p. 73: Si 
Ia paste (technique, position, 
<<metaphysique>>) s'annonce 
au <<premier>> envoi, a/ors il 
n'y a plus LA metaphysique, 
etc. ( t;a j' essaierai de le dire 
une fois de plus et 
autrement) ni me me L' envoi, 
mais des envois s a n s 
destination. 
daringly general terms. 
For he is extremely careful 
with expressions such 
the tradition, t h e 
metaphysics as onto-
theology, the philosophy 
tympan, ix: peut-on 
traiter de Ia philo-
sophie (I a meta-
as absolute, totalitarian knowledge, the 
as physique, voire I' onto-
theo/ogie) sans se 
laisser deja dieter, 
avec cette pretension d 
I' unicite, Ia Iota/itt! 
imprenable et impe-
riale d'un ordre? S'il y 
a des marges, y a-t-il philosophy of 
encore une philo-
sophie, laphilo-
sophie? presence or identity. Such generalities are never used 
by Derrida without the necessary reserve or nuance. 
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Yet in spite of this important restriction, which we are yet to acknowledge, it 
is still mainly against the background of the Hegelian concept of philosophy 
as an embracing, absolute 
tympan, viii: (Hegel, encore, toujours) 
system of knowledge (das System 
Philosophy Beside Itself, p. 46: Hegel is 
der Wissenschaft ) that we can the philosopher of the philosophic tradition; 
in his writing that tradition is closed and 
begin to situate and understand the fulfilled, consummated. But this very act is 
also constitutive of that tradition, making it 
general interrogation that lies at visible as such and so open to what will 
necessarily appear as its "outside". Hegel 
the basis of the peculiar oeuvre creates what will be named the 
"metaphysical enclosure" ( Heidegger) and 
and specific interest of Derrida. It the "logocentric closure" (Derrida) ·to 
philosophize after Hegel is to do so from 
is especially this conception of somewhere else, somewhere from which that 
enclosure is in view; G p.: [Hegel]: dernier 
philosophy that he wants to philosophe du livre et premier 
penseur de l'ecriture. 
deconstruct. 
Philosophical knowledge (das Wissen; die Wissenschaft) is motivated and 
propelled by the infinity of understanding. Philosophy ·noblesse oblige· 
wants to understand any experience whatsoever in the light of an all-
embracing rational cohesion or totality. It wants to bring this cohesion to 
the surface, and to realize it on the level of the notion (das Begriff ). The 
notion is the realm of the Spirit (die Geist ), the world in which the Spirit, 
unlike an Abraham destined to err an c e, comes to its own and is finally at 
home, at its destination. In and through the notion the Spirit understands 
(begreift ) the other-than itself (as the other of itself); an object or world 
an exterior- which not only opposes the Spirit as a Gegen-stand, but which 
in a first moment- is also opposite and strange (fremdartig) to the realm of 
the Spirit. The world is contrary to, and in this sense other than the Spirit 
insofar as this world offers resistance to the Spirit and is as yet not fully 
understood. But by understanding (begreifen) this world, 
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this immediate (initial) contradiction loses its validity. Insofar as this world 
is understood, it is no longer radically opposite to, and no longer other than 
the realm of the Spirit, the world of the notion. The Spirit then recognizes 
itself in this world -as Odyssus could finally recognize himself throughout 
his vagaries, and pull himself together by narrating the story of his life, 
before coming back from where he started, 
appropriated in and by the notion and in this 
way is sublated (aufgehoben ) and incorporated 
(vereinseelt, one would have to say, or 
vereinleibt) into the realm of the Spirit. The 
world that is understood, is a spiritual world, a 
world of the Spirit. By 
Vorrede zur Grund· understanding the other-
lioieo der Philo-
sophie des Rechts, than-itself, 
p. 24: Was verniinftig 
ist, das ist wirklich; 
chez soi- the world is 
Vorrede, p. 29: Das reine 
Selbsterkennen im abso/uten 
Anderssein, dieser Ather 
als sole her, ist der Grund 
und Boden der Wissenschaft 
oder das Wissem im 
allgemeinen; cf. D i e 
Phiinomeoologie des 
Geistes, p. 146. 
and was wirklich ist. philosophical knowledge realizes (verwirk/icht ) itself 
das ist verniin/tig. 
and finds a concrete content. The Spirit recognizes its 
own rationality in reality. The rationality of reality is the very rationality 
of the notion. 
The Spirit realizes its own rationality in reality by understanding reality. 
Through the mediation of the other-than-itself philosophical knowledge 
thus comes to an understanding of itself. The reality which the Spirit 
understands, is a world in which the Spirit comes to an understanding of 
itself, and comes to its own notion. Absolute knowledge, which is only 
determined (be s ti mm t , destined) by itself, that is to say by the notion, is 
hence, on the one hand, a knowledge of the other (an objective knowledge) 
and, on the other hand, a realization of itself in this knowledge as complete 
self-knowledge. Since the notion realizes itself in the objectivity of the 
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world, this world is no longer really contrary to the V o r r e d e, p. 39: D i e 
Ungleichheit, die im 
Spirit. That appearance is understood as such, as Bewusstsein zwischem 
false h. 
Vorrede, p. 40: Das Falsche ware 
Andere, das Negative der Substanz, 
als Inhalt des Wissens das Wahre 
das 
die The 
ist. 
Aber die Substanz ist selbst wesentlich n o t 
das Negative [ .. ] 
world 
exterior 
dem lch und der Substanz, 
die sein Gegenstand ist, 
stattfindet, ist ihr 
Unterscheid, das 
is Negative ilberhaupt. [ ... ]-
Wenn nun dies Negative 
zuntichst als Ungleichheit 
des lchs zum Gegenstande 
an 
that erscheint, so ist es 
ebensosehr die 
could restrict or limit philosophical knowledge in Ungleichheit der Substanz 
zu sich selbst. Was 
the process of its self-unfolding. 
Hence my formulation of Derrida's interrogation. 
there a real, not merely apparent limitation 
ausser ihr vorzugehen, 
eine Tatigkeit gegen sie 
zu sein scheint, ist ihr 
Is eigenes Tun, und sie zeigt 
sich wesentlich Subjekt 
of zu sein. lndem sie dies 
absolute knowledge (absolute Wissen; savoir absolu) 
volkommen gezeigt, hat 
der Geist sein Dasein 
seinem Wesen 
possible? Could absolute knowledge -insofar as it is gleichgemacht; er ist sich 
Gegenstand, wie er ist, 
borne by the infinity of the notion- still be really und das abstrakte 
Element der 
determined and limited by an exterior (exteriority) - Unmittelbarkeit und der 
Trennung des Wissens 
a standpoint, a subject or an object outside of the und der Wahrheit ist 
ilberwunden. Das Sein ist 
absolute- without that exterior in turn being absolut vermittelt;- es ist 
substantieller lnhalt, der 
understood and seized (begriffen) in the gradually ebenso unmittelbar 
Eigentum des Ichs, 
progressing process of self-realization and self- selbstisch oder der 
Begriff ist. Hiermit 
unfolding of the notion? Is there still room for a beschliesst sich die 
Phtinomenologie des 
subject that brings to the surface an exterior that Geistes. 
cannot be understood and resolved by the absolute? 
This interrogation must simultaneously be elaborated on a threefold leveL 
Primo. What is the place, the position, the structure of a subject that wants to 
bring to the surface such an exterior? What sort of subject is this, who wants 
to point to an exterior that cannot and must not become an object of 
knowledge? Is that subject a subject other than das Absolute? That subject 
wants to be and must be outside of (exterior to) das Absolute if it is to bring to 
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the surface anything at all that cannot be localised and determined by d as 
Absolute. How can such a locus be localised and determined by das Absolute ? 
Won't that subject be precisely the realization (V e rw i rkl i c hung) of the total 
intelligibility which das Absolute wants to achieve? Won't that subject 
complete and realize in that very moment what das Absolute could up to then 
only partially realize? For that subject understands, then, more than does d as 
Absolute. Moreover, what could and will prevent or arrest absolute 
knowledge from understanding, after the event, the place of that subject -
which at first seemed to be outside of das Absolute- as a standpoint in and 
through which das Absolute comes to an enriched and final knowledge of 
itself? 
Secundo. What is or what could be that exterior that falls out of the range of 
das Absolute? Supposing that one could bring to the surface an exterior that 
cannot be brought into presence by the absolute subject but can be by that 
other subject. After all, has one not to see something in order to see that 
there is something that cannot be understood by das Absolute? But what will 
arrest the absolute subject from integrating this new presence, in a second 
moment, into itself as a moment in and of the infinite self-unfolding of the 
notion (die Selbst-Verwirklichung des Begriffs )? In other words, is there an 
exterior possible which would be something 
G, p. 442: Ce qui altere 
other than a supplementary replenishment /e nerf vivant de Ia 
of the all embracing system of 
langue [ ... ] n' a done 
d as surtout pas lieu. 
Moins que rien et Absolute? Either that exterior is something, pourtant, a en 
and then it can at least in principle become juger par ses 
determined, known and understood. 
effets, beaucoup 
But plus que rien. 
then nothing is in the way of integrating it 
into the all embracing system of das Absolute. 0 r it cannot be determined, 
and then it must be a rather undetermined nothing, 
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nicht etwas daseiendes. But in that case it seems that absolute knowledge 
need not be bothered, and need not concern itself with it at all. Is there a 
third possibility which escapes this alternative? 
Tertia. What is the nature of the discourse, the knowing that wants to curtail 
the totalizing drive of das Absolute without in tum being lapped up by the 
logic of the notion? That discourse wants to determine and limit the all 
embracing system, in 
interpreted from the 
such a way that this limitation cannot in turn be 
system onwards as an additional step towards a 
definitive realization of all embracing intelligibility. The system of d as 
Absolute would then be limited by something other than itself, that is to say, 
by a discourse that is 'other', and in this way does not correspond (or 
conform) to the logical structure of absolute knowledge, das absolute Wissen. 
But is such a discourse possible? Let me elaborate this latter facet of Derrida's 
interrogation from the perspective of Martin Heidegger. 
Philosophy has always been a philosophy of presence: being is being-
present to a subject. It is only in Hegel that this presence is realized, on the 
level of das Begriff, as absolute self-presence; a presence that is not 
disturbed by anything, by no absence whatsoever. Can we -so I could 
reformulate Derrida's interrogation from Heidegger onward- in turn 
determine the project of understanding being as being-present, as a 
particular project, as one amongst all possible projects, that is allotted to us 
by the dispatch of an unfathomable Seinsgeschick, as a particular manner to 
relate ourselves to that Ge sc hick, as a historically determined process that 
originates somewhere (in or with Plato) and the end of which is gradually 
drawing near (since or with Hegel), as a project that at some (future) stage 
we will be able to leave behind us definitively, once and for all? But can such 
a project be replaced by a project of a different kind, for instance by a 
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philosophy of absence? Yet can being be thought otherwise than as being-
present? Is not an absence, as soon as it is thought, necessarily brought into 
presence and reduced to a being-present? Is there a discourse, a sort of 
knowing, a philosophical programme or tractatus possible that can get away 
with this fundamental project? 
De /'i!conomie restreinte cl 
l'i!conomie gi!ni!rale, p. 383: Furthermore, what is the logic, the grammar of a 
II n'y a qu'un discours. il est 
significatif et Hegel est ici discourse that states that this project is itself only 
incontournable; tympan, p. 
ii: A le penser comme tel, cl a particular project? Can such a knowing still 
le reconnaftre, on le manque. 
On se Ia ri!approprie, on en justify itself logically? 
dispose. on le manque ou 
plutot on manque (de) le 
manquer, ce qui, quant cl Let me summarize this obsessive interrogation 
/'autre, revient toujours au 
me me; Hegel, Ia mort et le undertaken by Derrida and Heidegger as follows. 
sacrifice, p. 344-45: En fait. 
/'homme est toujours cl Ia Is not any opposition between an interior 
poursuite d'une souveraineti! 
authentique. [ ... ]Nous verrons (presence) and an exterior (absence) in and by 
qu'il poursuivit de plusieurs 
faqons ce qui se di!robait the movement of das Absolute -a movement that 
toujours cl lui. L"essentiel 
etant qu'on ne peut knows only the quietude and stability of the 
l'alteindre consciemment e t 
/e chercher, car Ia recherche movement itself- necessarily 
/' i!loig ne. 
Vorrede, p. 26: Allein, wie auch Aristoteles die Natur 
a/s das zweckmiissige Tun bestimmt, der Zweck ist das Unmittelbare, Ruhende, das 
Unbewegte, welches selbst bewegend ist; so ist es Subjekt. Seine Kraft, zu bewegen, 
abstrakt genommen, ist das Fiirsichsein oder die reine Negativitiit. Das Resultat ist nur 
darum dasselbe, was der Anfang, wei/ der Anfang Zweck ist,- oder das Wirkliche ist 
nur darum dasselbe. was sein Begriff. wei/ das Unmitte/bare als Zweck das Selbst oder 
die reine Wirklichkeit in ihm selbst hat. Der ausgefuhrte Zweck oder das daseinde 
Wirkliche ist Bewegung und entfaltetes Werden; eben diese Unruhe aber ist das Se/bst. 
The Unruhe is over-all controlled by a teleologically gesicherte or rhetorically 
geforderte 'Zuruckgang' or Wiederkehr' 'in die Einfachkeit'. Lettre, disons, devant 
arriver, et a destination! 
sublated (aufgehoben) and reduced to an opposition within the absolute 
system, in such a way that the opposition between itself (das System der 
Wissenschaft) and an exterior (that cannot be integrated into the system) is 
in fact dissolved? Can philosophy really hold out, endure and think the 
tension with an unsublatable exteriority? Is the system of absolute 
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rationality invulnerable and insensitive to any exteriority whatsoever? In 
short, should the relation between identity and non-identity be thought 
from identity onward or as an unsublatable difference? Can difference be 
the object of any philosophical knowing? 
Derrida wants to trace an exteriority and activate it in such a way that it 
confronts philosophy, from within, with its own defectiveness, failure and 
vulnerability; that is to say, an exteriority which renders philosophy -at its 
culminating point, as it climaxes, armed in the most potent and tricking way 
imaginable- at the same time impotent and utterly defenceless. If this 
exteriority is to be truly effective, then it should not in tum be recuperable 
within the logic of the notion and within (a) metaphysics of presence. It 
will therefore have to correspond or conform to three formal conditions. 
Primo. What escapes the potence (Macht) of the self-realizing system of the 
notion, can and should not essentially be something, not a being of which 
can be said what it is, not an object that can be determined and known in a 
purely theoretical way. This exterior can and should essentially not be an 
object dressing itself in front of the knowing subject, not a being which we 
can see more or less clearly, not a hidden presence which can be gradually 
unveiled by a subject of knowing. For 
Vorrede, p. 28: Dies Anundfilrsichsein 
aber ist es erst filr uns oder an sich, es as soon as it is about an exterior that 
ist die geistige Substanz. Es IIWSS dies 
auch fUr sich selbst, muss das Wissen can be defined, an exterior the essence 
von dem Geistigen und das Wissen von 
sich als dem Geiste sein, d.h. es muss of which can be aniculated, it can also 
integrated into 
sich als Gegenstand sein, aber ebenso 
unmittelbar als aufgehobener, in sich be 
reflektierter Gegenstand. 
system of knowing. 
an embracing 
It must be about 
an exterior that irrevocably ties knowing to a radical not-knowing: a not-
knowing (un non-savoir) that is not to be (mis)taken for a provisional not-
yet-knowing. One consequence of this is that the traditional division 
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subject-object is essentially inadequate and hence problematic when it 
comes to thinking the relation to such an exterior. 
Secunda. It can and should not be an exterior that menaces the interiority of 
the system merely from the outside, for a menace that comes merely from 
the outside can easily be neutralized: such an exterior can easily be kept at a 
distance, outside, and thrust down. It must therefore be about a truly 
menacing exterior which accomplishes 
itself always in the system. Put differently, 
it must be about an exterior that is out o f 
itselfwithin the system, an exterior in the 
interior, an exterior exceeding 
itself exorbitantly. It follows that classical 
logic, which requires that the exterior be 
outside of the interior and be separated and 
distinguishable from it, is essentially 
inadequate and should therefore be put into 
question when it comes to thinking the 
relation to the exterior which Derrida has 
in mind. 
G, p. 52: Le dehors entretient avec 
le dedans un rapport qui, comme 
toujours, n'est rien mains que de 
simple exteriorite. Le sens du 
dehors a toujours ete dans le dedans. 
prisonnier hors du dehors, et 
reciproquement"; G, p. 308 : if [le 
supplement dangereux] viendrait du 
dehors qui serait simplement dehors. 
Ce qui est conforme a Ia /ogique de 
l'identite et au principe de /'ontologie 
classique (le dehors est dehors, 
l'etre est, etc.) mais non a Ia /ogique 
de Ia supplementarite, qui veut que 
le dehors soil dedans, que /'autre et 
le manque viennent s'ajouter comme 
un plus qui remplace un mains, que ce 
qui s'ajoute a que/que chose tienne 
lieu du defaut de cette chose, que /e 
defaut comme dehors du dedans soit 
deja au-dedans du dedans, etc .. 
Tertia. It should, finally, be about an exteriority which causes or promotes a 
radical failure of any intentional meaningconstructive (Sinn g eben de) 
activity. The exteriority must expose the meaning of a system from within to 
a radical loss of meaning; that is to say, a loss to which no new meaning can 
be given, a loss of meaning that 
De /' economie restreinte a /' economie gt!nerale, 
is experienced as meaningless. p. 383: Le pot!tique ou I' extatique est ce qui 
dans tout discours peut s' ouvrir d Ia perte 
absolue de son sens, au (sans) fond de sacre, de 
The bar or limit between the non-sens, de non-savoir ou de jeu, a Ia perte de 
connaissance dont il se reveille par un coup de 
exterior and the interior which is des. 
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put at stake! by the exterior is the uncontrollable limit of meaningfulness 
and meaninglessness. 
In order to perform this paradoxical and almost impossible task Derrida will 
have to construct his text according to a very special style, logic, and 
grammar. 
It is not in itself difficult to 
write a text that escapes the 
logic of the notion and self-
consciousness. But such a 
discourse will consist, then, 
of a hotchpotch of 
incoherent connections, 
De l'economie restreinted l'economie generale, p. 
384: En tant que manifestation du sens. le discours 
est done Ia perte mi!me de Ia souverainete. La 
servilite n'est done. que le desir du sens: 
proposition avec laquelle se serait confondue 
l'histoire de Ia philosophie; proposition determinant 
le travail comme sens du sens, et Ia techne comme 
deploiement de Ia verite; proposition qui se serait 
puissament rassemblie dans le moment hegelien et 
que Bataille, dans Ia trace de Nietzsche, aurait 
portee a enonciation, dont il aurait decoupe Ia 
denonciation sur /e sans-fond d'un impensab/e 
non-sens, Ia mettant en/in en jeu majeur. Le jeu 
mineur consistant a attribuer encore un 
arbitrary associations and sens, dans /e discours, il /'absence de sens. 
gratuitous ideas, und ist 
darum von einer Art, die die Philosophie verschmiihen muss2. Such a style 
of writing will only be viewed from within the rationality of philosophical 
knowing as an incarnation of pure irrationality, a lapse into the utter I y 
subphilosophica[3. Such a discourse will deviate so 
G , p. 222: Presque 
inconcevable: Ia simple 
irrationalite, le 
contraire de Ia raison 
sont mains irritants et 
deroutants pour Ia 
logique classique. 
much from the discourse of the notion as regards 
style, tonality, rhetoric, logic and grammar, that the 
difference will be indifferent. This type of difference 
could not really affect philosophy, effectively, from 
within. Philosophy will remain insensitive and 
I Mise en jeu, en feu -par une permutation d laquelle il faut ici s'excercer, Ia double 
seance, p. 61 n36; cf. also ibid., pp. 309-10, and Sarah Kofman, LsD, p. 43. 
2 W.F.G. Hegel, Vorrede (PMnomenologie), p. 44. 
3 W. Kaufman, Hegel: Texts and Commentary, p. 71. 
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invulnerable to such a (pseudo)radical break-out. The deviation and attempt 
to undermine is too coarse to be really effective. Philosophical rationality 
won't even recognize itself in such a break-out. This type of discourse will 
simply be rejected and confined to an exterior which philosophy indeed has 
nothing to do with. It will finally be considered as a regress or fall to a level 
of irrationality which philosophy has left 
behind itself and understood long before. Monthy Python's Flying 
Circus: Just The Words, V o I 
2, pp. 87-8: Man I came here for a 
Yet on the other hand, Derrida does not good argument. Mr Vibrating No 
you didn't, you came here for an 
want to point out the logical inconsistencies argument. Man Well, an argument 
in a philosophical exposition 
rarely refutes argumentations. 
either. is not the same as contradiction. He Mr Vibrating It can be. Man No 
it can't. An argument is a 
connected series of statements to 
He does not replace a train of thought with a 
establish a definite proposition. 
Mr Vibrating No it isn't. Man 
Yes it is. It isn't just 
better logical argumentation. contradiction. Mr Vibrating His style is Look, if I argue with you I must 
take up a contrary position. M a n 
reminiscent rather of psycho-analytical But it isn't just saying 'No it isn't'. 
Mr Vibrating Yes it is. M a n 
Neither does he want to offer No 1·t isn't, argument is an treatment4. 
intellectual process .. contradiction 
all sorts of supplementary replenishments. is just the automatic gainsaying of 
anything the other person says. 
For, in so doing, Derrida would fall back into Mr Vibrating No it isn't. 
that which he wants to undermine: his 
discourse and texts would not, then, be repelled, but accepted with gratitude 
4 Arbeit; the affinity with Freud does not reside in what Freud states explicitly but, 
rather, in the attentiveness for what is, encore autrement, bien sur, outre, trow!, 
symptomatique, in a text; cf. Sarah Kofman, Un philosophe <<unheimlich>>, LsD, p. 95, 
"Si /'attention au <<rebut>> reteve d'une ecoute analytique, Derrida, pour rendre compte 
de Ia subversion qu'il opere, ne s'en tient pas cl Ia notion psychoanalytique de 
deplacement, ,see also Pos, p. 15 : "Ecriture [ ... ] qui donne cl lire /es philosophemes. 
et par suite tous les textes comme des sortes de symptomes (mot que je suspecte bien 
sur) de que/que chose qui n'a pas pu se presenter dans l'histoire de Ia philosophie [ .. ]"; 
in the end there might be no Derridean analyses that is not overdetermined by Freudian 
metapsychology. 
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and integrated as a supplementary step towards the total realization of 
absolute knowing. The defectiveness and impotence with which Derrida 
wants to confront philosophy forms a negativity that cannot be filled up by 
anything or anyone. 
A style of writing that effectively disjoints the Entre crochets, p. 93: interet, 
pretrise de I' interprete es 
logic of a text and lifts it out of its hinges, is parodies, interpretrise. Non, 
Ia parodie suppose toujours 
parody, the caricatural double (Doppelganger) of quelque part une naivete, 
adossee d un inconscient, et 
a text. In parody the original remains le vertige d' une non-
maftrise, une perte de 
immediately recognizable; that is why parody is connaissance. La parodie 
absolument calcutee serait 
not immediately thrust down. une confession ou une table 
de Ia loi. 
Parody produces a difference that is not a 
difference. But in this paradoxical 
interval of a difference with no difference 
De I' economie restreinte d there 
I' economie generale, p. 374: E t 
d' abord Ia difjerence entre Ia 
maftrise et Ia souverainete. On ne 
peut miime pas dire que cette 
difference a un sens: elle est Ia 
difference du sens, I' intervalle 
unique qui separe le sens d' un 
certain non·sens. 
De I' economie restreinte d I' economie 
generale, p. 370:Car au bout de cette nuit 
que/que chose s' erait trame, aveuglt!ment, 
je veux dire dans un discours, par quai 
s' achevant Ia philosophie comprenait en 
soi, anticipait, pour les retenir aupres 
de soi, routes les figures de son au-dela, 
toutes les formes et routes les ressources 
de son dehors. Par Ia simple prise de 
leur enonciation. Hormis peut-iitre un 
certain rire. Et encore. 
laughter (eclat de rire). 
can be released -when parody is 
Hors livre, p. 62: L'exces aventureux 
d'une ecriture qui n'est pas dirigee par 
un savoir ne s'abandonne pas a 
/'improvisation. Le hasard ou le coup de 
des qui <<ouvrent>> un tel texte ne 
contredisent pas Ia m!cessite rigoreuse 
de son agencement forme/. Le jeu est ici 
/'unite du hasard et de Ia regie, du 
programme et de son reste ou son 
surplus. 
successful- a maximal distance that has 
as an energetic effect, a 
total disturbance, totally disrupting the 
text from within: the disturbance 
which is produced by an outburst of 
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My Chances/Mes Chances, p. 4: I shall cast out 
two questions, then. Once these questions are 
cast, imagine that suddenly (d'un seul coup) 
they become two dice. Nterwards(apres-coup), 
when they have fallen, we shall try to see, if 
something still rem to be seen, at what sum 
they arrive between them: in other words, what 
their constellation means. And whether one 
can read my fortune (mes chances) or yours. 
The parody of a 
consists in a perfect 
imitation, doubling or 
The character which is 
is 
character 
repetition, 
mimesis. 
parodied, 
immediately recognizable. The difference is barely noticeable; one can 
hardly say in precisely what the difference consists. In this way the 
reading and writing of Derrida are a repetition, a doubling, an almost literal 
reproduction of another text; the sentence structure, the choice of 
expressions are respected even in the smallest details. The distance between 
the two texts is as minimal as possible5. Parody is only possible on the basis 
of a maximal attentiveness and sensitivity to the 
character: each action is thoroughly analyzed; De I' economie restreinte a 
I' economie generate, p. 377: 
nothing is overlooked; the smallest detail, Ressemblant a une figure 
[dans I' enchafnement de Ia 
characteristic, trait, facial expression, phenomenologie], trait par 
trait, elle en est I' alteration 
gesticulation is registered; the wording and style absolue. Difflirence qui ne se 
produirait pas si I' analogie 
of speaking are retained integrally both se limitait d tel ou tel trait 
abstrait. 
intonation, 
grammar and the content and choice of words 
are repeated with the greatest attention, care and precision. And yet it is 
repeated in such a way that a shift of accent is occasioned: the repeated 
iterates in a different context, in a different frame, and this displacement of 
context completely disjoints [zerrisst] the original. 
5 Cf. Pos, p. 12 : il faut surtout lire et retire ceux dans les traces desquelles j'ecris, les 
<<livres>> dans les marges desquelles j'ecris et entre les /ignes desquels je dessine et 
dechiffre un text qui est a Ia jois tres ressemblant et tout autre. 
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.. unfaithful in its faithfulness: La carte 
postale, p. 29: Je suis un 
monstre de fidtHite, 
l'infidele le plus pervers. 
Parody is directed to those 
characteristics in which the character 
is most vulnerable: her facial 
expression, her appearance6. Likewise, Derrida's reading and writing is 
characterized by an enormous respect for the material externality of a text; 
he is scrupulously careful not to let slip away a single detail from his 
sensitive gaze; punctuation marks, peculiar turns of phrase, titles, divisions 
and even the signature in the text are registered meticulously. But in the 
repetition the frame is altered: in G Ia s Hegel is literally placed on the same 
page as Genet. And in this chasm an unsublatable distance and 
De I' economie restreinte d I' economie generate, 
p. 382-83: En doublant Ia maftrise, Ia 
souverainete n' echappe pas d Ia dialectique. 
[ .. ]Loin d' interrompre Ia dialectique, I' histoire 
et le mouvemenl du sens, Ia souverainete donne 
d /' economie de Ia raison son element, son 
milieu, ses bordures Loin de supprimer Ia 
synthese dialectique, e//e /'inscrit et Ia fait 
fonctionner dans le sacrifice du sens. 
estrangement 7 can still take 
place. In the repetition a text is 
stripped of its peculiarity 
(property, propriete, identity). 
Parody is only possible on the 
basis of a generous love and a 
great respect for the character; it 
requires a direct involvement with, and a physical proximity to, that 
character. But parody is at the same time shameless; it leaves nothing 
untouched; everything is contaminated; nothing remains standing 
(/'erection -tombe); it profanes and desecrates; it is disrespectful in its 
respect, unfaithful in its faithfulness. 
6 That is : question de style; qual que//e, pp. 352-53 : Le timbre de ma voix, le style de 
mon ecriture, c'est ce qui pour (un) moi n'aura jamais ere pTI!sent ... Si mon style se 
marque, c'est sur une face qui me reste invisible, illisible. Point de speculum : j'y suis 
aveug/e d mon style, sourd au plus spontane de ma voix; cf. Nabokov, Common-sense and 
the art of literature, and the de Montherlant one-liner. 
7 Expropriation, desapproximation, theft (vo/ ). 
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And this paradoxical interval explodes in a(n) (out)burst of laughter (eclat 
de rire). Nowhere else are we so touched 
by the nullity, the futility of a character than in parody. In parody the 
distinction between original and copy is about to disappear or dissolve. A 
good parody makes itself forgotten as parody. Is it real or not real? The 
character herself or an imitation? Mask or real face? When Derrida quotes 
Hegel, is that still really Hegel or not8? 
Every now and then9 Reb Derrissa succeeds in bringing about this effect: 
an outburst of laughter. Reason is defenceless against this laughter; this 
laughing is totally disarming; no arm, no argument, no law is powerful 
enough to reduce this laughter to silence I 0. And the more reason defends 
itself against this laughter, the more futile, the more derisory and laughable 
it becomes. The double provokes, not mild, ironical laughter, nor aggressive 
8 Cf. Sarah Kofman, LsD, p. 85 : "[ ... ] l'indecidable est par excellence unheimlich 
atopique, sans foyer ni patrie, ne revenant jamais au pere." 
9 In so far as parody is itself an effect of style it follows that Derrida must lose himself 
in his writing and that, thus, parodic effects cannot be produced at will: Derrida 
calculates -with what, obliquely, deregulates calculation; cf. My Chances!Mes Chances, 
p.4: We certainly count on the calculating capacity of language, with its code and game, 
with what regulates its play and plays with its regulations; p. 16: My clinamen, my luck, 
or my chances (mes chances) are what lead me to think of the clinamen beginning with 
the divisibility of the mark. 
10 Cf. Sarah Kofman, LsD, p. 96: Derrida, philosophe <<unheimlich>>, de /'ecart, de 
/'ecartelement, de Ia mise a l'ecart, catastrophique et <<monstrueux>> (Cf. Gramm., pp. 
57, 61,62), fait perdre toute defense, [my emphasis; BB]; cf. also La carte postale, p. 
64: Le surarmement, mon doux amour, voila ce qui nous a rendus fous, le surarmement 
aphrodisiaque du discours, pas le notre mais I' arsenal des raisons, Ia logistique dont 
nous nous etions pourvus; if Derrida's texts can be so disarming, that has also something 
to do, then, with the fact that his writings are not strikingly argumentative. 
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laughter, but instead, the roars and peals of a laughter which catches one 
off-balance. A laughter which, in and through repetition, imitation, is 
touched by the nullity, the futility of what we take so seriously and what we 
have to take so seriously, jusqu'en son terme, in order to be able to laugh 
about it. Laughing is not a lucid act of consciousness that distances itself 
from its object; the object is not put at a distance, in front of consciousness, 
and in this distance contemplatively neutralized 11. Indeed distance is 
developed in laughter, but this distance is not the effect of a transparent 
Sartrian gaze, of an endlessly neant -izing pour soi. By the eclat de rire 
reason (dire, discourse), rationality itself sinks away into nullity, a 
negativity that is of a different order than the negativity of consciousness. 
Nowhere is reason confronted more with its futility and ultimate nullity 
than in laughter. In laughter reason experiences, goes through its own 
decline, no longer knowing where it has it, and in this decline nothing is 
'pitied', instead one laughs about it. No, it is not truth and insight in the true 
reality which philosophy finds at its completion, am Schlusse. 
11 Cf. My Chances/Mes Chances, p. 5:The ob-
jectum (ob-jet) is kept under view and, within 
sight or intui tus. while it puts a handle on the 
hand or conceptus, the Begreifenor Begriff. [ .. ] 
Grasping everything in advance, anticipation 
(antipare, ante-capere) does not let itself be taken 
by surprise; there is no chance for it; cf. also L a 
carte postale, p. 90-1: Ce malheur sans fond, le 
desastre de cette chance, je comprends que les 
autres n' arrivent pas d le supporter, il est 
Ach. es sind nicht nur die Dichter 
und ihre schonen "lyrischen 
Gefuhle", an denen dieser Wieder-
Erstandene seine Bosheit auslassen 
muss: wer weiss. was fur ein Opfer 
er sich sucht, was fur ein Unthier 
von parodischem Stoff ihn in 
Kurze reizen wird? "lncipit T r a 
g o d i a" -heisst es am Schlusse 
dieses bedenklich-unbedebklichen 
Buchs: man sei auf seiner Hut! 
lrgend etwas ausbundig Schlimmes 
und Boshaftes kundigt sich an: 
incipit p a r o d i a, es ist kein 
Zweifel .. , Vorrede zur zweiten 
Ausgabe par 2, Die Frohliche 
Wissenschaft. 
insupportable et moi-meme je ne cherche pas d le supporter. On ne peut que s' essouffler 
a en avoir raison (d'oil Ia raison, qui n'est rien d'autre, mais avec elle nous 
ne nous aimons pas). 
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but un eclat de rire. One does not laugh at truth; one laughs because it is all 
nothing(ness), non-verite, femme, Baubo.12 Like in death and Angst (M. 
Heide gger 13 ), in laughter (Nietzsche, Freud 14, Bataille15, Derrida) it is about 
12 Cf. Sarah Kofman, BaubiJ: Theological Perversion and Fetishism. 
13 As laughter will burst out infra, in the context of an analysis of the dynamics of the 
caress, the following passing from Was ist Meta physik?, in which Heidegger relates 
the revelation of beings as a whole to a structural moment in our relationship to the 
beloved, is worthwile quoting: Die tie[e Langeweile, in den Abgriinden des Daseins wie 
ein schweigender Nebel hin· und herziehend, ruckt aile Dinge. Menschen und einem 
selbst mit ihnen in eine merkwiirdige G/eichgu/tigkeit zusammen. Diese Langeweile 
of[enbart das Seinde im Ganzen. Eine andere Moglichkeit so/cher Offenbarung birgt die 
Freude an der Gegenwart des Daseins -nicht der blossen Person- eines geliebtes 
Menschen. So/ches Gestimmtsein, darin einem so und so >>ist<<, lii.sst uns -von ihm 
durchstimmt- inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen befinden. Die Be[indlichkeit der 
Stimmung enthiillt nicht nur je nach ihrer Weise das Seinde im Ganzen, sondern dieses 
Enthiillen ist zugleich -weit ent[ernt von einem b/ossen Vorkommnis- das 
Grundgeschehen unseres Da-seins; the Freude we take in the presence of the loved one 
must therefore be rather instable. It is perhaps through the Angst heraus (see n. 15 and 
17 below) that /'eclat de rire can take over. 
14 Cf. Sarah Kofman, L'enfance de l'art, in particular La vie comme jeu, pp. 225-31. 
15 De l'economie restreinte d /'economie genera/e. pp. 370-71: Rire de Ia philosophie 
(du hegelianisme) - tel/e est en effet Ia forme du reveil - [ ... ] Et encore, par moments 
priviligits qui sont mains des moments que des mouvements toujours esquisses de 
/'experience, rares, discrets, Iegers, sans niaiserie triomphante, loin de Ia place 
publique, tout pres de ce dont rit le rire: de I' angoisse d' abord, qu'il ne [aut meme pas 
appeler /e negatif du rire [ ... ] De puis plus d' un siecle de ruputures, de < <depassements> > 
avec ou sans <<renversements>>, rarement rapport d Hegel fut aussi peu definissable: une 
complicite sans reserve accompagne le discours hegelien, le <<prend au serieux>> 
jusqu'en son terme, sans objection de forme philosophique, cependant q u' u n 
certain eclat de rire I' excede et en ditruit le sens, signale en tout cas Ia 
pointe d'<<experience>> qui le disloque lui-m~me; ce qu'on ne peut [aire qu'd bien viser 
et d savoir de quoi on rit. The angoisse is further qualified as the absolutely comical: 
Le comique absolu. c'est l'angoisse devant Ia depense d fonds perdus, devant le sacrifice 
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our relation to nothing (das Nichts); but unlike in Angst, one now laughs, 1 e 
rire eclate 16: 
Und falsch heisse uns jede Wahrheit, bei der es nicht ein 
Geliichter gab17 . 
absolu du sens: sans retour ni reserve (p. 272). It would seem that this motif of 
l'angoisse could be related to what M. Blanchot, in a fragment of Fragmenraire, describes 
as /'angoisse de lire: The dread of reading: it is that every text, no matter how important 
and how interesting it may be (and the more it gives the impression of being so), is 
empty -it does not exist at bottom (trans!. by A. 
Interpretation, p. 183). In Spurs/Eperons (p. 132) 
Warminski, Readings in 
Derrida relates the suspense 
of reading to the possibility that the secret may always fall short. An affirmative 
reading demands that one follows a text beyond the possibility of recognition or 
recollection, of interiorization, towards those corners where it no longer means to say 
anything at all. In eroticism, the same paradoxical double movement (cf. La carte 
postale, p. 34 and p. 156) seems to structure the gesture of the lover (cf. infra). It 
would not seem inappropriate, therefore, to suggest that the motif of the angoisse, in De 
/'economie restreinte a /'economie generate should be rapproched to the <<J' ai peur>> in 
Glas, p. 43 (cf. also Ja, ou le faux-bond, p. ll2), and the <<angoisse>> and <<peur>> in the 
Envoi s: reading and eroticism might be borne by a analogous dynamics, sharing 
analogous possibilities of aberrations, and sharing equal possibilities of affirmation. 
16 De /'economie restreinte a /'economie generate, p. 370. 
17 Also spracb Zaratbustra, Dritter Teil, Von a/ten und neuen Tafeln, no. 23; cf. 
Die froblicbe Wissenscbaft, Erstes Buch, no. 1: Uber sich se/ber lachen, wie man 
/achen musste, um aus der ganzen Wahrheit heraus zu /achen,-dazu hatten bisher die 
Besten nicht genug Wahrheitssinn und die Begabtesten vie/ zu wenig Geniej Dann, wenn 
der Satz "Die Art ist Alles, Einer ist immer Keiner" -sich der Menschheit einverleibt 
hat und Jedem Jederzeits der Zugang zu dieser letzten Befreiung und 
Unverantwortlichkeit offen steht. Vielleicht wird sich dann das Lachen mit der 
Weisheit verbundet haben, veilleicht giebt es dann nur noch ''frohliche Wissenschaft". 
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Derrida punctiliously follows the different paths and possible exits in a text. 
He follows them until they become wrong ways: not paths or ways that would 
fulfill the promise of arriving at an ultimate bright spot (the transparence 
of un signifie transcendental), but cuts-de-sac, paths that have a dead end, 
that come to nothing (Holzwege?), a labyrinths of ways in which we 
hopelessly lose our way. And he 
is still there to laugh! He follows 
tracks till we get off the track. He 
makes connections that are 
'literally in the text', and that 
undo the logical connections; he 
radicalizes the possibilities till 
from within they become 
impossible and we are faced with 
St. Melville, Philosophy Beside Itself, p. 
82-3: The central pursuit of our sovereignty 
can only lead to ever more extreme 
affirmations of what escapes our discourse, 
from our projects and our calculations. For 
Bataille these are affirmations that embrace 
shit and sacrifice and, above all, laughter -not 
only as it escapes its submission to discourse 
and project, but also as it affirms the comic 
(im)possibility of our sovereignty, intimicy, 
and communication. With this last "the idea of 
seriousness itself" is indeed threatened -in, as 
it were, its own name. 
the impossible. He does not bring a text to its possible completion, or truth, 
but to its decline, its fundamental impossibility. Derrida repeats and imitates 
texts. He repeats Hegel and takes him completely 
serious, jusqu' en son terme. He repeats himself; 
Derrida, a caricature of himself. -How laughable 
philosophy can be if we take it very seriously! 
Derrida must avoid that philosophy immediately 
Vl. Nabokov, Nikolai Gogo!, 
p. 144: -and one likes to 
recall that the difference 
between the comic side of 
things, and their cosmic side, 
depends upon one sibilant. 
says Fort against his writing; but he equally wants to escape the in-taking 
Da. Neither Fort nor Da; but at the same time both Fort and Da, outside and 
inside, here and there. One cannot really localize Derrida; neither repel nor 
incorporate him. In this undecidable interval Derrida reads and writes, 
dragging philosophy with him into this abyss . There is nothing we can do 
with Derrida; and still he haunts us. 
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<<L'economie abusive>> de Ia De l'economie restreinte a l'economie generale, p. 377: 
dif[erance (descelle) les De ce rire, Ia <<philosophie>> qui <<est un travail>> ne 
oppositions de I' impropre et peut rien faire, ne peut rien dire. 
du propre (ou du proche), les 
valeurs de propri.!te en 
general, de monument, de 
garde et de sepulture ( oikos' 
oiUsis: mais aussi du me me 
coup, pratiquement, cette He follows texts in their tracks, as a shadow, 
demarche brise, fracture ou 
viole Ia loi du propre, Ia Wanderer und Schatten, a double, Doppelganger. 
cloture de I' economie 
restreinte et circulante The experience of the perfect double is 
[ ... ]Effondrement du propre 
dans toutes les regions ou il unheimlichl8; what is familiar, what is proximal 
se produit. 
to us, becomes at the same time disconcertingly 
strange; the familiar (le propre) becomes doubled and halved, 
disappropriated, both proximal and unrecognizably remote19 
The tension, the difference from the double cannot be surmounted or 
sublated. A difference -an unequality to an uncontrollable exterior or an 
unsublatable absence- that leaves no traces in the text, in a philosophical 
work, in metaphysics, would be a difference that one could not trace. If 
absence, concealing itself in disclosure, does not draw traces of its absence 
in the present, then one could not track it down20. It is in and through 
symptoms that the unconscious announces itself to the subconscious 
18 La double seance, p. 300 n56: Dans Das Unheimliche, Freud, plus attentif que 
jamais a I' ambivalence indecidable, au jeu du double, a I' echange sans fin du fantastique 
et du reel, du 'symbolise' et du 'symbolisant', au proces de Ia substitution interminable 
peut sans contredire a ce jeu, en appeler et a I' angoisse de castration derriere laquelle 
ne se cacheraient aucun secret plus profond, aucune autre signification, et au rapport 
substitutif, par exemple entre I' oeil et le membre viril; cf. also ibid., p. 249 n25, and 
Sarab Kofman, Un philosophe <<unheimlich>>, LsD. 
19 In Glas Derrida succesfully occasions effects of unassailable alientation in the text 
of the philosopher who most radically has worked-over alienation. 
20 Cf. La differance, pp. 24-7. 
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(Vorbewusste) as that which is not present any M. Blancot, L'entretien 
infini, p. 390: Admettons ce 
more to the subconscious. But then this tie que porte cette 
rupture avec le 
rupture: 
langage 
between the interior and the exterior, between entendu comme ce qui 
represente; et avec le langage 
absence and entendu comme ce qui re9oit 
et donne le sens, et done 
aussi avec ce mixte 
presence, between immanence and signifiant-signifie qui a 
remplaci aujourd' hui, dans 
transcendence is itself a central issue in les distinctions (il est vrai 
deja passees) de Ia 
metaphysics. linguistique, I' ancienne 
division de Ia forme et du 
formute: dualite toujour s 
It is, however, characteristic of the metaphysical prhe cl s' unifier et telle que 
le premier terme rer;oit sa 
tradition that this tie, or the trace, has been primaute qu' en Ia restituant 
aussitOt en second dans 
interpreted as sign. The sign is the pre- lequel necessairement il se 
change -aussi Valiry [ cf. 
eminent middle, or means, to think and to qual quel/e [:]les sources de 
v a I e r y] caracterise Ia 
dominate the tension with abscence, and to litterature par sa forme, 
dis ant que c' est Ia forme qui 
neutralize it in this way the menace of abscence. fait le sens ou qui signifie, 
mais ce signifil! propre cl Ia 
Hence Derrida's question: in what respect can forme fait aussi de Ia forme 
ce qui n' a d' autre tache que 
the trace be thought as sign? What motivation d'exprimer ce nouveau sens: 
Ia coquille a beau d' etre vide, 
grounds this project21? And in what way, or to elle re9oit de ce vide Ia 
presence qui I' informe. 
what extent, can the analysis of the sign Rupture alors avec /e 
<<signe>>? Du moins, avec tout 
conception allow us to track 'something' that can ce qui reduirait /' ecriture cl 
se concevoir, comme le 
no longer be understood as sign of an absence? precise Foucault, il partir 
d' une theorie de Ia 
signification. 
21 Fr. Nietzsche, Das Problem des Sokrates, no. 6, 
Gotzen-Dammerung : Man wiihlt die Dia/ektik nur, wenn man kein andres Mittel 
hat[ ... ] Sie kann nur Notwehr sein, in den Hiinden solcher, die keine andren Waffen mehr 
haben; that Nietzsche is referring here to Socratic rather than Hegelian Dialectics, that -
come to that- about Hegel, Nietzsche ne connut guere qu' une vulgarisation de regie (G. 
Bataille, as quoted in De /' economie restreinte cl /' economie generate, p. 369) is perhaps 
less pertinent a point to observe that the simple and scandalous suggestion that a 
dynamics of as different kind than a conceptual one might secretly command any 
discursive move a thinker makes; Derrida takes this suggestion seriously, and will 
detect, underneath the apparently theoretically motivated subordination of -for 
instance- writing, a complex polemos of forces. 
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3./Perhaps, 
Desormais /es significations 
ne convergent pas vers la 
verite. Ce n'est pas e//e Ia 
grande affaire! L'etre 
n'arrive pas a etre jusqu'au 
bout: son train de matson en 
faillite demande de nouveau 
delais, un recours aux signes 
au sein d'un presence qui se 
de robe a elle-meme; mais 
dans /e signifiti de ces signes 
ne se produisent que des 
signes. La notion 
husserlienne de /'iteration 
infinie doni !'<<idee au sens 
kantien>> assurait, pour lui, 
Ia comprehension, ajourne 
sans cesse, Ia 
contemporaneite du signifiti 
avec une presence. Ce//e-ci, 
toujours indiquee, echappe a 
Ia prehension. D'ou l'usure 
du signifi<i. E//e libere un 
systeme de signes, de 
signifiants sans signifie, 
d'un langage que ne guide 
aucun plein sens. En guise 
de dissemination, se dit ainsi 
Ia differance en /aquelle Ia 
presence se dCconstruit, un 
ajournement sans echliances a 
• Ill accordance with 
Or c'est bien /'essence 
itrange du supplement que de 
n'avoir pas d'essentialite: it 
peut toujours n'avoir pas lieu. 
A Ia /ettre, it n'a d'ai//eurs 
jamais lieu: it n'est jamais 
present, ici, maintenant. S'il 
/'etait, it ne serait pas ce 
qu'i/ est, un suppll!ment, 
tenant /e lieu et maintenant 
Ia place de /'autre. Ce qui 
altere /e nerf vivant de Ia 
langue ( < <L 'ecriture, qui 
semble devoir fixer Ia langue, 
est precisement ce qui altere; 
e//e n'en change pas les mots 
mais /e genie>>) n'a done 
surtout pas lieu. Moins que 
rien et pourtant, a en 
juger par ses effets, 
beaucoup plus que rien. 
Le suppltiment n'est ni une 
presence ni une absence. 
Aucune ontologie ne peut en 
penser /'operation. 
respecter qu'est le temps ou, 
I 
a rich metaphysical tradition, one could give the 
p us exactement, qu'est /e 
passe-temps /ui-meme. Jeu 
dans tes interstices de l'etre following, rather general, definition of the 
oil les centres de gravitation sign 1. 
ne sont pas /es memes qu'au 
The sign insinuates itself in the place of 
monde. Mais y a-t-il something 
centres? Y a-t-il gravitation? 
Y a-t-il? Tout est autrement 
si on peut encore parler 
d'etre. (E.L) else, e.g. an object. We use signs in order to refer 
to something that itself is not actually present. 
1 Main references: La differance, Marges, pp. 9-10; La structure, /e signe et te jeu, 
L'ecriture et Ia difference, p. 412; Semiologie et grammatologie -entretien avec 
Julia Kristeva, Positions, pp. 28-35. 
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We would not have to use signs if the object itself were actually present to us, 
if it were wholly and immediately, or adequately present to us. The sign 
insinuates itself as a means, as an extra aid that offers assistance wherever 
and whenever presence (the 
object), of itself, falls shon. If the object cannot present itself in the flesh, 
at least it allows for being presented by something other than itself, the 
sign. In this sense the sign serves in the place of an other; it is a 
representative replacing something else. 
The sign is thus a substitute; yet it is also a supplement: it adds itself to 
something else; it serves as an additive filling a deficit of presence; it offers 
assistance and completion where that is needed, making up for that which in 
itself suffers a deficiency. 
The sign is also a material inscription. In that aspect of it that presents itself 
as a thing, as a being-present, the sign is a material presence which induces 
its own oblivion. Indeed, the sign should not draw attention to its own 
material density; it should obliterate itself to the extent that it should not 
first of all show itself but, rather, the very thing it is to represent. If one 
directs one's attention exclusively, or primarily, to the material externality 
of the sign, then one no longer takes the sign as sign. 
The sign creates a bond with an absence. It represents the object in its 
absence. It is in this sense that the sign can ensure that the absent object 
does not slide into insignificance, on mere account of its being absent. It is 
by vinue of the sign that what is absent nevenheless remains meaningful to 
us, and that we can still be interested in and concerned with it. 
The sign is evocative; it creates a tension and institutes a lack which we 
would like to fill up, it arouses a desire for something: namely, to see the 
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object itself in its liveliness, to touch it, to grasp it, to feel it, to embrace it, to 
envelop it, to incorporate it or to consume it; the desire to sojourn in the 
direct proximity of immediate presence. The sign evokes the desire for a no· 
longer-signifying, naked, pure and self-sufficient presence: the pristine 
proximity of an object that itself evokes nothing (more), that in turn is not 
itself a sign of something, and that is, thus, fully satisfying, leaving nothing 
left to be desired. 
Yet the sign temporalizes, and creates a distance: it defers the moment of 
direct contact. The desire for an immediate contact with the object has its 
origin in this deferment of satisfaction. The sign suspends immediacy2 , and 
in this suspension consists the experience of meaning. To take something as 
a sign is the prototype of the experience of meaning: the sign puts (us) in 
motion, stirs (us). It makes us long to attain something. The sign suggests 
the hidden presence of that which we would like to see with our own eyes; it 
suggests the hidden presence of that which we would like to grasp with our 
own hands. It evokes the ideal of a presence without signs; it makes us 
dream of direct contact with the real thing without mediation of surrogates, 
of signs. 
This ideal can be formulated in several ways, depending on the signifying 
practice in question: a presence without distance, a grasping without words, 
a body without supplementary signs, a seeing without additional 
2 Immediacy here alludes both to the hegelian night in which nothing can make its 
signifying appearance and which the sign, understood as the death of the thing, first 
suspends and to the freudian theme of the immediacy of satisfaction understood as the 
zero-reduction of all psychic tension. 
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references... It is the ideal which both frightened and stirred Rousseau3: a 
contact sans symbole ni supp/etif, Ia jouissance elle-meme. 
The classic conception of the sign should be understood against the 
background of this ideal4. It is therefore part of the structure and the 
essence of the sign qua sign that it is conceived of in terms of re-
presentation: a presence that is absent is re-presented, or made present 
again. 
The absent presence can be understood in two ways: 
- as an originary present, the presence of which was lost afterwards. The 
origin, the originary presence has disappeared, and what is left of it, the 
remainder, is a sign; yet the original presence, at the origin, was directly 
present to us (or at least to itself). In this scenario the sign is an essential 
source of sadness: what we really would like to see is no more, it has been 
lost, and what remains is but a supplement, a poor substitute. 
-as a final ultimate presence that we will be in a position to attain, in the 
future. The sign, in this scenario, raises expectations and makes us live: it 
brings us one step closer to the real reality that still hides in secrecy, that 
lies concealed in the distance, behind the veiling and network of signs. 
The direct presentation of the present is, thus, both arche and telos. Signs 
can be said to be comparatively better or worse, depending on whether they 
represent the original more accurately and adequately, and bring us closer 
to the ultimate presence or, on the contrary, widen the gap that separates us 
from that presence. 
3 G, p. 223. 
4 Pos, p. 30. 
It is against this background of an originary presence 
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that was lost, or a presence that already is, an sich, but is not yet given to us, 
that one can or must conceive of signs as either literal or figurative 
representations, either proper or improper representations, direct or 
indirect expressions or articulations of an originary and ultimate presence. 
What is now expressed merely figuratively can and should be expressed 
literally, with no loss of meaning or presence, in the future. The same 
signified can be externalized, by means of signifiers, either metaphorically, 
or nonmetaphorically, and this in such a way that nothing of the proper 
content and meaning of the original signified gets lost. Improper, 
figurative discourse can, in principle, always be avoided: there will be a time 
in which it can be avoided in all cases. For the time being, however, it 
obviously has to be avoided as much as possible since direct, unmediated 
contact is always more desirable and better than a supplementary detour 
through improper figuration -i.e. a guise that conceals far more than it 
unveils. 
However, though signs may be said to be comparatively better or worse they 
still remain deficient and incomplete: they are a surrogate, an Ersatz of what 
we really would like to see. 
As a material inscription the sign can never wipe itself out completely. It 
can never completely wipe out its own trace. The possibility that the 
reference to its other does not take place, or disappears, or even gets 
destroyed, can never be totally eliminated. Sculptures and pictures may 
refer to God as a secret, may signify the absence of the sacred; yet instead of 
worshipping the sacred we are always at risk of worshipping mere pictures 
that no longer refer to the transcendent God. The externals of a text may 
constantly distract our attention from the originary or ultimate intention of 
the author, from the proper meaning of the text which the words can 
6 1 
express only poorly. The secret of a woman can always be reduced to the 
signs that evoke that secret. 
The sign is not just a subordinate substitute. It constantly threatens to use its 
function improperly, by insinuating itself into the foreground. In the 
metaphysical tradition this double and dangerous play of signs has always 
been warned against: the sign is a necessary aid and a dangerous usurper 
taking chances with its proper function. This imminent threat is a direct 
consequence of the materiality, the density, the beautiful and gracious 
appearance, the external play of signs. We may well let ourselves be seduced 
and misled by the enchanting appearance of a woman, instead of remaining 
attentive solely to her true nature and real personality that lie veiled behind 
the fascinating and alledgedly superficial play of external signs5 . 
Precisely because of this imminent threat the tradition has always priviliged 
those signs, the materiality of which would be almost nothing6 , would be 
completely transparent and fugitive -signs, in other words, without density. 
In a very detailed and extensive reading of -amongst others- Plato, Husser! 
and de Saussure, Derrida has shown how metaphysics and structural 
linguistics? interpret the difference between writing (the written word, the 
5 Cf. G, pp. 216-17. 
6 Cf. G, p. 12. 
7 Cf. Linguistique et grammatologie, G, pp. 42-108; Semiologie et grammato/ogie, Pos, 
pp. 28-35; Paul Moyaert has analysed the presuppositions of Chomskian-style 
transformational or generative grammatics from a Derridean/Lacanian perspective in De 
grondstruktuur van de taal. Een kritische analyse van de vooronderstellingen van 
Chomski in het Iicht van de problematiek van Derrida en Lacan. Since a deconstruction 
of the sign should go hand in hand with a deconstruction of the linguistic subject -a 
deconstruction that will not be undertaken here, at least not frontally- mention should 
be made of Julia Kristeva's D'une identite I' autre. 
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textuality, the materiality of the signifier) and the spoken word (speech, 
phone) as a hierarchically structured difference, that is: as an opposition. 
From Plato and Aristotle onwards, writing has been defined as a sign of a 
sign: a sign of the spoken word which, in its own tum, is the sign of the 
meaning that is expressed. Writing is a double, the representation and 
reproduction of the sound. Writing serves speech, the living speech-act. 
What is already present to consciousness in the actual now-moment of the 
living speech-act is recorded once again in the register of writing. Since 
writing does not add anything essential -at least, should not add anything 
essential to the already constituted meaningful content (writing should only 
repeat)- the material inscription should in fact become superfluous sooner 
or later. 
The subordinate character of writing, in both metaphysics and linguistics, 
goes together, moreover, with a 'moral' evaluation, that is to say: a 'moral' 
condemnation. Though writing is but an aid to the actual speech-act, and as 
a matter of fact an even useful aid, it is still condemned as bad, as dangerous, 
as threatening and obscuringS. It is interpreted as a dangerous supplement, 
as an inscription that kills, and that threatens the living meaning9: writing 
is the letter that kills the spirit, as the burial vault of living signification. 
And not only condemned: as a dangerous supplement writing has to be 
banished and secluded in a place outside! 0 -at a safe and neutral distance 
from philosophy and language. Writing is banished to a place outside of 
philosophy, and in such a way that it cannot touch philosophy and language 
8 Cf. Ia tyrannie de Ia leure [etc.], Cours de linguistique generale, pp. 53-4; G. 
pp. 61-2. 
9 Cf. G. p. 214. 
10 Cf. G, p. 62. 
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in their essence, that is, cannot touch them from within. Writing is an 
exteriority, an outside, a body that is added only afterwards to the pure 
interiority and internal rationality of the concept, the essence, the signified, 
the living spirit, the soul. The outside, the exteriority always constitutes a 
threat to the inner purity of the inside! I; therefore one has to institute a 
sharp, clear, and total distinction between both sides. The inside has to be 
conceived immaculately, in itself, independent of whatever outside may 
eventually be added to it to corrupt its purity. 
Precisely in order to neutralize this possibility of contamination I 2, 
metaphysics has privileged the phone and speech. The voice, the operation 
of hearing oneself speak, the act of being-present to oneself at the moment 
one speaks, should offer a guarantee of the absolute self-presence of 
consciousness. In the act of hearing itself speak consciousness is still 
immediately present to itself. It does not run the risk of losing the presence 
of the signified in the exteriority of a body, of the word and of the gaze of the 
other. Since I hear the word I utter in the very moment I speak it, no 
separation from or in myself takes place. The sound is a mere transparent 
milieu in which selfconsciousness can move safely without running the risk 
of getting separated from or within itself. Moreover, the sound is so fugitive 
that there isn't even enough time for it to be lost or to be divided and 
dispersed in space. When I speak solely with and to myself I immediately 
understand the meaning of what I say and mean. In the soliloquy there is no 
other, no exteriority that could disturb this tranquility or could alienate it in 
II Cf. G, p. 59 
12 Derrida's work can be said to be a persisting meditation on what it means that 
contamination is uberhaupt possible -like Freud's work can be said to be a persisting 
meditation on what it means that trauma is uberhaupt possible: what, then, must be the 
structure of the human psychism for something like trauma to be possible? 
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and from itseJf1 3. Exteriority intervenes only in intersubjective 
conversation or dialogue. 
Philosophy thinks, understands, and may also use words and speak for itself, 
at least when it is present to itself in the very moment that it affects itself 
verbally. But it should not come to writing and write itself down; or rather, 
idea/iter, it should not come to writing at all. Writing is dangerous. He who 
writes lives on in his writings, even if he is no longer in the position to 
control his writing, even if he is no longer able to contain his writings 
within limits. And if philosophy is to institute itself scripturally 14, then the 
writings should nevertheless be thrown away afterwards. We should forget 
about writing, for what should remain and what it is all about is the 
transparent concept. Writing constitutes a threat to the ideal of the complete 
self-presence of philosophical conciousness. 
Before indicating in what respect Derrida complicates the sign-conception, 
let me briefly sketch out how de Saussure, Plato and Husser! respectively 
struggled with the dangerous supplement. 
Writing, according to de Saussure, exists for the sole purpose of representing 
I anguage 15. The object of structural linguistics is not determined by the 
combination of the spoken and the written word. It is the former that alone 
I 3 Cf. La voix et le pbenomene, pp. 85-7. 
14 Cf. the French translation of a short piece of Edmund Husser!, with a lengthy 
introduction by Derrida, L'origine de Ia geometrie, which deals with the 
constitution of ideal objects that exhibit an ideal objectivity or, in other words, the 
constitution of science as science, whereby -according to Husser!- the written word 
plays a fundamental part. For Husser! there can be no science, and no philosophy, apart 
from texts. 
15 Cours de linguistique generale, p. 45; G, p. 46. 
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constitutes its object. The written word falls outside of the interiority of 
language and is unrelated to its inner systematicity. This inner 
systematicity is manifest only in the phone. The true nature of language lies 
behind the veil of writing 16. The latter is but tbe figuration of the spoken 
word17. To it is attributed the exteriority that one paradigmatically 
attributes to utensils. Yet though external and subordinate, it is impossible 
for modem linguistics, whose object of study is, after all, language, simply to 
abstract from the procedure through which language is figurated. In this 
sense writing is a useful and even necessary aid, yet also dangerous and 
deficient18. Writing is not simply a guise; it alters, it distorts, it disguises 
what it clothes: L'ecriture voile Ia vue de Ia langue : elle n'est pas un 
vetement mais un travestissement 19, it is a travesty! What is more, writing 
can rightfully claim the most important place rather than allowing itself to 
be harnessed in the service of the spoken word. De Saussure speaks in this 
context of une usurpation 20. Writing naturally disrupts the natural course 
of language21. By showing itself the figure conceals the true nature of 
language. It thereby prevents us from seeing the naked essence and pure 
form of language. 
I 6 Cours de Iinguistique generale, p. 48. 
I 7 Cours de linguistique generale, p. 44; G, p. 50. 
18 Cours de linguistique generale, p.50. 
19 Cours de linguistique generale, p. 51-2: On le voir bien, de Saussure continues, 
par l'orthographe du mot jran9ais oiseau, ou pas un des sons du mot parlt! (wazo) n'est 
represente par son signe propre; il ne reste rien de /'image de Ia langue. 
20 Cours de linguistique generale, p. 45; G, p. 54. 
2 I Cours de linguistique generale, p. 57. 
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De Saussure wanted to isolate a scientifically justified object that would be 
free from all sorts of metaphysical suppositions regarding language and that 
would justify structural linguistics' claim to scientificity. Yet in his 
condemnation of writing he essentialy reaffirms a complex network of those 
hierarchically structured oppositions, and those moral qualifications that lie 
at the basis of metaphysics and that are inseparable from it: body (the 
sensible) vs. soul (the intelligible), external vs. internal, derived vs. 
originary, re-presentation vs. original presentation, appearance vs. reality, 
bad vs. good22. What de Saussure intends to -and declares to- exclude thus re-
appears in his theory of language, secretly commanding it. 
Writing, for Plato, is a pharmakon: an artificial aid, an unnatural medicine 
that one needs, as well as a poison that can damage life. Medicine and poison 
one should therefore be extremely cautious when it comes to writing! 
However, one could hardly manage without the operation of writing as a 
supplement to the mneme, living and authentic memory -a memory that, in 
its very act, is present to itself. Writing offers itself as a necessary 
protection or defence mechanism against the porocity of memory, against 
the loss of meaning, against the disappearance of the true and living 
presence of truth, against the possible holes and fissures in the texture of 
memory. Yet -and precisely herein lies the deceitful character of its 
assistance- under the pretext of assisting mneme writing rather consolidates 
hypo m n em is: a memory that remains totally exterior, a blind and literal 
repetition in which the remembered presence is not really made present in 
the actual now-moment; a mimes is, an external imitation of true memory, an 
act of uninspired reproduction of real and authentic knowledge. In writing 
the moment of original presence is lost. What is repeated is only the letter, 
22 La pharmacie de Platon, p. 96 and p. 117. 
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the dead letter. Instead of offering protection against forgetting, writing 
aggravates forgetfulness of the origin. Writing thus makes us even more 
forgetful; as a sign, it promotes precisely the loss of direct contact with the 
represented23: it aims on the side, vise a cote, and reinforces only 
hypo m n e sis. And with the introduction of writing -dead repetition- the 
fissures and the incompleteness in the original presence most definitely 
break through. In his reading of the myth of Theuth in Plato, Derrida shows 
how writing comes to occupy the place of the sun, the logos, the light, the 
father who is the origin of the living word. Writing is the miserable son, I e 
fils miserabJe24, the heretic, the orphan who goes on living without the 
father; the lost son, le fils perdu25 who goes his own way and does not stay in 
the direct proximity of the father-origin, of the originary meaning, the 
authentic intention of the author. In writing parricide is committed: 
writing means the death and the irrecuperable loss of the origin. The father 
-who should be the immortal representative of the truth of his text- is 
murdered in and through writing : All graphemes are of a testamentary 
nature, writes Derrida26. Once written down a text is irrecuperably cut off 
from the proper, original intention of the author. The textuality of a text 
renders it impossible to go back to, and to be present to the guiding intention 
of the author. The author cannot but let go of his text and to lose sight of it; 
he is no longer present to or in his text when the text is read or repeated. At 
most there remain some traces that refer to his absence -a signature, for 
instance, the proper mark of propriety. Yet in so far as the signature itself 
23 La pharmacie de Platon, p. 113. 
24 La pharmacie de Platon, p. 167. 
25 La pharmacie de Platon, p. 168. 
26 G, p. 100/69e. 
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is an inscription, it can be repeated in turn, it can be used improperly and 
one can abuse its function. Even the signature -the strict proper marque by 
means of which the author immediately refers to himself, impresses his 
personal hallmark upon his work and wants to keep it for and with himself-
can be expropriated. Even the signature is open to quotation, to the 
operation of dead repetition; it is only une /eurre supptementaire2 7. By 
signing his work in person the author also signs his own death sentence28. 
The text renders the return to the origin impossible. This impossibility is the 
condition of possibility of the text. A text is an inscription that never stops 
blazing a trail, a trail that repeats and doubles/halves itself endlessly29. 
What remains is the materiality of the text; no single interpretation can 
dissolve the materiality of a text. Time and again one has to return to the 
letter of the text that presupposes and institutes the ·absence of an originary 
vou/oir-dire. The letter remains irreplacable. Moreover, a text has no 
proper destination3 0. No one can fully appropriate a text: a text is the 
27 Sarah Kofman,LsD, p. 16; M. Blanchot, L'entretien infini, p. 629: Pourquoi done 
signons-nous nos livres? Par modestie. pour dire: ce ne son/ encore que des livres, 
indifft!rents a Ia signature. 
28 Signature t!venement contexte, p. 391. 
29 Signature evenement contexte, p. 374-5. 
30 In an earlier draft of the preface to Philosophische Bemerkungen Ludwig 
Wittgenstein writes: [ .. ]so bleibt dennoch die Tatsache bestehen, dass lch dem Strom der 
europiiischen Zivilation ohne Sympathie zusehe, ohne Verstiindnis fur die Ziele, wenn sie 
welche hat. lch schreibe also eigentlich fur Freunde, welche in Winkeln der Welt 
verstrent sind (Vermiscbte Bemerkungen, p. 21). Such an address will, of course, 
not prevent the writings from falling in die Hiinde den philosophischen Journalisten 
(Vermischte Bemerkungen, p. 126). But isn't it ironic that Wittgenstein addresses 
himself (or at least would like to) to his friends so as not to meet that sort of resistance 
or incomprehension he fears his writings will meet in those minds that are fre md to 
him? For friends always remain, and must remain somehow strange to us; to that extent 
69 
property of no one. And the way it goes is never a proper one. Its way is not 
one of slowly. but surely approaching an ultimate Z i e l -for instance its 
proper meaning. With writing begins the never ending play of 
interpretations; never-ending since the text <<as such>> institutes the 
absence of an originary intention and an ultimate signification31. Time and 
we never really know to whom we will have addressed ourselves; cf. La carte postale. 
p. 60: Que peut signifier cette lettre chiffr.!e, ma tres douce destint!e, mon immense, m a 
toute-proche inconnue?; cf. also La carte postale, p. 156: Mais c'est toi que j'aime 
encore, Ia vivante. Au-deld de tout; cf. also St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, p. 353: 
the theoretical problem that, in analytical philosophy, is referred to as 'The Problem of 
Other Minds', hides, according to Cavell, a real (existential, if you will forgive me) 
difficulty in the light of which the theoretic reconstruction appears as a cover (cf. The 
Claim of Reason, p. 109: I think this is something Nietzsche meant when he ridiculed 
philosophers for regarding life "as a riddle, as a problem of knowledge", implying that 
we question what we cannot fail to know in order not to seek what it would be painful to 
find out). At the core of the difficulty lies the following paradox: the stronger the 
desire to address oneself intimately to one concrete person the less one knows to whom 
exactly one addresses oneself. It must be said that, to that extent, intimicy and 
insignificance go hand in hand: the intensity of the desire to address oneself, in words 
or in thoughts (cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, I 680), is 
proportional to an awareness of desorientation. The importance of this paradox lies in 
what Derrida has described as the structure of destination: see, in particular, M y 
Chances/Mes Chances, p. 3 and pp. 15-6 (le nom de Pierre). For a direct parallel with 
Wittgenstein, compare Philosophische Untersuchungen, I 691 (Wie ruft er ihn?). 
3 l The hermit in Jenseits Gut und Bose, 289, at one point vents his doubt as to 
whether philosophers can ever have letzte und eigentliche Meinungen; must one not 
suspect, hinter jedem Grunde, unter jeder "Begrundung", eine Abgrund? But then jede 
Philosophie can only he eine Vordergrunds-Philosophie, an effect, at most, produced by 
the structure of a movement, leurre de reappropriation et de source rejointe (Sarah 
Kofman, LsD, p. 29), leurre de cloture. In the Vermischte Bemerkungen (p. 25) L. 
Wittgenstein airs a similar doubt regarding the possibility of ever saturating, of ever 
rounding up the process of signification at the level of discourse, as texts are wildly 
incontinent, each term, each terminus constituting a spermatic reserve, a germ 
multiplying and dividing internally (Sarah Kofman, LsD, p. 44): Denn lch mochte mit 
dem der Philosophie gegebenen, den geschriebenen und gesprochenen Siitzen, quasi den 
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again the text is at risk of getting lost; this risk is inherent. At any time the 
text is open to the dangers of the operation of quotation that lift it out of its 
'proper' context. Other texts can be inserted in its margins; fragments of 
other texts can be grafted onto others3 2. Because of its materiality a text 
cannot prevent one from reading connections in it which the author has not 
really (and sometimes simply could not have3 3) meant. The rupture with 
and loss of the proper context is not so much an accidental, or external 
possibility; it is, rather, constitutive of a text as text34. 
I summarize : the death of the author and the loss of an original intention, 
the absence of an ultimate destination or an ultimate truth of the text, the 
impossibility of a proper meaning-context, and a material remainder that 
cannot be dissolved or replaced by any meaning or reading, are the four 
structural features of a text as text3 5. They imply the fundamental 
Bi.ichern, anfangen. Und hier begegnet man der Schwierigkeit des >>Alles f/iesst<<. Und 
mit ihr ist vielleicht i.iberhaupt anzufangen. In this context the ancient >>Alles fliesst< < 
comes to signify the dispersing and swelling movement which both feeds and wears the 
text, never managing to tie up signifier and signified after a uncreased fashion. An 
unbridled overflow time and again lifts reading out of its handles, unsetttling its 
relative stability, turning the process of interpretation into an endless screw; compare 
Pos, p. 62: [Ia dissemination] marque une multiplicite im!ductible et generative. Le 
supplement et Ia turbulence d'un certain marque fracturent Ia limite du texte, 
interdisant sa formalisation exhaustive et cloturante ou du moins Ia taxinomie saturante 
de ses themes, de son signifie, de son vou/oir-dire. 
32 Sarah Kofman, LsD, p. 19: /'operation de Ia greffe qui ecarte le propre de lui-mtme. 
33 -Is Spinoza a marxist? Kant a pacifist? Nietzsche a deconstructionist avant Ia lettre? 
-These are, in a way, essential and impossible questions. 
34 Signature evenement contexte, p. 377: Cette force de rupture n'est pas un predicat 
accidentel, mais Ia structure mtme de l'ecrit. 
35 Cl. Levesque, L'economie generate de Ia lecture, p. 187. 
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impossibility of the ideal of absolute selfpresence of consciousness3 6. 
Metaphysics as (the) philosophy of presence - is possible if, and only if, it 
excludes its own writing, excludes it or suppresses it, denies it and banishes it 
to an outside3 7. The most fundamental gesture of metaphysics consists in 
effacing itself as text or writing: the philosophical text [ ... ] includes, 
precisely as its philosophical specificity, the project of effacing itself in the 
face of the signified content which it transports and in general teaches3 8. 
Yet metaphysics cannot but write (itself down) and continue writing. But in 
and through (the operation of) writing the ideal of a signified that is not 
marked textually becomes fundamentally impossible39. 
Husserl's cogito is evidently given at the moment it dwells in the actual 
living now, in each of its various acts of consciousness. And the 'I' that is 
apodictically, evidentally given in the acts of consciousness, is mine: it's me; 
I am the one who -being immediately present to myself in the act of 
consciousness- is given as evidence at the moment in which I perceive, 
judge, or phantasize, that is, in the act itself. Yet does the 'I' necessarily 
refer to the subject I am as being present here-and-now to myself, in the 
act? 
36 Cl. Levesque, L'inscription du dialogue, p. 216: Aucune immediatete, aucune identite, 
aucune presence, aucune subjectivite ne peuvent tenir et se Ienir so us les coups 
martelants, decisifs et repetifs de Ia leure incisive et mortelle. L'espacement comme 
ecriture et semence de mort previent, precede et dissout toute possibilite de rapport 
personnel et jusqu'd Celie possibi/ite de dire Je: <<Avec quelle melancholie, mais quel/e 
calme certitude, il sentait qu'il ne pourrait plus jamais dire: Je.>>; (L'attente, 
I'oubli, Editions Gallimard, Paris 1962, p. 34). 
3 7 Cf. Freud et Ia scene de /' ecriture, p. 293: refoulement et non oub/ie. 
38 G, p. 229/160e. 
39 Cf, M. Blanchot, L'entretien inrini, p. vii-viii. 
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In the Logische Untersuchungen Husser! dissolves the personal 
pronoun 'I' into the rubric of occasional expressions. Characteristic of such 
expressions (such as: 'here', 'now') is that it is necessary to bind their actual 
Bedeutung or meaning-intention (Bedeutungsintention; vouloir-dire) to 
concrete circumstances. In order to grasp the actual Bedeutung of the 
indexical expression 'here', one has to direct one's attention to the 
circumstances in which the expression is used. The meaning of an 
occasional expression is bound to, and dependent upon, the person who uses 
the expression, upon the spatio-temporal coordinates of the speech-act. The 
Bedeutung of objective expressions, on the other hand, is not dependent 
upon such context-bound elements, and is, therefore, dubbed by Husser! as 
'ideal'. 
Occasional expressions can be recognized and identified very easily: it is 
impossible to substitute such an expression, as it occurs in discourse, by a 
general meaning-concept. A general meaning-concept for the expression 
'I' might be circumscribed as follows: 'every person who, at the moment he 
says 'I', refers to himself.' Yet if one were to substitute the expression 'I' by 
its general meaning-concept in the sentence 'I am very well, thanks', the 
outcome of the substitution would be absurd40. In actual discourse the 
listener can only grasp the actual meaning-intention that inspires these 
words by identifying -time and again, and at each time ad hoc -the locus 
from whence these words are uttered. The opacity characteristic of 
occasional expressions -opacity, since the sentence in which the expression 
'I' is used is not translatable salve veritate into a general and non-context-
bound concept- in real discourse primarily occurs on the side of the listener 
40 La voix et le phenomene, p. 105. 
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(or reader)41. According to Husser!, this opacity does not occur on the side 
of the speaker. As far as the speaker, the user of the expression 'I', is 
concerned, the Bedeutung of the expression -understood as a relationship to 
the object- is immediately, intuitively fulfilled. The immediacy of fulfilment 
leaves not a single trace of opacity. When I say 'I' and thereby only speak to 
and with myse]f4 2, then the meaning-intention is immediately fulfilled by 
the direct representation I have of my-self as a person4 3. In the operation 
of a speech-act that is merely and solely of and for and with me, in der 
Einsame Rede, the 'I' in the soliloquy directly refers to me-myself as an 
individualized contingent ego. I am immediately present to myself at the 
moment I say '!', to myself. Yet -Derrida wonders- is the latter indeed truly 
the case? Does not the expression 'I' -even as it occurs in die einsame Rede, 
den einsamen Seelenleben- always already function as an ideality, as a 
repeatable generality? Is not the word 'I' always already44 an ideal element 
that as such remains the same for an I-here-now in general? Is it not always 
already an ideal element that retains its meaning-intention as such 
whether or not I disappear as an empirically given presence? Does not the 
occasional expression 'I' -as far as we have a use for it, in discourse-
presuppose that it won't stop signifying when the object itself -in casu: 
4 1 La voix et Ie phenomene, p. 105. 
4 2 According to Derrida we have no idea of what it means, or comes to, to address 
ourselves to a single person, in casu the self; cf. My Chances/Mes Chances, p.2; La 
carte postale, p. 58: Une fois intercepte -il suffit d'une seconde- le message n'a plus 
aucune chance d'atteindre qui que ce soit de determinable, en quelque lieu 
(determinable) que ce soil. 
43 La voix et Ie phenomene, p. 106. 
44 For an illuminating account of the dash of the toujours deja in Derrida's writing see 
R. Gascht!, Reading Chiasms: An Introduction, pp. x-xii. 
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myself- is no longer present, exactly as holds for objective expressions 
which remain meaningful even when the object itself is not physically 
present? When I say, to myself, 'I am', then the expression can only be 
meaningful -just like any other discursive expression- on the condition that 
it remains understandable in the absence of the object that actually fulfils 
the meaning-intention of the expression, in casu: my absence. ·The 
expression 'I am' is meaningful -whether or not I have the actual intuition 
of myself. 'I am' has meaning, whether or not I am physically present. It is 
not a necessary condition for 'I am' to be meaningful that the meaning-
intention is actually fulfilled, that is, that I actually intuit myseif45. 
In this context Derrida makes use of the distinction Husser! introduces 
between the Bedeutung and the intuitive fulfilment of the Bedeutungs-
intention in the context of objective expressions, in a way that goes against 
the grain of Husserl's intention, by extrapolating it to occasional expres-
sions. In reference to the priority and the autonomy of the Bedeutung vis-a-
vis the actual fulfilment of the Bedeutungsintention in intuition, Husser! is 
able to explain how it is that we can understand sentences whose Bed e u-
tungsintention could not be fulfilled intuitively, for a priori reasons. A 
sentence can mean something only on the condition that understanding it is 
not dependent upon the being-fulfilled of its intention by the actual 
intuitive perception of that which is intended. The possibility of 
meaningfulness must be radically dissociated from actual intuitive 
fulfilment. No direct contact with the object is required in order for the 
sentence to mean (anything at all). In order to be meaningful the sentence 
presupposes the possibility of non-fulfilment. The non-presence of the 
object intended constitutes the prior condition for the possibility of the 
45 La voix et le phenornene, pp. 60-1. 
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meaningfulness of the sentence. Therein precisely lies the autonomy of the 
Bedeutungsintention46. Yet what holds for objective expressions holds 
equally for occasional expressions4 7. Just as I need not actually perceive in 
order to understand a statement about perception, so there is need to intuit 
the object 'I' in order to understand the meaning of the words 'I am'. The 
possibility of non-intuition, of non-fulfilment, constitutes the essence of the 
Be deutung as such4 8. It is with reference to this possibility that Husser! is 
able to explain how it is that we can understand the word 'I' as it emerges as a 
written inscription in the text of an unknown person or anonymous writer, 
or as it emerges out of the mouth of a fictitious character, or as it emerges in 
the case of a merely quoted and repeated '!', in short: as it occurs in all those 
cases and circumstances in which the word's presumed author is (already) 
dead or simply non-existent: Ia valeur significative du Je ne depend pas de Ia 
vie du sujer49. Whether I'm dead or alive, 'I am' remains -meaningful. The 
meaning of the expression 'I am' is therefore not dependent upon its truth-
value, that is: upon the fact that the propositional pan 'I am' is true or false. 
We should say, rather, that the possibility of my non-presence, and of my 
uttermost radical absence in death, is a necessary condition for the 
possibility for the 'I am' to be able to function as a meaningful expression 
iiberhaupt: My death is structurally necessary to the pronouncing of the J5 0. 
It is therefore essential that 'I am' -once it is uttered or written down-
already functions as an anonymous inscription that goes its way without 
46 La voix et Ie phenomene, p. 108. 
47 La voix et le phenomene, p. 107. 
48 La voix et le pbenomene, p. 107. 
49 La voix et le phenomene, p. 107. 
50 La voix et le pbenomene, p. 108. 
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myself as living presence, and that is cut off from the living self-presence 
and even makes this living presence of myself to myself fundamentally 
impossible. 'I am' has meaning even when I am no longer; and my future, 
uttermost radical not-being is necessary for the 'I am' to be meaningful at 
all. '/ am' is first meaningful against the background of my future as radical 
absence. By saying 'I am' I inevitably sign my own death sentenceS!. 
The inscription 'I' which at first seems so proper to me as that which is the 
most near and the most intimate to me since it refers to me directly, as it 
were, now totally expropriates me. By this familiar '!', I now find myself 
sentenced to deathS 2: I am already an anonymous inscription whose identity 
with my individualized here-and-now is always already lost. 
In writing, Derrida tracks a paradoxical exteriority that can neither be 
resolved nor be controlled. An outside in the inside of philosophical 
discourse: irruption of the outside on the insideS 3. As writing constitutes a 
threat to the possibility of the transparent selfpresence of consciousness and 
therefore threatens the guiding ideal of the enterprise of the philosophical 
concept54, it must be banished from the inside and be projected onto an 
outside. Yet writing is not an exteriority that one can keep outside, at a safe 
distance from the inside. The outside exceeds itself exorbitantly, and is 
51 La voix et le phenomene, p. 60-1. 
52 Je suis veut done dire originairement je suis mortel. Je suis immortel est une 
proposition impossible, La voix et Ie phenomene, p. 60-1. 
53 G, p. 52. 
54 Cf. M. Blanchot, L'entretien inrini, p. vii. 
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always already outside itself in an inside55. It has always already broached 
the inside from within. The exteriority that confronts philosophy is thus. 
strictly speaking, not object-ive: its modality is not that of an object that 
confronts the philosophical system. Writing is not an object, not a 
Gegenstand which the subject of knowledge could ever master. The subject 
that escapes from the Macht of consciousness -a consciousness that circles 
'in' itself, the quasi-immediacy of auto-affection- is the subject who writes. 
Once again, the philosopher can never control the effects his writings may 
produce; writing is excessive5 6. The meaning of his texts eludes the power of 
his selfconsciousness. 
Writing is the supplement of the spoken word, the signifier is the 
supplement of the signified. Whatever one conceives of in terms of guise, 
appendage, parergon, frame, reproduction, is a supplement of something 
else. In what does the complex logic of the supplement consist? 
The metaphysical logic of the supplement is based on the principal 
separation of, and the originary distinction between two levels: the level of 
the sensible, and the level of the intelligible5 7. The material order of the 
(sensible) signifier (the externality, the exterior, the corporeal) is added 
afterwards to the already constituted order of pure presence, to the self 
sufficient interiority of a spiritual inside, to the intelligible order of a 
transcendental signified that is meaningful in itself, deriving its meaning 
from itself. The meaning of the transcendental signified is then 
55 This structure bears some ressemblance to the structural moment of the 
Urverdriingung in the constitution of the (freudian/lacanian) unconscious. 
56 Cf. Philippe Sollers, Toil in L'~criture et l'exp~rience des limits, pp. 105-
38; in particular the section called L' exces, pp. 133-37. 
57 Cf. La mythologie blanche: Ia metaphore dans le texte philosophique, p. 269. 
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hypostasized into the dimension of a higher and deeper reality that is given 
in and of itself, and that lies behind the corporeal layer of the supplement. 
The supplement is added only afterwards to the plenitude of a presence that 
in itself is not signified, not marked. Unlike the complement which offers 
an additional completion, the supplement is an external addition, added from 
outside, itself being outside the positivity to which it is added, as a mere 
accessory58. What is added afterwards is always impure, and is stigmatized 
as a bad, deficient and sometimes malicious representation of the original. It 
is inevitable that something of the original is lost. The supplementary 
inscription is, therefore, to be declared guilty. The supplement provokes a 
possible loss. By means of the supplement the happiness and glory of the 
original presence in an innocent paradise gets lost or contaminated. The 
deficiency of the supplement sharply contrasts with the lost plenitude of the 
original. The supplement is -like the body is and always has been, from Plato 
onwards- 'sinful'; it is a perversion of an original purity. In fact we should 
try to get rid of it and go back to the pure interiority for which there is no 
corporeal substitute. 
This interpretation of the supplement conforms to the logic of identity that 
attempts to preserve a strict and clear distinction between an inside and an 
outside, and that situates the accidental contamination by an outside in an 
afterwards: the originary interiority gets contaminated as a supplement is 
added afterwards from an outside that is simply outside59. Yet this logic of 
identity does not conform to the 'properly' paradoxical logic of the 
58 G, p. 208. 
59 G, p. 308. 
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supplement, which would have it that the outside be inside60. The outside is 
always already at work within the inside. 
The supplement adds itself to something else. It is thus a additional 
appendage. In this sense the supplement constitutes a surplus, a plenitude 
that enriches or embellishes another plenitude. The supplement constitutes 
an ornament, an additional enrichment, an extra, an excessive plenitude61. 
However, the supplement is also a representative and a substitute. It adds in 
order to replace: it intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, 
it is as if it fills a voiJ62. The supplement insinuates itself in-the-place-of 
something else that cannot be present in its own terms, that suffers from a 
lack in itself and so falls short of presence itself: As substitute, it [the 
supplement] is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces no 
relief, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. 
Somewhere, something can be filled up of itself, can accomplish itself, only 
by allowing itself to be filled through sign and proxy (ne peut se remplir de 
soi-meme, ne peut s'accomplir qu'en se laissant combler par signe et 
procuration). The sign is always the supplement of the thing itseJ/'3. As a 
substitute the supplement is not added on top of, but it intervenes in-the-
place-of an anterior default of presence, an absence. The exchange between 
those two moments constitutes the paradoxical logic of the supplement, a 
logic that disrupts a metaphysics of presence from within. 
60 G, p. 308; cf. also M. Blanchot,L'entretien infini, p. 632-33. 
61 G, p. 208. 
62 G, p. 208. 
6 3 G, p. 208/145e. 
As an addition 
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the supplement makes up for a deficiency; it compensates for a primordial 
non-selfpresence64. 
If presence needs a supplement in order to appear, to come into presence, 
then this means that presence, in its essence, is always already marked from 
within by default, infirmity, deficiency, void, lack: C'est que 'Ia presence' du 
sens et de Ia parole avait deja commence a se manquer a elle-meme65. If the 
originary presence had been fully and permanently present, then the 
supplement would not only have constituted a totally superfluous plenitude 
and an absolutely useless waste of energy: as a matter of fact, it would have 
been impossible. The very possibility of supplanting presence already 
implies that presence is incomplete, and is torn from the outset. If presence 
cannot do without the supplement then must we not say that it is not 
presence that is originary but, rather, that the supplement is: the ideal will 
always already have been -alledgedly66. corrupted. The supplement is the 
necessary condition of possibility for the presence of the present. The 
supplement first produces and institutes a being-present. It is firstly with 
the help of the supplement that the absence of the present can become 
meaningful. Yet at the same time the supplement is and remains an 
inscription that defers the being-present (the presence) of presence, and 
64 Prenons un exemple simple mais revetateur. Soit le Supplement d'un dictionnaire, 
par exemple celui du Littre: en un premier sens de ce mot le Supplement litteralement 
s'ajoute aux tomes precedentes: c'est done un surplus, mais /'existence de ce Supplement 
nous apprend que dans les quatre tomes precedentes, en depit de leur volume, certains 
mots manquaient [ .. ], R. Laporte, La double strategie, p. 243. 
6 5 La voix et Ie phenomene, p. 97. 
66 Cf. G, p. 442: Rousseau veut a Ia [ois maintenir l'exteriorite du systeme de l'ecriture 
et /'e[[icience male[ique [ ... ] Mais disons·nous autre chose? Oui, dans Ia mesure ou nous 
· montrons /'interiorite de /'exteriorite, ce qui revient a annuler Ia qualification ethique 
et a penser /'ecriture au-de/a du bien et du mal. 
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that makes the latter fundamentally impossible. The supplement is never 
tbe 'real' presence -it is the replacement of it. The original evidence, the 
adequate intuition, and the direct contact with the origin are always already 
replaced by an originary supplanting substitute6 7. The presence of the 
absolute beginning is thus -and from the outset- deferred by the original 
inscription of a supplement: le concept de supplement originaire68. The 
supplement is a necessary condition of possibility that -at the same time-
creates the fundamental impossibility of that which it makes possible: 
Without the possibility of differance [Ia differance]. the desire of presence as 
such would not find its breathing-space. That means by the same token [d u 
me me coup] that this desire carries in itself the destiny of its non-
satisfaction [inassouvissement]. Differance produces what it forbids, makes 
possible the very thing it makes impossible69. Presence is possible only by 
the grace of the supplement that institutes its impossiblity. Put otherwise: 
the supplement itself is only possible on the ground of an originary 
impossibility that is instituted by the supplement. It -the substitute- makes 
presence meaningful (and desirable) by deferring it. That is the effect and 
the result of the paradoxical logic of the supplement. 
The original is thus always already substituted; it has always already been 
lost: the origin is produced afterwards, with delay. It appears or emerges 
only afterwards, in and through the delay. As origin the supplement adds 
itself to the origin and at the same time it substitutes a deficient origin. The 
supplement is une possibilite qui produit a retardement ce a quoi elle se dit 
67 Cf. G, p. 443. 
68 La voix et Je phenomene, p. 98. 
69 G, p. 143e. 
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ajouter10. It is always only afterwards, in the delay, at the moment in which 
the origin is already gone, that the relationship to the (lost) origin is 
instituted and made possible. That the supplement itself is original means 
that there is no proper origin and no absolute beginning. One can no longer 
say that -first- there is an original presence which unfortunately was lost or 
deferred afterwards. Nothing preceeds the delay; the supplementary delay 
itself comes first: le delai originaire 71. In the delay a link or relationship to 
an absence -which remains absent- is instituted. There is no prior some-
thing that is deferred (afterwards); it is in the tension of delay itself that the 
presence of the absent as absence is produced. The supplement is outside 
from the start,- outside of itself, exceeding itself in the inside that it produces 
by splitting it: the inside is always already separated from itself, and so 
divided -doubled and halved (doublementldedoublement12). The 
supplementary outside can no 
selfsufficient inside -everything 
longer 
begins 
besmirchment of an originary exteriority. 
process of difference. 
be grounded in an anterior 
with the pollution and the 
And precisely herein lies the 
Differre means both the movement of suspension, deferment, postponement, 
the movement of temporalization, and the spatial and material articulation of 
differences, the articulation of interval, the production of a spatial in-
between 73. Difference is the original space and the temporal movement -
spacing of time and temporalization of space- in and through which the 
perception of meaning becomes or is possible: il faut poser Ia question du 
70 La voix et le phenomene, p. 99. 
71 La voix et le phenomene, p. 98. 
72 G, p. 439. 
73 Cf. La dif[erance, p. 8. 
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sens et de son origine dans Ia difference14; Ia signification ne se forme ainsi 
qu'au creux de Ia dijferance 7 5. No experience of meaning is possible 
without difference. The creux of differance is originary. Difference no 
longer refers to an original or ultimate identity (in which it would dissolve 
into indifference); the different distinctions are no longer held together, 
are no longer unified in and by a common third term that would remain 
identical to itself. Rather, differences circle around an absence that can no 
longer be filled up. What is in question here is no longer the difference 
between a present reality on the one hand and a supplementary 
representation on the other hand7 6. What is at issue is, rather, this 
originary difference that first makes possible and produces, with delay. 
afterwards, the difference between reality and representation (Vorstellung) 
-a difference by virtue of which any true reality is always already 
permeated by a plausibility that is the effect of a doubling (and halving) 
reproduction. It all begins with reproduction -the reproduction that evokes 
the appearance of reality and that produces the reality of appearance. 
That the supplementary difference is originary means moreover that there 
is no true, no proper origin of meaning: ce qui revient il dire [ ... ] qu'il n'y a 
pas d'origine absolue du sens en genera177; Aucune intuition ne peut 
s'accomplir au lieu ou <<les <<blancs>> en ejfet assument l'importance>>78. 
There can be no question of an originary, proper, or authentic supplement. 
74 G, p. 102. 
75 G, p. 101. 
7 6 Cf. La voix et le phenomene, p. 67: Ia difference n' a pas lieu entre Ia rea lite et Ia 
representation. 
77 G, p. 95. 
78 G, p. 99. 
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For the distinction between proper/improper, I i teral/fi gurati ve, 
originary/secondary, direct/indirect, authentic/inauthentic supplement is 
possible only if one posits -somewhere behind the originary difference - the 
self sufficient presence of a nonsignified or nonrepresented identity that 
would provide a measure allowing us to evaluate a set of different 
supplements in terms of property or purity. Yet no supplement is closer to 
the origin than any other; no one supplement is further away from the 
origin than any other; no one supplement represents a supplementary 
deviation in comparison to any other. The operation of distancing, of 
widening the gap, and of deviation is itself original: it is in and through the 
gap that the impossible presence of an absence is produced. The 
supplementary difference gives meaning to a lack-of-being (un manque-ii-
etre) that at the same time is produced by and maintained by the supplement. 
The supplementary difference gives a concrete and tangible form, a material 
figure to an absence, a form through which the absent becomes present in a 
substitute and, in the same movement, is put at a distance as substitute -a 
distance that cannot be bridged. That the supplement itself is originary also 
means that every supplement always comes in the place of other 
supplements, and that every supplement inevitably must give up its place to 
other supplements79: The supplement comes in the place of a lapse, a 
nonsignified or a nonrepresented, a nonpresence. There is no presence 
before it, it is not preceded by anything but itself, that is to say by another 
supplement. The supplement is always the supplement of a supplement. One 
wishes to go back from the supplement to the source [du suppLement a 
l'origine]: one must recognize that there is a supplement at the source [d u 
supplement ii l'origine]80. What institutes itself here is an endless process 
79 La structure, le signe et le jeu, p. 423. 
80 G, p. 429/303-4e. 
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of substitution -a process that has no beginning and no end. Each additional 
supplement that intervenes to make up for the originary loss of presence in 
tum institutes an additional supplementary distance: Through this sequence 
of supplements a necessity is announced: that of an infinite chain, 
ineluctably multiplying the supplementary mediations that produce the 
sense of the very thing they defer: the mirage of the thing itself, of 
immediate presence, of originary perceptions81. Each supplement at the 
same time defers what it institutes, and in this movement the experience of 
meaning originates. The loss that this process of substitution institutes 
prevents the process from ever rounding itself up: What broaches the 
movement of signification is what makes its interruption impossible82. In 
this endless process of substitution an originary splitting-up of meaning, an 
originary dispersion of meaning, une dissemination, takes place. With each 
new substitute, new and unforeseen effects of signification arise. yet at the 
same time a loss is provoked as well. No single substitute can contain the 
richness of meaning of other supplements and repeat it literally. The 
process of signification is not a cumulative gathering of past, new. and 
future effects of signification. The production of meaning does not 
accumulate and collect, like the lexicon does, but causes an inevitable loss of 
meaning. 'Dissemination' refers both to the movement of the fertile 
dispersion of meaning, and to its the loss and usury. It opposes polysemie. 
The semantic notion of 'polysemie' supposes that there is an originary 
correlation between a signifier and a signified, which afterwards is 
completed and enriched with new effects of meaning (different 
connotations for instance) that are all held together by the originary 
81 G, p. 157e. 
82 G, p. 49e. 
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signified83. Dissemination, on the other hand, rests on the absence of any 
such originary correlation between signifier and signified: there is no 
signified that in itself would sum up, collect, totalize, accumulate and 
possibly reconcile all the secondary effects of signification84. The process 
of signification cannot be totalized. Production and loss of meaning are 
equi primordial. 
It is no surprise that, for Derrida, the sign as sign constitutes a highly 
problematic thing that is to be deconstructed: when the relation 
signifier/signified is conceived of as a sign-relation, one inevitably holds on 
to the presence of a signified that does not have to be signified and that 
shields itself from the signifying process of signifiers: the formal essence of 
the signified is presence85. A signified that shields itself from the process 
of signification is dubbed by Derrida a 'transcendental signified': it is the 
point, the intelligible order, the unity or the center from which everything 
derives its signification and to which all signifiers are orientated, to which 
all signifiers refer as their ultimate realization and the fulfilment of the 
process of signification86 . The transcendental signified stands on its own; 
it draws its meaningfulness from itself. Yet once the very possibility of such 
a transcendental signified is put into question, the radical distinction 
between the dimension of the signifier and the dimension of the signified -
83 Pos, p. 62. 
84 Pos, p. 61. 
85 G, p. 18e. 
86 G, p. 106-7. 
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that is, the sign itself -becomes problematic87. C'est done /'idee de signe qu'il 
faudrait deconstruire 88. 
In the Cours de linguistique generale the traditional conception of the 
sign is still at work. The instrinsic definition of the sign -according to which 
the sign is determined as a positive entity- implies that the principle of 
arbitrariness is central. This latter principle means not only that there is no 
intrinsic or natural bond between the signifier and the signified and hence 
that the relation is of a symbolic and conventional nature, but also that the 
same signified can be expressed by quite different signifiers having their 
home in distinct linguistic systems, and in such a way that no loss of 
meaning occurs8 9. This possibility of substitution-with-no-loss radically 
separates the order of the signified from the order of the signifier, and even 
sublimates the former order into a self sufficient transcendental instance 
shielding itself from any form of linguistic constitution90. Furthermore, in 
so doing the signifier is reduced to a merely functional inscription 
representing what is already and fully given in and of itself and, by right, 
has no need of the signifier to be what it is. 
Simultaneously, however, this traditional conception of language and the 
sign is practically problematized in the Cours by the extrinsic conception of 
8 7 Pos, p. 30. 
88 G, p. 107. 
89 Cf. Cours de Jinguistique generale, p. 100. 
90 Cf. Cours de linguistique generale, p. 100; Pos·, p. 30: En laissant cette 
possibilite ouverte [ ... ] il fait droit d l'exigence classique de ce que j'ai propose 
d'appeler un <<signifie transcendentale>>, qui ne renverrait en lui-meme, dans son 
essence, d aucun signifiant, exederait Ia chaine des signes, et ne fonctionnerait plus lui-
meme. a un certain moment, comme signifiant. 
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the sign. The extrinsic approach to the sign conceives the relation between 
the two relata in terms of a system of differences that does not suppose any 
positive entity at au91. This affirmation of the system of differences as 
originary affects the selfsufficiency of the signified. The latter's ontological 
priority is fundamentally contested. This tension in the Cours is well 
known: Tout ce qui precede revient a dire que dans Ia langue il n'y a que des 
differences. Bien plus: une difference suppose en general des termes 
positifs entre lesquels elle s'etablit; mais dans Ia langue il n'y a que des 
dif[erences sans termes positifs. Qu'on prenne le signifie ou le signifiant, Ia 
langue ne comporte ni des idees ni des sens qui preexisteraient au systeme 
linguistique, mais seulement des dif[erences conceptuelles et des dif[erences 
phonique issues de ce systeme92. 
In essence impossible, the signified no longer precedes the signifier; it is no 
longer anterior to it but, rather, it is first articulated from a differential 
network of signifiers onwards. According to Derrida, the signified emerges 
here in the differential interval between signifiers; it is thus produced by 
the signifiers. This means -prim o- that the signified is never given, is 
never immediately present, in the flesh. The signified is an effect, and it 
emerges as a trace, une trace in the trace (trail) of a difference, a trace with 
no proper origin and with no proper or ultimate destination, hence destined 
to ( diff-)errance. The signified is a trace that one follows without ever 
reaching a definitive final term. One always and by necessity arrives too 
late to encounter the signified itself; it is always already deferred by the 
presence of a supplementary difference: The self-identity of the signified 
conceals itself unceasingly (se derobe) and is always on the move (se deplace 
91 Coors de lingoistiqoe generale, p. 160. 
9 2 Coors de lingoistiqoe generale, p. 66. 
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sans cesse)93. This means -secundo- that the signified always emerges in a 
position of, and from the place of the signifier: qu 'il [le signifie] so it toujours 
deja en position de signifiant94. In every instance a new and additional 
signifier is needed in order to reproduce and to produce the signified of a 
sign i fie r9 5; and precisely in this process the self-sufficient presence of a 
signified is deferred over and over again. In this deferment the signified 
emerges as a meaningful trace signifying the absence of an ultimate 
transcendental signified. Death-knell of phonocentrism: That the signified 
is originally and essentially (and not only for a finite and created spirit) 
trace [ ... ] is the apparently innocent proposition within which the 
metaphysics of the logos, of presence and consciousness, must reflect upon 
writing as its death and its resource96. 
So much for this rather formal exposition of difference and the originary 
supplement, in Derrida. This exposition will now be made more specific with 
an analysis of the economic structure and existential bearing of difference. 
9 3 G, p. 72/49e. 
94 G, p. 108; cf. Pos, p. 30. 
95 Cf. Ia mythologie blanche, p. 261-62; the determination or identification of the 
signified is never saturated; its identity can not be determined without further 
differentiation which in turn delays identity. 
96 G, p. 73e. 
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4./ The endless process of 
Jouir ! Ce sort est-il fait 
pour I 'homme ? Ah ! si jamais 
une seule fois en rna vie 
supplementary differences and substitutive j'avais goiite dans leur 
Nous touchons ici au point de Ia inscriptions 
plus grande obscurite, 11 l'enigme 
meme de Ia differance, 11 ce qui en institutes 
divise justement le concept par un 
etrange partage. II ne faut pas se present as 
hAter de decider. Comment penser 
11 Ia fois Ia differance comme impossible: 
detour economique qui, dans 
plenitude toutes les delices 
de !'amour, je n'imagine pas 
que rna frele existence y eiit 
the pu suffire, je serais mort sur 
le fait. 
the Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
I e 
!'element du meme, vise toujours 11 jeu de Ia substitution comble et marque un 
retrouver le plaisir ou Ia presence 
differee par calcul (conscient ou manque determine!. What we would really 
inconscient) et d'autre part Ia 
differance comme rapport 11 Ia like to see, what we really would like to 
presence impossible, comme 
depense sans reserve, comme perte bring into our corporeal or spiritual 
irreparable de Ia presence, usure 
im!versible de l'energie, voire proximity in order to appropriate it 
comme pulsion de mort et rapport 
au tout~autre 
apparence tout 
evident - c'est 
interrompant en 
economie ? II est 
!'evidence meme -
qu'on ne peut penser ensemble 
l'economique et le non-economique, 
le meme et le tout-autre, etc. Si Ia 
differance est eel impensable, 
peut-etre ne faut-il pas se hater de 
Ia porter 11 !'evidence, dans 
!'element philosophique de 
!'evidence .. 
Jacques Derrida 
completely, is time and again marked as an 
impossible, an unattainable ideal. 
Impossible not because we fall short in some 
respect, but because the present itself is 
permeated by a determined lack. The 
present itself is always already separated 
from and in itself, doubled and halved. 
Now difference is not only the condition for 
the possibility of the perception of meaning. It also lies at the basis of 
human desire. It makes desire possible by suspending satisfaction and by 
fundamentally making impossible its ultimate fulfilment. That which could, 
possibly, fill up the lack-of-being has always already disappeared as a trace 
in the track of supplementary substitutions. Difference creates an originary 
negativity within the human psyche, and institutes the impossibility of any 
1 G, p. 229. 
9 1 
ultimate signified to resolve it. Yet desire nevertheless remains tied to the 
dream of an impossible fulfilment which is evoked by and made impossible 
by the supplement. If that tie with an impossible presence disappears then 
the supplement will no longer be perceived as meaningful. It would then 
have been reduced to an insignificant material inscription -insignificant, 
because if no longer evokes anything. Human desire never stops striving to 
resolve itself as desire: desir de non-desir. This impossible fulfilment is 
desired and feared at one and the same time: perfect pleasure, Ia jouissance 
ell e-m em e, would be tantamount to a total end, or death itself. The 
fascination for the total fulfilment is the fascination for death -death which 
is feared and desired at the same time: P Ieasure itself, without symbol or 
suppletory [suppletif], that which would accord us pure presence itself, if 
such a thing were possible, would be only another name of death2. 
Difference is the movement that suspends death, making life possible by 
deferring the ultimate fulfilment that it nevertheless evokes. 
protects life against itself, against its own reduction. 
Difference 
The relationship between desire and difference is not only to be approached 
starting from a determined lack, but also from an energetic perspective. 
Without delay the psychic apparatus would ruin itself by going directly to its 
ultimate end, namely: non-desir, a tensionless condition. What difference 
accomplishes is that not all psychic energy is wasted and used immediately, 
and that, thus, some energy is left over so that we can continue to live3. 
Difference makes sure that some energy is kept in reserve, that not all of it 
is invested or consumed at once but that we deal sparingly with it, that we 
save some energy for later on. Delay obliges the psychic apparatus to take 
2 G, p. 223/155e. 
3 La difjerance, pp. 19-20. 
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care of itself, and to consider its self-interest -life is aimed at as an end in 
itself and any lethal stake is suspended. One will not put one's own life at 
stake by aiming directly at the impossible. That is the effect and the result of 
difference. This economic principle is conservative: it wants to conserve 
and to maintain the present condition. This process constitutes the economic 
structure of difference6. 
Yet the psychic apparatus is at the same time -consciously or unconsciously-
regulated by a principle or mechanism that fundamentally deregulates this 
game of economic calculation and self-interest: a noneconomic process. This 
noneconomic process consists in radically putting oneself at stake: to submit 
and abandon oneself completely, with no thoughts or speculations on 
additional profit-making, to the impossible, to the lethal play of 
substitutions, and even to challenge this very play of substitutions by 
placing it at stake. Not wanting to escape one's own decline at any cost, but 
putting oneself and one's life at stake. Not keeping some energy in reserve, 
no longer saving and endlessly accumulating supplements, but submitting to 
the impossible without reservation: une depense sans reserve 7. No longer 
accepting the impossibility of the impossible and avoiding or deferring the 
lethal confrontation with the impossible, but radically abandoning oneself 
to it. No longer preferring life at any cost, but preferring a life that fully 
assumes the risk of death -death as the ultimate possibility that is the 
foundation for all other possibilities and at the same time institutes the 
impossibility of ever new possibilities. 
If the economic principle consists in creating meaning and in bestowing an 
additional meaning on everything, including the possible loss of meaning, 
6 La differance, p. 8. 
7 De I' economie restreinte tl I' economie generale, p. 380. 
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then the issue in the noneconomic principle of difference is to relate 
oneself to the liminal experience in which everything loses its meaning, 
that is to say : the extreme experience of death, Angst (Heidegger), suffering 
(Blanchot, Artaud, Levinas), and laughter (Bataille); a radical and 
irrecoupable loss of meaning, une perte de sens, with no hope of any returns 
or any additional gains of sense. 
In the important essay De /'economie restreinte a /'economie generate, 
Derrida puts Bataille and Hegel side by side, articulating their relative 
position with reference to this 
problematic of the loss of 
Der Tad, wenn wir jene Unwirklichkeit so 
nennen wollen, ist das Furchbarste, und das meaning. 
Tote festzuhalten das, was die grosste Kraft Hegel is the 
erfordert.[ .. ]Aber nicht das Leben, das sich vor philosopher who most radically 
dem Tode scheut und von der Verwiistung rein 
bewahrt, sondern das ihn ertriigt und in ihm assumed the risk of death and the 
sich erhii/t, ist das Leben des Geistes. Er 
gewinnt seine Wahrheit nur, indem er in der loss of meaning to the extent of 
absoluten Zerrissenheit sich selbst findet. 
Diese Macht ist er nicht als das Positive, positing 
welches von dem Negativen wegsieht, wie wenn 
that risk as the 
wir von etwas sagen, dies ist nichts oder 
falsch, und nun, damit fertig, davon weg zu 
irgend etwas anderem iibergehen; sondern er 
ist diese Macht nur, indem er dem Negativen 
ins Angesicht schaut, bei ihm verweilt. Dieses 
Verweilen ist die Zauberkraft, die es in das 
Sein umkehrt; Vorrede, p. 36. 
grounding principle, the 
founding dynamics of self-
consciousness. Yet, 
simultaneously, an additional 
meaning is given to any loss of 
meaning on a higher level. Hegel inflects negativity into a productive, 
servile force, which is to be taken seriously, that is, into account. 
Everything is bestowed with meaning; nothing is ever lost in mere 
insignificance. Even to the loss of meaning, to death, however painful and 
absurd it may be, a meaning is given in the context of a larger whoJe8. The 
loss of meaning does not radically put life at stake, but is put at work in the 
8 ED, p. 377-8 
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interest of life: par une ruse de Ia vie, De /' economie restreinte a /' economie 
genera/e. p. 377: ce qui est risible, c'est 
c'est-ii-dire de Ia raison, Ia vie est done Ia soumission a /'evidence du sens, que 
rien ne soil definitivement perdu par /a 
restee en vie9. The restrained economy mort. que celle·ci recoive /a 
signification encore de <<negativiti 
implies a mastering of any loss of abstraite,>> que /e travail soil toujours 
possible qui, a differer /a jouissance. 
meaning. The loss is, by some detour, contere sens. serieux et verite a /a mise 
inflected, turned (u m g eke h r t) into a 
higher secondary gain, in the service 
of an ultimate meaning! 0. 
To this pre-eminently Hegelian 
economy are opposed Bataille's 
explosion of laughter (eclat de rirell) 
and the sovereignty (la souverainete) 
of the general economy whereby one 
submits oneself to the possible loss of 
meaning and laughs about it, however 
dramatic the loss may be, with no hope 
en jeu; 
compare: When I was fifteen years old or 
sixteen I carried around in the streets of 
Brooklyn a paperback copy of Plato's 
Republic, front cover facing outward I 
had read only some of it and understood 
less, but I was excited by it and knew it 
was something wonderful. How much I 
wanted an older person to notice me 
carrying it and be impressed, to pat me 
on the shoulder and say. . ./ didn't know 
exactly. I sometimes wonder, not without 
uneasiness, what that young man of 
fifteen or sixteen would think of what he 
has grown up to do. I would like to think 
that with this book he would be pleased 
It now occurs to me to wonder also 
whether that older person whose 
recognition and love he sought then might 
not turn out to be the person he would 
grow up to become. If we reach 
adulthood by becoming the parent of our 
parents, and we reach maturity by 
finding a fit substitute for parents' love, 
then by becoming our ideal parent 
ourselves finally the circle is closed and 
we reach completeness; Robert Nozick, A 
Portrait of the Philosopher as a Young 
of any additional gain. The following Man. 
quote from Derrida clearly marks both 
positions: Like lordship, sovereignty certainly makes itself independent 
through putting life at stake; it is attached to nothing and conserves 
nothing. But, differing from Hegelian lordship, it does not even want to 
maintain itself, collect itself, or collect the profits from itself or from its own 
risk; it "cannot even be defined as a possession." "/ hold to it, but would I 
9 ED, p. 375-76. 
I 0 ED, p. 374, 376. 
II ED, p. 376. 
95 
hold to it as much if I were not certain that I could just as well laugh at it ?" 
(Methode de Meditation)l2. 
Hegel and Bataille are not Derrida's only points of reference for the double 
articulation of difference. In La dif[trance he also refers to Nietzsche's and 
Freud's opposition between the economic drive of life (Eros) and the death 
drive (Thanatos) . Derrida has commented on this freudian problematic in a 
magisterial reading of Jenseits des Lustprinzips (see infra). 
It is, however, misleading to speak, zu reden [but precisely -Hegel est ici 
incontournable] in this context of two moments that are opposed to one 
another, since no dialectical reconciliation or compromise is possible 
between the two relata. A loss of meaning that can be reconciled, versohnt, 
with the act of Sinngebung , a loss that can be umgekehrt, turned in das 
Sein, is not a loss at all. The two moments do not oppose one another. They 
are ineluctably intertwined with one another. 
By positing a non-dialectical relationship, Derrida can avoid the possibility 
that an additional secondary meaning be given to the loss of meaning, on 
some higher dialectical level. The loss of meaning cannot in its turn be 
turned, or mastered. One cannot conceive of the loss of meaning that 
threatens us as an end in itself, nor can one conceive of the loss as a refined 
means to create a surplus of meaning. Derrida can therefore rightfully state 
that difference can neither be aimed at in itself (the loss of meaning as an 
end in itselO. nor be subordinated to something else (the loss of meaning as 
a means to achieve something else). It follows, moreover, that it is not the 
phenomenological subject who executes the loss; if the subject could execute 
it, then the loss would still remain dependent on, and still be in the interests 
12 ED, p. 388/264e-modified. 
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of, the meaning creative undertaking 
the ego. Difference would be just another 
of My Chances/Mes Chances, p. 5-6: Is 
not what befalls us or descends 
upon us. as it comes from above, 
like destiny or thunder, taking our 
faces and hands by surprise -is 
this not exactly what thwarts our 
expection and disappoints our 
anticipation? Grasping everything 
in advance, anticipation (antipare, 
ante-capere) does not let itself be 
taken by surprise; there is no 
chance for it. Anticipation sees the 
function in some economy of sense. The 
loss of meaning is, rather, a loss that occurs 
in spite of me, that executes itself in me 
and overcomes me beyond any project or 
anticipation, 
and which occurence never takes place for 
me: event past narrativity 13. 
Cinquante-deux aphorismes pour 
un avant-propos, no. 38: 1/ n'y a 
pas de projet deconstructeur, pas 
de projet pour Ia deconstruction; 
cf. Die Frauen und ihre Wirkung in 
die Ferne, Die frohliche 
Wissenschaft, section 69: the 
action in distans surprises us, it 
comes from beyond the horizon of 
finality and anticipation; it 
deregulates the order of Wurfen 
und Entwilrfen, as is Nietzsche's 
expression, translated by P. 
Klossowski as: <<jets>> et projets; 
cf. Cinquante-deux aphorismes 
pour un avant-propos, no. 18, on 
projet. 
To desire to 
execute the loss of meaning oneself would 
not only be pure self-destruction but would 
objectum coming ahead, by the 
Gegenwurf in which the movement 
of the throw (jet, werfen) can once 
again be perceived. The ob-jectum 
(ob-jet) is kept under view or hand, 
within sight or intuitus, while it 
puts a handle on the hand or 
conceptus. the Begreifen or 
Begriff. And when something does 
not befall us "by accident" ("par 
hasard" ), as the saying or belief 
goes, then one can also fall oneself. 
One can fall well or badly, have a 
lucky or unlucky break -but always 
by dint of not having foreseen- of 
not having seen in advance and 
ahead of oneself. In such a case. 
when man or the subject falls, the 
fall affects his upright stance and 
vertical position by engraving in 
him the detour of a cl i namen. 
whose effects are sometimes 
inescapable. [ .. ] No horizon, then, 
for the event or encounter, but only 
verticality and the unforeseeable. 
The alterity of the other -that 
which does not reduce itself to the 
economy of our horizon- always 
comes to us from above. indeed, 
from the above. 
constitute a subtle attempt at avoiding really being hit by that loss14. 
13 Cf. M. B1anchot, L'entretien infini; ED, p. 376 and p. 378. 
14 For a literary illustration of a [futile] attempt at mastering or avoiding the 
iterability in which we are caught see J. Joyce, A painful case. 
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The intimate interweaving of the 'noneconomic' and the economic principle 
transforms the process of difference into something other than a 
glorification of the delay in itself, or a gratuitious manipulation and addition 
of indifferent supplementary inscriptions. Were it not for this 
interweaving, difference -as an end in itself- would make no difference, 
would be totally in-different. 
Derrida has not yet given a concrete 'phenomenological' analysis of this 
problem. Rather than providing a neutral description or exposition of the 
complex relations, he brings this intertwining to realization through his 
specific style of writing. His writing itself 'performs' the problem he wants 
to raise. The style of his writing allows us to read, to notice the problematic. 
The style of his writing puts philosophy at stake by handing it over to the 
risk of non-sense. His writing thereby runs the risk of a radical loss of 
meaning. Putting philosophy at stake, en jeu, in such a way that its potency 
is eclipsed by radical impotence, it no longer being able to be able, which 
results in and explodes in laughter -that is, succinctly, what Derrida's 
deconstruction (of 'philosophy') is all about. 
In what follows I shall attempt to elucidate in what that peculiar 
relationship to the risk and loss of meaning, as well as the radical putting-at-
stake of meaning consist exactly. The example I shall elaborate is borrowed 
from Totalite et Infini. Essai sur I'exteriorite by Emmanuel Levinas. 
Derrida's concern is not limited to philosophy and its relation to writing. His 
economic analysis of difference hits all practices of meaning-constitution of 
which we normally say that the signifier is only the guise, only the clothing 
or expression of a meaning an sich; this meaning an sich is then 
hypostasized into a higher resort, a deeper and hence more fundamental 
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reality that lies behind the beautiful appearance of the material inscriptions 
visant a cote. What Derrida puts into question is the general identification of 
meaning and being -an identification that is formative. as Nietzsche already 
noted. of metaphysics <<as such>>l5 . 
What Emmanuel Levinas wants to track, in Totalite et Infini, is an 
experience of meaning, an appeal, that withdraws from the autonomous 
meaning-constructive activity or project of the intentional subject, and 
thereby thwarts the speculative economy of the phenomenological subject. 
An experience of meaning which is not evoked by an object but by an 
alterity; a meaning that cannot be 
filled by any entity (etant) or being 
(l'etre), and that refers to an 'otherwise than being, or beyond essence', an 
'autrement qu'etre, ou au-de/a de /'essence.' It is about an appeal to which 
the subject must respond yet to which it can never respond adequately, to 
which it can never respond in a (the) proper way. One of the most 
important propaedeutic 
'phenomenological' analyses 
hints at such an experience 
meaning is the description of 
appeal of the feminine I 6 
eroticism. 
Milan Kundera 
that Je voulais poser brutalemenl Ia main sur 
son visage et, en un seul instant, Ia 
of prendre tout enliere, avec toutes ses 
contradictions si inlolt!rablemenl 
the excitantes [ ... ]J'avais /'impression que 
toutes ces contradictions recelaienl sa 
and substance : ce tresor, celle pt!pile d'or, 
ce diamant cacht! dans les profondeurs. 
[ ... ]Certes nous ne sommes pas surs que 
les profondeurs recelenl vraimenl 
quelque chose - mais quoi qu'il en soil, 
en chacun de nous il y a ce geste brutal, 
ce mouvemenl de Ia main qui cherche a 
soulever le visage de /'autre, dans 
l'espoir de trouver, en lui et derriere 
lui, quelque chose qui s'y est cacht!. 
15 La structure, le signe et le jeu, p. 412. 
16 For an analysis of Levinas' notion of the feminine I refer to Tina Chanter, Feminism 
and the 0 ther. 
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La beaute negatrice de l'animalitt!, qui 
George Bataille eveille le de sir, aboutit dans 
l'exasperation du desir a l'exaltation des 
parties animales ! [ ... ]Si Ia beaut<!, dont 
The female seduces. Her beautiful l'achevement rejette l'animalite, est 
passionement desiree, c'est qu'en elle Ia 
appearance and the artful clothing of possession introduit Ia souillure 
anima/e. Elle est desiree pour Ia salir. 
her body have appeal and fascinate. Non pour elle-meme, mais pour Ia joie 
gofltee dans Ia certitude de Ia 
The external appearance refers to profaner. [ ... ]L'attrait d'un beau visage ou 
d'un beau vetement joue dans Ia mesure 
'something' else to which the glance que le beau visage annonce ce que le 
vi!tement dissimule. Ce dont il s'agit est 
looks forward; 'something' that one de profaner ce visage, sa beaute.[ ... ]L a 
beaute importe au premier chef en ce que 
would like to see and yet will never Ia laideur ne peut etre souillee, et que 
/'essence de l'erotisme est Ia souillure. 
really see. The defiant signs of the 
female conceal what they suggest and by so doing are the cause of desire. Of 
course, one could say that the external is of little importance and that it can 
be thrown overboard; that it constitutes but a provisional and hence 
superfluous supplement. What we -in the erotic interest- yearn for is direct 
contact with the naked truth, sans symbole ni suppletif, contact with an 
unmarked and unsignified presence. What lies behind the veil is thought to 
be meaningful in itself, deriving its meaning from itself. 
Yet what would be revealed in such a hypothetical liminal situation (a body 
with no supplementary seductive signs), what would be left over in this 
situation, is an anonymous, impersonal body which would not have much 
appeal and in which one would lose interest - a dead, unsignifying body. One 
would reach the opposite of what one desires: a body that does not appeal, 
that does not evoke anything, leaving nothing to be desired. What makes the 
body attractive is the originary tension of the delay, an originary play of 
revealing and concealing. What is evoked by the difference of the delay is 
not 'something' that one could really see; it is meaningful only in the trace 
of a difference. And yet, if the body is really to have any appeal, then one 
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must fail to appreciate this impossibility, that is to say: must fail to appreciate 
that the secret that is evoked is a secret that cannot bear the light of day. 
Contemporary pornography avidly cashes in on this paradoxical desire that -
among other things- lies at the foundation of sexual curiosity. Pornography 
announces itself under the motto: "here you are finally shown without much 
ado what you have never seen so clearly before and what you in fact have 
always been most anxious to see." Pornography proceeds with a microscopic 
glance: everything is revealed! Yet, by so doing, pornography is in danger 
of deteriorating into its opposite, namely: triteness, boredom. What we are 
shown is an indifferent body that cannot appeal. Everything has become 
real; no longer is anything evoked. A radical disclosure results in a radical 
disenchantment and in a total destruction of meaning. 
The feminine, according to Levinas, lies at the undecidable limit of furtive 
tenderness and an unsignifying, raw and exorbitant ultra-materiality 17. 
The feminine has appeal in and through its subtle tenderness, its extreme 
fragility, the vulnerability of its face: The tender manifests itself at the limit 
of being and non-being, as a soft warmth where being dissipates into 
radiance, like the 'pale blush' of the nymphs in the Afternoon of a Faun, 
which 'leaps in the air drowsy with thick slumbers', dis-individualizing and 
relieving itself of its own weight of being, already evanescence and swoon, 
flight into self in the very midst of its manifestation18. Nowhere is the 
female so vulnerable and hence so attractive (Levinas : Love aims at the 
Other; it aims at him in his frailty ffaiblesse]19) as in its face; the other is 
17 Totality and Infinity, p. 256. 
18 Totality and Infinity, p. 256. 
1 9 Totality and Infinity, p. 256. 
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even so vulnerable that she does not have the power to protect and to defend 
her secret. Yet the extra-ordinary fragility of the feminine lies also at the 
limit of an existence 'without ceremonies', 'without circumlocutions',< <sans 
fards > >, of a non-signifying' and raw 'density', of an 'exorbitant ultra-
materiality20. 
The radical fragility and fugitive subtlety of her face -a non-being that is 
too much to be nothing and too less to be something and that is yet less than 
nothing 21. has an intimate complicity 
with an anonymous carnal density, a 
La carte postale, p. 89: N 0 U S 
sommes des experts de defiant exhibitionism 22, a shameless 
Ia pudeur, Cli!Jsi !JOUS obscenity 23, an overwhelming bodily 
/CiiSSO!JS ses ChCI!JCes a 
!' obsce!Je surplus: a body that gives away its secret, 
no longer shamefully withdrawing in 
itself, instead exhibiting itself shamelessly. Yet a body that exhibits itself in 
this shameless fashion does not receive meaning from the light of day: 
weight of non-signifyingness [non-signifiance]24. What confronts me is a 
paroxism of materiality25 that no longer refers to something else: pure 
voluptuosity. The essentially hidden throws itself toward the light, without 
20 Totality and Infinity, p. 256. 
21 Totality and Infinity, p. 263 
22 Totality and Infinity, p. 256. 
23 Totality and Infinity, p. 263. 
24 Totality and Infinity, p. 257. 
25 Totality and Infinity, p. 256. 
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becoming signification. Not nothingness -but what is not yet 26. The 
feminine as profanation of her secret: the personal face flows into an 
impersonal body, a noctural there is [il y a]. In the effrontery of its 
production this clandestinity ['what is not yet': not a this or a that ; non-
essence, the essence of which is exhausted by clandestinity] avows a 
nocturnal life not equivalent to a diurnal life simply deprived of light2 7. 
And then this intimate intertwining or equivocation of fragility and 
indecency28 explodes in a burst of laughter: this is not serious any more29. 
We reach a level where seriousness is totally lacking, and where we can only 
laugh about the futility of all that which we take so seriously and have to 
take so seriously in order to be able to laugh about it -because it is all just -, 
non-verite, less than nothing. In the feminine face the purity of expression 
is already troubled by the equivocation of the voluptuous. Expression is 
inverted into indecency, already close to the equivocal which says less than 
nothing, already laughter and raillery30. The face [ ... ] in its feminine 
epiphany dissimulates allusions, innuendos. It laughs under the cloak of its 
own expression, without leading to any specific meaning, hinting in the 
empty air, signaling the less than nothing31. The secret which the female, 
26 Totality and Infinity, p. 256. 
2 7 Totality and Infinity, p. 257. 
28 Totality and Infinity, p. 260. 
29 Totality and Infinity, p. 263. 
3 0 Totality and Infinity, p. 260. 
3 I Totality and Infinity, p. 264. 
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or the text3 2, evokes is not 'something'; it is 'otherwise than being'. The 
secret appears without appearing, not because it would appear halfway, or 
with reservations, or in confusion3 3 . 'Appears without appearing': the 
secret is not 'something' that could fill up our desire. 
The movement of the lover who is seized by shameful defiance and who 
abandons himself to the appeal of the female, is the caress, Ia caresse34. The 
caress feels and handles, seizes beyond the felt, goes further than the senses; 
it searches, forages, in search of the secret, the invisible: marche a 
l'invisibJe35 -a movement toward the invisibJe36. It is driven on by the 
impossibility of expressing what it wants to express: In a certain sense it 
expresses love, but suffers from an inability to tell it31. Urged on by this 
impossibility the caress goes on, to the limit: its movement consists in going 
beyond the possibJe38. The caress is disrespectful, it coerces the untouched 
3 2 Cf. M. Blanchot, The dread of reading (I' angoisse de lire), as quoted/translated in A. 
Warminski, Readings or Interpretations, p. 183; cf. Spurs/Eperons, p. 130-32: 
Cette restance n' est entratnee en aaucun trajet circulaire, aucune itiniraire propre entre 
son origine et sa fin. Son mouvement n' a aucun centre. Structurellement emancipee de 
tout vouloir-dire vivant, e/le peut toujours ne rien vouloir-dire, n' avoir aucun sens 
decidable, jouer parodiquement au sens, se deporter par greffe, sans fin, hors de tout 
corps contextuel ou de tout code fini. Lisible comme un ecrit, eel inedit peut toujours 
rester secret, non qu'il detienne un secret mais parce qu'il peut toujours en manquer et 
simuler une verite cacht!e dans ses plis. 
3 3 Totality and Inrinity, p. 257. 
34 Totality and Inrinity, p. 257. 
35 Totalite et Inrini, p. 235 
3 6 Totality and Infinity, p. 261. 
3 7 Totality and Inrinity, p. 258. 
3 8 Totality and Infinity, p. 261. 
104 
feminine secret to show itself, it forces an ingress to the impossible. The 
stroking caress desecrates; nothing is spared; it wants to take possession of 
everything; the desire that animates it is in pursuit of the impossible. To 
discover here means to violate, rather than to disclose a secret3 9. The 
indiscrete caress is essentially bound to the profanation and tarnishing of 
the secret of the female. 
The profanation which intervenes, which insinuates itself in caressing, and 
which is inherent in its movement, can be definitive and painful: destroying 
the secret of the female, a complete tarnishing, radically humiliating the 
female and reducing her to an insignificant object. The female is therefore 
really vulnerable in sexuality. The caress can and is to be as desecrating, as 
disrespectful and as objectifying as the microscopic impudence of the 
pornographer's glance. The female is therefore radically put at stake in 
eroticism. The risk of destructive tarnishing is a consequence of the appeal 
of the face. Profanation, disrespect, presupposes the face: it is necessary 
that the face (the hard resistance of these eyes without protection - what is 
softest and most uncovered40) has been apperceived for nudity to be able to 
acquire the non-signifyingness of the lustful41. We really want to see the 
impossible that is evoked because the face has appeal for us; and we thereby 
run the risk that nothing is left over. The being-without-meaning, non-
signifyingness, is already close at hand in the face, lying at wait in the 
signifyingness of the face: La non-signifiance se tient dans Ia signifiance42. 
This presence of non-signifyingness in the signifyingness of the face, or 
39 Totality and Infinity, p. 260. 
40 Totality and Infinity, p. 262. 
41 Totality and Infinity, p. 262. 
4 2 Totalite et lnfini, p. 240. 
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this reference of the non-signifyingness to signifyingness is the primordial 
event of feminine beaury43. 
Yet, on the other hand, profanation, at the moment it goes to the extreme 
impossibility, can be affected in tum, precisely in and through the failure to 
filch the secret from the female, by the transcendence of the secret. The 
caress can experience the hidden as an impenetrable (and essentially 
inviolable) secret44, precisely in its inability to grasp it, in its inability still 
to be able to. 
There is no way of getting around this double possibility or this equivocation 
of eroticism, of the caress, of the tenderness of the face and the anonimity of 
the naked body -where the chastity and decency of the face abides at the 
limit of the obscene yet repelled but already close at hand and promising45. 
One has to abandon oneself to this play, and it is to this play that one 
abandons oneself when the feminine face has a real appeal in eroticism. Yet 
the risk of a loss of meaning is herewith inevitable. The two moments -
experience of meaning and loss of meaning- are ineluctably interwoven 
with one another: fragility and obscene ultra-materiality, caress and 
indecent profanation. The point of transition is unmasterable. However, I 
cannot pursue this tarnishing for itself so as to call up the experience of 
meaning again. Such a tarnishing is calculating and hence is not taking 
real chances. And that is the non-dialectical intertwining of the 
noneconomic de-regulation and the economic calculation of difference. 
Derrida's analysis of difference is not a hysteric glorification of an 
4 3 Totality and Infinity, p. 263. 
44 Cf. La double seance, Diss 
45 Totality and Infinity, p. 263. 
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unattainable, idealized and ideal object of love which is so complete that it 
itself cannot be a sign of desire, and cannot show any such sign. In hysteria 
there is an unbridgable gap between the 
'subject' and the object of love. Yet in hysteria 
the object of love is idealized to the extent that 
one never has to engage oneself really: the 
glorification of the impossible love4 6. In 
L' aphorisme a contretemps, 
no. 17: Un gage peut 
toujours s' inverser qui 
garde Ia mort. 
hysteria, the delay is cultivated as such; the difference for the sake of 
difference, the impossibility of a secret love-relation is aimed at as an end in 
itself. Hysteria is the desire for desire as an end in itself. By idealizing the 
object of love as an impossibile, hysteria secludes itself from the possible 
failure in a love-relation: a pure (impossible) love which no outside, no 
corporeality puts at stake. In a certain respect, the hysteric love-relation 
with an unattainable ideal cannot fail; but as a result any concrete love-
relation becomes a priori impossible and is doomed in advance to fail. Real 
involvement in a love-relation means that one fails to appreciate the 
impossibility of the impossible by s the impossible at stake sand by defying 
it; real involvement means that one accepts the risk of losing the object of 
love definitively. 
La carte postale, p. 39: Ia preuve, mais vivante 
justement, qu'une lettre peut toujours ne pas arriver 
a destination, et que done jamais e/le n'y arrive. Et 
c'est bien ainsi, ce n'est pas un malheur. c'est Ia vie, 
Ia vie vivante, battue. Ia tragtdie. par Ia vie encore 
survivante. Pour cela, pour Ia vie je dois te perdre, 
pour Ia vie. el me rendre pour toi illisible. J' 
accepte 
Das Einer 
vertheidigen 
folglich auch 
gereicht ihm 
Augen noch 
sich nicht 
kann und 
nicht will, 
in unsern 
nicht zur 
46 For an more elaborate analysis of hysteria in terms of cultivation of difference for 
difference's sake I refer to Anton Vergote, Bekentenis en begeerte in de religie, 
in particular the chapter on the structural moments in hysteria. 
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Schande: aber wir schatzen Den gering, der zur Rache weder das Vermogen 
noch den Guten Willen hat,-gleichgultig ob Mann oder Weib. Wurde uns ein 
Weib festhalten (oder wie man sagt "fesseln") konnen, dem wir nicht 
zutrauten, dass es unter Umstanden den Dolch (irgend eine Art von Dolch) 
gegen uns gut zu handhaben wusste? Oder gegen sich: was in einem 
bestimmten Faile die empfindlichere Rae he ware (die chinesische Rache) -, 
reads Fahigkeit zur Rache4 7. In a love-relation I always relate myself to the 
possible death, loss or infidelity of the beloved. An object of love has appeal 
for us if and only if we can really lose the object. When I am certain that the 
other will never leave me in the lurch and cannot, and never will, radically 
say no, then the other ceases to have appeal. A love-relation is imposible 
without the constant 
and painful awareness that my love is 
vulnerable and that the other can hurt 
me. True fidelity supposes the risk and 
possibility of infidelity. Infidelity and 
loss of the beloved are no me an s and 
ends, but an inevitable risk that one 
cannot calculate. The demand for 
recognition which is, aforehand, 
certain of being recognized and which 
does not really take chances by 
La carte postale, p. 90: ( h 0 U I, 
c'est /0 notre lot trag/que, 
mon doux amour, l'atroce 
loterie, mais je commence 
a t'aimer depuis cet 
impossible. { .. ] Oui, un 
lot, l'atroce loterie, nous 
ne pouvons ni nous garder 
ni nous perdre, et c'est ce 
qui nous a/me, ce qui nous 
retient «par coeur». 
running the real risk of being denied or rejected, is a recognition that 
means nothing. It is precisely in this possible denial that the other reveals 
herself in her radical transcendence. 
4 7 Die frohliche Wissenschaft, Zweites Buch, section 69. 
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La carte postale, p. 156: <<Que/que destinataire>> finit alors, a mesure que 
/'approche, /'approximation, /'appropriation, /'<<introjection>> progressent, par ne plus 
rien pouvoir demander qui ne soil deja souffle par moi. Tout se corrompt ainsi, i/ n'y a 
que du miroir, plus d'image, ils ne se voient plus, ne se destinent plus, plus rien. Tu 
crois que c'est cet epuisement qui nous arrive? Nous nous serions trop 
aimes. Mais c' est toi que j' aime encore, la vivante. Au-dela 
de tout, au-dela de ton nom, ton nom au-deta de ton nom. 
To be certain at first that the Other will fully understand me so that the 
possibility of a radical non-understanding is excluded, is an understanding 
that means nothing at all4 8. True loyalty consists precisely in this 
willingness to follow the beloved beyond recognition, beyond the grave, 
beyond reason49. Le plus grand amour naft de /a plus grande force de 
dissociation50, whether it is about texts51,femmes52, Baubo. 
48 Cf. the experience machine in R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia; although 
this experiment was set up primarily to convey the point that, somehow, something other 
than how our lives feel from the inside matters or, in other words, that humans are 
essentially symbolic creatures, it is very much in line with the experiment to say that 
the recognition we could get from a soundboard person whose responses are programmed 
and cannot say no, would be worthless. To add to the experiment, one could imagine the 
despair afflicting a person who's bereft of her lover's affection. Would the Ersatz 
impressions the machine could provide her with satisfy her? No. For our person is not 
merely in pursuit of the pleasant effects her lover could provide her with: she wants her 
lover's affection back, not just the impression. And to that extent she must assume the 
risk that, as I put it, the other will say no. Throughout La carte postale and 
Memoires: for Paul de Man, Derrida touches upon the question of the profound 
impasse of desire directed to alterity: the interiorizing drive tends to reduce the other 
to a character in a narrative we tell to ourselves (En vo is, p. 156); yet friendship 
presupposes the alterity of the other: Pas de litterature avec c;a, pas avec toi mon amour 
(Envois, p. 34-5). For a literary elaboration on the theme of the impasse of desire I 
refer to John Fowles, The Collector. If this Nozickian analysis of our attachment to 
the other is correct, one might as well wonder what this might tell us about what we call 
the love of wisdom, that is, our attachment to something like a discipline. 
49 La carte postale, p. 90-1: Ce ma/heur sans fond, le desastre de cette chance, je 
comprends que les autres n' arrivent pas a le supporter, il est insupportable et moi-
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L'aphorisme a contretemps, In his analysis of the originary supplement (the 
p. 523: J' aime parce que 
/'autre est /'autre, parce que delay as origin) Derrida shows that the presence 
son temps ne sera jamais le 
mien. La duree vivante, Ia of an ultimate signified with no supplementary 
presence meme de son amour 
reste infiniment e/oignee de delay is impossible and remains an unattainable 
Ia mienne, et cela jusque 
dans ce que I' on voudrait ideal. Moreover, the realization of such an ideal 
decrire comme I' euphorie 
amoureuse, Ia communion (a thinking without words, a body without 
extatique, I' intuition 
mystique. Je ne peux aimer supplementary signs, a presence without the 
/'autre que dans Ia passion 
de eel aphorisme. Celui-ci mark of absence .. ) would mean -considered 
n' advient pas, il ne survient 
pas comme /e malheur, Ia hypothetically- the death of all meaning. Yet 
rna/chance ou Ia migativite. 
II a Ia forme de /'affirmation such an ideal -which at the same time is no ideal 
Ia plus aimante -il est Ia 
chance du desir. at all- is unattainable not because our human 
resources fall short of the mark, but because it is 
intrinsically impossible. Nothing corresponds to this ideal. Derrida's 
<<philosophy>> of difference is not an unmasking of our desire. It does not 
tell us that desire, for its finitude, should liberate itself from the illusion of 
attaining the impossible since the impossible is really nothing (an 
unexisting shade, a Chinese shade), and that from now on we should content 
ourselves with mere Ersatz-objects (whatever these may be). Derrida does 
not replace an impossible ideal by another one. Neither does his philosophy 
have in view a Stoic attitude by which we could shield ourselves from the 
painful and dramatic Joss of meaning so that the difference does not really 
concern us any more, that is to say, becomes in-different; it does not intend 
an attitude by which we could mask our impotence and failure. Desire 
m~me je ne cherche pas a le supporter. On ne peut que s' essoufler a en avoir raison 
(d' oil Ia raison, qui n' est rien d' autre, mais avec el/e nous ne nous aimons pas) 
50 L' aphorisme a contretemps, p. 524. 
51 Cf. Ja, ou le faux-bond 
52 Cf. La carte postale, p. 34. 
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remains tied to this impossibility: rapport sans rapport. To be really 
concerned with the radical alterity of this impossibility means to abandon 
oneself to it, to surrender to it, to put oneself and the secret at stake. Even if 
it all comes to nothing. We can only laugh about it, however painful loss 
may be. This is the paradoxical interspace in which the Derridean play of 
difference joue. And to this risk of meaning loss we should respond with an 
ungeheure unbegrenzte fa 53. 
Da, da -in Russian, that is ... 
53 Glas, p. 29Jb. 
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5 ./Psychoanalytic discourse 
C'est Ia logique 
inimag inable, impensable 
meme de ce pas au-de/il qui 
m'interesse. 
has always drawn Derrida's interest. In Freud et Ia 
scene de I' ecriture, a text which, like De Ia 
gram mat o I o g i e, dates from 1966, Derrida 
describes, in the following rather general terms, 
the affinity (Verwandschaft) between Freud's oeuvre and the 
deconstruction of Western metaphysics: Notre ambition est tres limitee: 
reconnaitre dans le texte de Freud quelques points de repere et isoler, au 
seuil d' une reflexion organisee, ce qui de Ia psychanalyse se laisse mal 
contenir dans Ia cloture logocentrique, telle qu' elle limite non seulement 
I' his to ire de Ia philosophie mais le mouvement des <<sciences humaines> >, 
notamment d' une certaine linguistiquel. 
The Freudian unconscious cannot easily be encapsulated within a philosophy 
of presence2: id is neither something that could ever present 'itself' to 
consciousness, nor does it constitute a hidden or virtual presence which 
could be revealed through a patient labor of awakening. The unconscious is 
not an entity, not a deeper reality or being, but a radical alterity3, or 
I Freud et Ia scene de /' ecriture, p. 296. 
2 Sarah Kofman, LsD, p. 55: Comme l'ecriture [l'inconscient] est atopique, comme e/le, 
i/ derange /' economie domestique, met Ia maison sens dessus dessous. L' originalite de Ia 
psychanalyse n' est pas d' avoir in vente /'inconscient mais de /' avoir insert! partout et 
pourtant de ne /' avoir fait apparaitre nulle part, en propre. en personne. Une telle 
notion, comme /' ecriture, brise toute limite et toute marge, ebranle done profondement Ia 
metaphysique. 
3 La differance, p. 21: En ce sens, contrairement aux termes d'un vieux debat. fort de 
to us ses investissements metaphysiques qu' il a toujours engages, I' <<inconscient>> n' est 
pas plus une <<chose>> qu'autre chose, pas plus une chose qu'une conscience virtuel/e ou 
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differance 4 . From within, consciousness is forced constantly to confront 
itself with an impossibility that resists all attempts at Be herr s c hung: time 
and time again the unconscious kicks over the traces of consciousness, 
imposing itself as an elusive traceS in the track of certain symptoms. 
Symptoms constitute material breaking points wherein consciousness is no 
longer able to present itself and to shield itself from the signifying activity 
of the unconscious. Yet symtoms are merely A b k om m I in g e, that is, 
descendants, derivatives or posteriors, of the unconscious . The unconscious 
reveals itself in the paradoxical opening of delay, I' apres-coup; it leaps away 
at the moment it manifests itself: le retardement [Nachtriiglichkeit; I' apres-
co up] is the basic structure of the unconscious6. In this sense the 
unconscious constitutes an originary past that has never been present -a 
past that can no longer be understood from an originary now-moment. It is 
always gone, revealing itself only apres-coup, in and as trace?. 
Difference, as the production of a spatial interval between distinct 
inscriptions, directly links up with Freud's metapsychology. From Die 
masquee. Cette alterite radicale par rapport a tout mode possible de presence se marque 
en des effets irreductibles d'apres-coup, de retardement. 
4 La differance, p. 21; Sarah Kofman, LsD, p. 56. 
5 Freud et Ia scene de /'ecriture, p. 317: Nous pensons ici [ .. ] au travail itinerant de Ia 
trace, produisant et non parcourant sa route, de Ia trace qui trace, de Ia trace qui se 
fraye elle-meme son chemin. La metaphore du chemin fraye, [ .. ]. communique toujours 
avec /e theme du retardement supplementaire et de Ia reconstitution du sens apres-
coup, apres un cheminement de taupe, apres le labeur souterrain d'une impression. 
Celle-ci a Iaisse une trace travailleuse qui n' a jamais ete per~ue [ .. ]. 
6 La difjerance, pp. 21-2; Sarah Kofman, LsD, pp. 60-1. 
7 La difjerance, p. 22; Freud et Ia scene de /'ecriture, pp. 317-18, p. 324; Sarah Kofman, 
LsD, pp. 60-1; Emmanuel Levinas, La trace de /'autre, pp. 200-02. 
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Traum deutung onwards Freud conceives of the psychic apparatus as an 
ingenious writing machineS that is capable of retaining past traces while 
continuing to register ever new impressions9. Moreover, Freud manipulates 
a scriptural model for the unconscious [the dream as hieroglyphe, rebus; the 
unconscious as consisting of pictural object-representations]. The 
unconscious, in Derrida's reading of Freud, consists of a network of 
pictographic inscriptions that are not, however, the secondary 
precipitations of the spoken word, of more originary acoustical word-
representations: the unconscious as archi-ecriturelO. 
To the extent that the unconscious consists of material inscriptions, it can 
never be translated or decipherd exhaustively, that is, without loss. No doubt, 
Freud at several places affirms his belief in the generality and fixedness of 
some code for oniric writing. Does he not state that there exists a relation of 
translation(Ubersetzung) and transcription (Umschrift) between, on the one 
hand, the manifest content of a dream and, on the other hand, the 
unconscious dream-thoughts 11. But from what Freud is able to do with a 
dream, as he interprets, it appears that no perfect decoding of a dream is 
possible, that there always remains an untranslatable supplementary 
remainder, the trace of which cannot be effaced or left out of accouml2. So 
8 As regards logocentrism and machineries, see tympan, pp. xxi-xxii; le puits et Ia 
pyramide, p. 126. 
9 Sarah Koman, LsD, pp. 62-3. 
10 Sarah Kofman, LsD, p. 64; Freud et Ia scene de l'ecriture, pp. 312-14. 
11 S. Freud, Le Moi et le <;a, p. 615, as quoted in Freud et Ia scene de I' ecriture, p. 
313. 
12 What thus cannot, should not be left out of account is the unaccountable, what enters 
no accounts- the condition for the possibility of interpretation and its limit. 
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a tension seems to arise between what Freud says (eine vollstiindige und 
gesicherte Ubersetzung) and what he does (leaving the remainder): what he 
does makes it impossible to concieve of the relation between the manifest 
and the latent text as a falsifying translation which would be returned or 
restored to its proper truth, through some analytical maieutics. 
To translate, then, would be to drop the remainder -which precisely makes 
up the specificity of the dream: for the manifest content does not relate to 
unconscious thoughts as a deficient expression or an abridged 
representation of an unconscious content that would be constituted of itself 
and that could be represented literally; the unconscious is not the storage 
place of a literal signification that, once constituted, could then be expressed 
-after a deformed, deflected or disguised fashion- in a symptom 1 3. 
Psychoanalysis does not search for a literal interpretation of symptoms: no 
proper interpretation 
itself only in the 
of symptoms is possible. The 
originary ecart of an originary 
unconscious reveals 
deviation 14. The 
unconscious is text: deja tisse de traces pures, de differences ou s' unissent le 
sens et Ia force, texte nul/e part present, constitue d' archives qui sont 
toujours deja des transcriptions. Des estampes originaires15. The 
unconscious is already an unsurveyable web of inscriptions repeating other 
inscriptions: Tout commence par Ia reproduction16. The reproduction 
produces the meaning of the unconscious traces: I' appel au supplement est 
13 Freud et Ia scene de l'ecriture, pp. 312-14; Sarah Kofman, LsD, pp. 63-4. 
14 Cf. Ia mythologie blanche, p. 273. 
15 Freud et Ia scene de l't!criture, p. 314. 
16 Freud et Ia scene de l'ecriture, p. 314; Sarah Kofman, LsD, p. 64. 
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ici originaire et ere use ce qu' on reconstitue a retardement comme le 
present17. 
Psychoanalytic labor does not aim at rendering the symptom superfluous by 
presenting the unconscious content in a nonfigural way to consciousness. 
For no literal signification could replace the symptom. Moreover, a symptom 
has no proper meaning: its signification is endlessly overdetermined. But in 
the symptom the affect-laden process of signification has come to rest, to a 
dead end. To put that process back in motion, that is what the psychoanalytic 
labor aims at: the symptom might lose its obsessive pressure, its stifling 
squeeze by being repeated in different contexts. Far from interpreting 
symptoms, in the sense of giving meaning to the apparently meaningless, 
the effect of analytic labor is ultimately one of ridicule: the symptom is 
dissolved for rendered futile. 
Freud -together with Fr. Nietzsche and G. Bataille- is an important reference 
for understanding the economic structure of difference 1 8. What is of 
particular interest in Freud is the interlacing of Eros and Thanatos. 
Speculer-sur <<Freud>> is Derrida's reading of Jenseits des Lustprinzips, 
a text that must be read or translated as Pas au-dela du principe de plaisir. 
Each step which Freud undertakes in pointing out 'something' that 
transcends or deregulates the pleasure principle is then, in a second move, 
reinterpreted as constituting a detour (ein Umweg 19) in the service of the 
pleasure principle. Each step (pas ) beyond hence constitutes un ne pas au-
17 Freud et Ia scene de l'ecriture, p. 314. 
18 La differance, pp. 13-20. 
19 La carte postale, p. 304. 
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dela: Freud does not get any step further20: no position can be pointed out 
that would be contrary to the pleasure principle, or that would be 
dialectically opposed to it. Freud's text is fundamentally a-thetic21 This 
failure or impossibility constitutes the basic structure of Jenseits des 
Lustprinzips. Yet this inability has a curious repercussion on the style, on 
the writing of this text. What Freud wants to, but cannot describe, 
accomplishes itself, behind his back, in his writing, there where neither 
Freud nor the pleasure principle would have expected it. The text itself takes 
the (impossible) form of a Jenseits des Lustprinzips. What takes place as 
Freud writes Jenseits des Lustprinzips is, hence, an example of a Jenseits 
that cannot be mastered. Freud's text takes the form of the examples he puts 
forward and that should have put him on the track of a Jenseits; the text 
becomes an example of an example. And so the demoniacal character of 
Freud's text is itself the best example of the demoniacal efficacy of that 
'something' which the text aims at mastering. 
One of the best known access routes to get on the track of an impossible 
Jenseits istheFort!Da game. Now, the text itself takes the structure of a 
Fort!Da. For instance, Nietzsche and philosophy time and time again crop up 
in Freud's argumentation, and are time and time again thrown away22. 
Through this unexpected reading of Derrida we can get an idea of the 
originary interlacing of Eros and Thanatos: the death-drive is essentially 
not the dialectical anti pole of Eros; Thanatos is, rather, an intrinsic 
possibility at work in any drive: Mais par quel bout que l' on pre nne cette 
20 La carte postale, p. 357: les pas au-de/a du principe de plaisir, tous ces pas qui 
n' avancent pas. 
21 La carte postale, p. 279. 
2 2 La carte postale, p. 323. 
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structure a un-deux-trois termes [deux principes plus ou moins Ia 
differance, that is] , c' est Ia mort. Au bout, et cette mort n' est pas opposable, 
elle n' est pas differente, dans le sens de I' opposition, des deux principe et de 
leur differance. Elle est inscrite, quoique non inscriptible, dans le proces de 
cette structure [ .. ] Si Ia mort n' est pas opposable, elle est, deja, Ia vie Ia 
mort23. 
The economic deregulation which the death drive causes can, hence, in no 
way be mastered or dominated. In that way Derrida can clarify the 
nondialectical, incalculable economic structure of differance. 
The affinity with Freud does not reside in what Freud explicitly says in his 
metapsychology. On the contrary: Derrida reads, uses, abuses Freud against 
Freud, to the extent that Freud still allows for, if not promotes a dialectical 
interpretation of certain binary oppositions. 
what Freud does when he analyses symptoms. 
The affinity may consist in 
Derrida shows how that which philosophy excludes, suppresses and 
represses, in order to safeguard the distinction between itself and other 
nonphilosophical practices of meaning (literature, rhetoric), to protect its 
ideal of pure rationality and of a perfect adequation between the order of 
expression and the order of the expressed, always returns in the writing 
itself of philosophy. This implies that, from within, this ideal is made 
impossible by writing and, hence, that the separation or distinction itself is 
impure 24. Through its own materiality which always returns within 
philosophy, the purely rational activity which philosophy aspires to be, 
becomes impossible. 
23 La carte postale, p. 305. 
24 Cf. La loi du genre, pp. 178-79. 
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Repression, according to Freud, can never be completely successful: that is 
precisely why repression is meaningful. Traces of the repressed mark the 
psychism, as symptoms. Symptoms are the traces of an unsuccessful 
repression. Derrida too searches for traces of an unsuccessful repression25. 
The separation of -for instance- rhetoric and philosophy can only be 
successful (and meaningful) if it, simultaneously, fails. Since philosophy is 
not able to suppress its own material frame definitely, Derrida in turn is able 
to read a philosophical text as a symptom26. 
In this sense philosophy, from within, always enters into a relation with a 
material exteriority that transgresses the distinction between the inside and 
the outside. As writing, philosophy transgresses, in spite of itself, its own 
borders, and is put in touch with an exteriority that it cannot really control. 
A text is always written with a double hand, whereby the one effaces what 
the other writes down and means, whereby the· one appears as the inevitable 
slippage of what the other wants to say, takes back what the other throws 
away, keeps what the other forgets. A philosophical text is unrolled on a 
double scene, whereby that which is expelled from one scene returns on the 
other, through some backdoor. What is logically, grammatically composed on 
the one scene is decomposed on the other. As writing, philosophy is recorded 
on two registers, the one making impossible what the other -failing to 
appreciate this impossibility and constituted by this failure- wants to 
attain27. 
25 Cf. Freud et Ia scene de I' ecriture, p. 293. 
26 Pos, p. 15. 
27 Pos, p. 14; Pos, p. 56 note 4. 
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In writing it is inevitable that there appears, in the text, puns and 
metaphors, fortunate and unfortunate choices of word, badly chosen 
examples which the author afterwards declares he did not really want to 
introduce, unnecessary digressions, rhetorical changes in tempo, references 
that are made but not elaborated upon for so-called economic reasons, 
footnotes, semantic ramifications, details that leap to the eyes and kick over 
the traces... All these things are part of the external frame through which 
something can be said and within which a text can present itself as a self-
contained unit, a rounded-off whole: the material frame that is external to 
the ideal of an internal, logically consistent exposition. Such exclusions, 
failures, condensations and shiftings are part of the ritual of a text -a ritual 
that draws a line which one should not transgress, and that links up with an 
exterior that eludes the internal logic. Derrida reads these phenomena as 
symptoms: they lie on the brink, on the border between the inside and the 
outside of a text. They round off a text; but they are also marginal 
indentations that put a text out of its logical joints. They are marginal notes 
and details which force open a text, and precisely there where it apparently 
manages to seclude itself. They institute the opposite of what a metaphysical 
text wants to achieve, namely: a perfect adequation between the order of the 
signifier and the order of the signified. They cause an irreducible and 
untranslatable imbalance between the two levels. The exterior of a text: 
there where a text no longer intends to, nor can say anything. 
where a link is made with the unthought and unsaid of a text. 
The points 
Although they 
are also in the text, they constitute an untranslatable surplus of inscriptions 
that cannot be paraphrased and recuperated in and by a literal, general, 
homogeneous interpretation. For all these futile, ludicrous details in the 
external frame, a text can never completely be substituted by, and dissolved 
in another text. This surplus which a text produces does not consist in an 
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abundance of signification that would lie behind the text, but in a network 
of irreplaceable material inscriptions. It is through these marginal notes 
that a text continues to signify. Remove the external frame -so as to establish 
a perfect adequation between the expression and the expressed-, and what 
one ends up with is a dead, insignificant fossil, about which nothing can be 
said. These symptoms are the last living witnesses of an irresolvable tension 
occuring between the inside and the outside (the unsaid, the unthought), 
that is: of the failed separation between the inside and the outside. It is 
through these edging notes that the outside -in its absence- remains at work, 
and keeps on signifying, appealing28. 
A literal interpretation would like to protect and overprotect a text against all 
possible misunderstandings and misuses, against all possible bordercrossings 
and superfluous 
philosophical text 
details whichthreaten the pure internal logic of a 
and put it at stake, en jeu, en feu. Through an 
exaggerated, or cramped, faithfulness to the text one would like to exclude all 
that through which the proper meaning of a text could be lost. A literal 
interpretation wants to realize the ideal of a philosophical text: throwing 
overboard all material details and everything that is part of the frame, 
retaining only the proper literal meaning. But the outcome of this operation 
would be, rather, that there remains nothing of the fascinating appeal of 
that text. Derrida, on the other hand, does not want to protect a text and 
render it invulnerable: he confronts a text in its weak moments -moments in 
which a text avows its inability and impossibility. A text only appeals in so 
far as it fails and is unable to realize its own ideal. A text donne a penser in 
its impouvoir. In his commentary on Rousseau, in De Ia grammatologie, 
Derrida writes that the double scene of a text consists in -among other 
28 Cf. G, p. 441. 
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things- the distinction between, on the one hand, that which an author 
wishes, says, explains, declares and wants to achieve and, on the other hand, 
what he accomplishes as he writes29. What Rousseau wants, is the originary 
origin, pure presence, the pure voice, pleasure itself, Ia vie mains Ia mort. 
But what he describes is the lethal supplement, the loss of the origin, the 
impossible presence, Ia vie Ia mort. Now Derrida does not resolve the tension 
between those two texts -the doubling or repetition of a text within a text: for 
the text in the text is not the bearer of the truth, the as yet hidden literal 
meaning of the first text. The text in the text institutes, rather, the definitive 
impossibility of the other -an impossibility which the manifest text attempts 
to hide as much as possible. On the other hand, Derrida does not want to 
unmask Rousseau's impossible desire either. He rewrites and repeats 
Rousseau's text and desire in a syntax, in a textual movement without 
beginning nor end, and it is in this way that Rousseau's textual desire is 
overflown by its own impossibility. The desire for the origin and ultimate 
fulfilment is meaningful only against the background of an irresolvable 
impossibility. The double bottom of a text is rewritten in a textual movement 
without ground, sans fond, sans origine : Parler d' origine et de degre zero 
commente en effet I' intention declaree de Rousseau [ .. ] Mais en depit de cette 
intention declaree, le discours de Rousseau se laisse contraindre par une 
complexite qui a toujours Ia forme du supplement d' origine. Son intention 
declaree n' est pas annulee mais inscrite dans un systeme qu' elle domine 
plus. Le desir de I' origine devient une fonction indispensable et 
indestructible mais situee dans une syntaxe sans origine30. 
29 G, pp. 325-26; pp. 441-42. 
30 G, p. 345 
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Derrida plays with philosophy; he engages himself, putting himself and 
philosophy at stake -because he loves philosophy. He cannot desist from 
responding to an appeal -<<viens, oui>>, <<le desir de router vers Ia mer>>3!_ to 
which he has no real response. He goes along, not knowing where he will 
end up3 2-he has accepted. He loves the texts which he reads, tries to 
understand and, indeed, tries to master3 3. In this way he relates himself -
rapport sans rappon34_ to the ineffable (what cannot really, not literally be 
said), the unthought of a text: to that which in a text donne a penser, and 
which the text cannot dominate; that which is absent, and must remain 
absent in a text35. Only a number of symptoms of this absence are left in the 
text. To try and think through what a text attempts to grasp means to dwell 
in, and to concern oneself with, that which inevitably eludes the potence or 
ability of that text. To write means to engrave in the margin(s) of that text, 
in those spots where the text does not and cannot mean to say anything any 
more. Really to relate oneself to the unthought does not mean to withdraw 
oneself timorously, lowly, respectfully before that impossibility and that 
secret which the text refuses to give away. To relate oneself to the 
unthought means to challenge the text, to do violence to it, to force and 
coerce it, to use and abuse it, making it say what it cannot say; to tie a text 
from within to its own inability, impouvoir. And then to release the text, 
stained and tarnished, to let it loose again, to return it to itself. Were that tie 
31 Ja, ou le faux-bond, p. 112; cf. Fr. Nietzsche, Morgenrothe, section 423, lm grossem 
Schweigen. 
32 Cf. Entre crochets, p. 109. 
33 Ja, ou le faux-bond, p. 112. 
34 Entre crochets, p. 106. 
35 Ja, ou /e faux-bond, p. 99. 
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with the impossible to disappear, then a text would become insignificant, 
unappealing, uninteresting: indifferent36. One really relates oneself to the 
signifying strength of a text only at the moment that one experiences one's 
inability to make the text say what it cannot say, the moment one can no 
longer follow and control the text: <<J'ai peur>>: ce n'est jamais tout a fait moi, 
ni Ia peur Ia mienne. Ce sont aussi des fonctions dans le texte, dans Ia logique 
de Ia scene qui s'y joue. Peur parce que sans cesse le cheval que j'enfourche. 
le texte, Ia force textuelle sur laquelle je monte doit etre plus forte que moi, 
ne pas se laisser dominer, dompter, maitriser par le mors qu'elle a ou que je 
lui mets ou que je lui prends dans Ia bouche. Sans quoi, aucun interet. J'ai 
peur parce que >a me regarde, parce que /'autre chose me regarde faire et 
m'entraine au moment meme ou je multiplie les gestes de maftrise. [ .. ] Ne pas 
le brider: j'ai deja dit pourquoi (forme et sens) brider s'imposait et de ne pas 
brider. C'est qu'aussi, au moment ou je lis et travaille tel ou tel texte de Genet, 
il est tout a fait ailleurs, loin de ces textes-ci, loin de Ia litterature, etc., me fait 
faux-bond, et que j'aime ,a, /'admire et m'en rejouis. J'essaie aussi de faire Ia 
meme chose37. 
Yes, le plus grand amour ... 
36 Entre crochet, pp. 108-09; Ja, ou le faux-bond, p. 113. 
37 Ja, ou le faux-bond, p. 112-13; Moira Gatens drew my attention to the following 
section in S. Freud, The Ego and the ld, p. 25: The functional importance of the ego is 
manifested in the fact that normally control over the approaches to motility devolves 
upon it. Thus in relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in 
check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do 
so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. The analogy may be carried 
a little further. Often a rider. if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to 
guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming 
the id' s will into action as if it were its own. 
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6./The line which philosophy 
Vielmehr ist 
Charakteristische 
das 
wants to draw, and to safeguard, between itself der 
ritue/len Handlung gar keine and 
Ansicht, Meinung, ob sie nun other 
richtig oder falsch ist, meaning, is 
obgleich eine Meinung -ein 
Glaube- selbst auch rilue/1 number 
sein kan, zum Ritus gehoren of 
nonphilosophical practices of 
based -among other things- on a 
hierarchically structured and 
kann. 
L. Wittgenstein axiologically tainted oppositions. If one is to 
repeat this conceptual framework, and to rewrite 
it in a text or movement without ultimate ground, then one will have to be 
careful that the 'concepts' with which deconstruction operates are not 
lapped up and neutralized by the logic ofdas Begriff. Moreover, one will 
have to take care that these unmasterable concepts do not remain exte rna/ to 
the text that is rewritten, but instead are brought to the fore within the text 
itself: an exteriority within the text1. Deconstruction must hence 
accomplish a double gesture2: prima, it must risk an ex abrupto changement 
de terrain and force a brutal outbreak; time and time again it must affirm 
and mark the break with, and difference from metaphysics. Secunda, it must 
repeat the unthought within the material of a text -the unthought, which is 
to say: that which can no longer be thought and dominated within the 
conceptual network of a text. 
If one is to penetrate and intervene effectively within the grounding 
structure of metaphysics, then one should not just neutralize one's basic 
concepts by writing a protest letter in the form of a 'neither .. nor..' 3. In so 
1 Cf. R. Gasche, Tbe Tain of the Mirror, p. 163: deconstruction must be intrinsic; it 
must remain within the texts or discourses under examination. 
2 les fins de /'homme, pp. 162-63. 
3 Pos, p. 57. 
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doing one still leaves a text untouched and assumes that better concepts 
might be possible to articulate the originary and ultimate sense of Being. 
Deconstruction does not just cross a border so as todefinitively leave behind 
itself what it has supposedly gone beyond without ever looking backwards. 
The less one touches metaphysics, leaving it untouched and putting it at a 
distance, the greater its silent strength4. One should not neutralize 
oppositions but violently reverse their logical, axiological and ontological 
hierarchy, thus letting the conflict burst out in all its vehemence and 
intensity. Still one should not settle for reversal only since by merely 
reversing oppositions one retains them5. Rather, one should simultaneously 
mark the rupture which accomplishes itself in that reversal and in so doing 
clear room for the outbreak of a new 'concept' that can no longer be thought 
within the traditional categorial schemata. Par analogie ( Je le souligne),6 
Derrida calls these new 'concepts' the non-localisable undecidable concepts: 
les indecidables. An example. 
Metaphysics institutes a 
literal, proper discourse 
distinction between a Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 
2, 1003, 33ff: We speak of 
which approximates being in many senses but 
always with a view to one 
presence as nearly as sense and to one nature. Not 
in the way we use identical Aristotle, Meta p by sics, 
VII, 3, 1028b, 2-4: The possible, and a expressions but in the way 
everything healthy is related question that was raised in 
earliest time, that we raise 
today, and that will always be 
raised and that will always 
be a matter of perplexity, is: 
ti to on, What is being? 
figural, 
discourse 
deliberately 
improper to health, inasmuch as it 
preserves or restores health 
or is a sign of health. [ ... ] In 
precisely this way we speak 
of being in many senses but 
always with a view to one 
which 
deviates 
from that ideal. It dominant sense. [ ... ] And just 
as there is one science of the 
healthy so it is in all such 
cases. [ ... ] Obviously 
4 Pos, p. 60; cf. de I' economie restreinte a I' economie 
therefore it is proper for one 
science to study being 
insofar as it is being. 
generale, p. 369-70: le reveil as une ruse du reve. 
5 Pos, p. 57. 
6 Pos, p. 58. 
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does so, and has to do so in the name precisely of the proper sense of Being 
which, as logos, metaphysics aspires to articulate, aussagen. The problem of 
metaphor arises from the positing of an ultimate or originary sense of Being 
-a positing that is informative of ontology. The concept of 'metaphor' is an 
elaboration within a metaphysical frame of thinking7. There is a primordial 
sense of Being in itself which can then be represented either properly or 
improperly. However, since improper talk is secondary it, in principle, can 
be translated into proper terms. The difference between proper and 
improper discourse could hence be dominated by and within the conceptual 
frame of metaphysics. In Ia mythologie blanche Derrida has shown how it 
is that metaphysics can never become an adequate metaphorology. 
Schematically the argument can be reproduced as follows: 
7 M. Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, p. 89: Das Metaphorische gibt es nur innerhalb 
der Metaphysik. Many people would qualify the style which das andere Denken 
requires as -precisely- metaphorical -, a qualification which Heidegger would reject. 
Das andere Denken is a thinking that withdraws itself from the metaphorical as the 
latter belongs to an epoche from which das Sein has withdrawn, to be present only as a 
Seiendes, for instance as eidos. Derrida, in Le retrait de Ia mitaphore, has tried to 
show how any thinking that attempts at completely effacing the metaphorical in itself 
will in fact be a thinking that keeps on introducing the metaphorical in itself. The 
effacement of metaphor is at the same time a return, drawing the trace of a new 
metaphor. The Jaw of supplementarily, which Derrida had already verified with regard 
to metaphor in Ia mythologie blanche, hence still holds for das andere Denken which 
attempts at radically effacing the metaphorical: in the effacement a new metaphor is 
traced. Metaphoricity is the yield precisely of a thinking that destroys metaphysics by 
thinking its We sen. This is perhaps why Derrida would not argue in favor of a 
Destruktion of the history of ontology, as Heidegger had called for in Sein und Zeit (p. 
39), but for a deconstruction: and never underestimate the return of metaphor and 
metaphysics. 
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-primo: the concepts with the help of which metaphysics attempts to 
dominate the metaphorical production of meaning are precisely those that 
have called into existence -so to speak- the concept of metaphor; 
-sec undo: there will always exist one metaphor that eludes the grip of that 
conceptual apparatus namely the metaphor of metaphor; 
-tertio: the metaphorical production of meaning can never be dominated 
since any so-called literal interpretation is in tum overdetermined by the 
metaphorS. The semantic slit which metaphor produces can never be 
stopped up by the identity of a homogeneous interpretation of meaning. The 
slit carries on endlessly : le champs n'est jamais sature9; 
-quatro : metaphysics cannot keep metaphor at a safe distance from itself 
since its own discourse is the sediment of solidified metaphors. Metaphysics 
cannot dominate the effects of the concept that it produces. In this way 
metaphysics is faced with its own impossibility. 
Metaphor is a possibility that is equiprimordial with the ideal of a literal 
signification. Moreover, it is a possibility that cannot really be dominated by 
literal discourse. Literal discourse is brought about through precisely the 
exclusion and suppression of the heterogeneous production of meaning of 
the metaphor: La metaphysique -reteve de Ia metaphore 1 0. The 
metaphorical time and time again returns, there where one would no longer 
expect it. 
8 Ia mythologie /Jlanche, p. 291/243-44e: determinee sans fonds. 
9 Ia mythologie /Jlanche, p. 262. 
10 Ia mythologie blanche, p. 308. 
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What is paradoxical in Derrida's analysis is that any analysis of metaphor 
can bring to the surface the problematic character of the conceptual frame 
of which metaphor itself is an effect. Metaphor is, in this sense, the 
symptom of the impossibility of a literal discourse on the proper sense of 
Being, or ontology!!. 
Now, the outcome of Derrida's deconstruction is not that the distinction 
between the metaphorical and the nonmetaphorical is destroyed or becomes 
indifferent 12. Derrida does not say that everything is just metaphorical, and 
with good reason 13. Deconstruction does not boil down to a regress into 
indifference. What Derrida shows is that the distinction has no firm 
footing14; that it can no longer be supported by or grounded in the priority 
of one of the two terms, or more particularly in the identity of a self 
sufficient literal sense that can then be expressed either directly or 
figurativelyi5. The distinction is now repeated and inscribed in and as a 
difference without origin and end term. It is in this way that in 
deconstruction something like the paradoxical concept of an originary 
deviation, of an ecart sans origine 16 can be set free. It is not a proper 
meaning in itself that corresponds to literal discourse -but the gaping 
absence of any such originary or ultimate meaning: each literal meaning is 
itself already a deviation, a deviation of a deviation, or a supplementary 
11 Cf. R. Gasche, The Tain or the Mirror, pp. 307-08. 
12 Cf. R. Gasche, The Tain or the Mirror, pp. 308-10. 
13 Ia mythologie blanche, pp. 254-57. 
14 Cf. Ia mythologie blanche, p. 273. 
15 Ia mythologie blanche, p. 323. 
16 Ia mythologie blanche, p. 256. 
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deviation. What supports the production of meaning is a difference without 
ground. And this difference (Ia differance ) is a 'concept' that cannot be 
thought by a metaphysics of presencel7. 
The supplement too -the originary supplement and the supplement as 
origin- has the structure of an undecidable concept. It is never inside nor 
outside, and is at the same time inside and outside; neither a plus nor a minus 
and both surplus and lack. In this sense the supplement is an undecidable 
concept that cannot be integrated within the system. As an undecidable, the 
supplement has no proper place in the system: it signals the impossibility of 
any definitive separation between the inside and the outside. The 
supplement is an inscription slitting the text as the latter secludes itself. The 
impossible border between an inside and an outside inscribes itself within 
metaphysics, that is to say: within metaphysics as text. The undecidable 
concept is hence not a versiihnende middle term. Moreover, the undecidable 
concept also has a circular structure. The supplement, for instance, is both 
an example of an undecidable concept and the name of the undecidable 
concept: the undecidable concept is itself a supplement vis-a-vis a 
traditional text. The pharmakon too is both an example and the name of the 
undecidable. Finally, undecidable concepts are not universal concepts: in 
keeping with the particular text another undecidable space is to be tom 
open. 
Because of the outbreak of an undecidable concept, a text time and time again 
may be reread and rewritten as a text that can never really dominate itself. 
The undecidable concepts cause a permanent imbalance between the order of 
the signifier and the order of the signified. 
17 Pos, p. 58. 
130 
As a reflexion on itself philosophy must think its own limit and limitation. 
For it is only through making this reflexive move that philosophy can ever 
hope to completely dominate its own activity, and to keep it within rigidly 
determined limits. In the name of its ideal -that is to say: as the place-
keeping representative of universal truth, true reality, the ultimate 
signified, absolute rationality and the perfect adequation between the 
expression and the expressed- philosophy aims at a clear separation between 
itself and other nonphilosophical practices of signification. This distinction 
is grounded in a transcendental signified that is meaningful in and of itself, 
that is to say: independently of any external and supplementary frame. In 
order to safeguard and protect its ideal, philosophy insists on a clear 
separation. It is therefore crucial that this distinction is explained and 
justified on the basis of essential intrinsic criteria, that is to say: criteria that 
carry their own justification in themselves. All practices of signification 
that do not conform to this ideal or these criteria must be kept at a distance; 
whatever might put that limitation at stake, en jeu, must be put hors jeu, out 
of it -, must be warded off. One would like a clear distinction to be installed 
[sic) between philosophy proper and an improper decoction, between good 
and bad philosophy, between philosophy and literature, between philosophy 
and rhetoric. Now what Derrida allows us to note is that -as it comes to 
delimit a philosophical text and a philosophical oeuvre- one must in fact 
appeal to extrinsic criteria, that is to say: criteria that are part of the 
materiality, the margin(s), the ritual of the external frame, and that as such, 
have nothing whatsoever to do with the very reason why philosophy 
attaches such importance to the distinction. Although these criteria are 
necessary, they are accidental and arbitrary too! They are arbitrary in the 
light of the ideal of philosophy: they do not explain why it is that so much 
seems to be at stake as philosophy wants to defend that distinction. And 
1 3 1 
precisely because this distinction -in the name of a transcendental signified-
also depends on the practice and ritual of the extrinsic frame, it threatens to 
become a little futile and ridiculous, which is to say: to lose its meaning. 
D. Giovannangeli, La question de Ia litterature, p. 81: Peut-on concevoir une phi/osophie 
ou une science, qui, en tant que telle, preserve Ia difference dans son etrangete. sans Ia 
subordonner a l'identite? Quand Hegel, par exemp/e, opere le passage ll Ia difference 
essentie//e -intrinseque et non plus extt!rieure-, it conc/ut que Ia difjt!rence <<est ainsi 
opposition>>. Dans cette reduction de Ia difjt!rence, Ia diversite fait place ll Ia dualite, 
ou chaque terme s'oppose ll son autre (non a /'autre en general). 
Take the demarcation of a philosophical text. What could be, in this 
connection, the intrinsic criterium on account of which Hegel would be a 
real philosopher, Nietzsche would be out of the game, and Heidegger say 
somewhere in between, at times in, at times out. Gesetzt: to clear the field one 
appeals to the internal logical consistency of a philosophical exposition. But 
then: will one a priori label all those texts that are not logically consistent 
with the epitaph 'non-philosophical'? This seems hard to maintain. And 
what about the texts by one author that are internally contradictory and 
cannot be reconciled with one another? Shall one banish those texts from 
philosophy? And what about the nonphilosophical references, the poetic 
turns of phrases, the badly chosen examples -in 
M. Foucault, What is an short: all the unintegratable nicks and notches 
Author?, pp. 103-04: When 
undertaking the publication in the margin(s) of a text? 
of Nietzsche's work, for 
example, where should one 
stop? Surely everythin must And what about a detached sentence like 
be published, but what is 
<<everything>>? [ ... ] The Nietzsche's "ich habe meinen Regenschirm 
deleted passages and the 
notes at the bottom of the vergessen" 18. 
page? Yes. What if, within a 
workbook filled with 
aphorisms, one finds a Should this sentence be considered to be part of 
reference, the notation of a 
meeting or of an address, or a Nietzsche's philosophical oeuvre? What could or 
laundry list: Is it a work, or 
not? Why not? And so on, ad 
infinitum. 
18 Nachgelassene Fragrnente 1880-1882, Bd. 9, 
Herbst 1881, 12 [62]. 
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would prevent the principle of P. de Man, Allegories of Reading, pp. 
9-10: But suppose that it is a de-bunker 
iterability, which is inherent to a text rather than a "Bunker", and a de-bunker 
of the arc he (or origin), an archie De-
as text, from using this sentence in a bunker such as Nietzsche or Jacques 
Derrida for instance, who asks the 
philosophical argument? Is there question "What is the difference" -and 
we cannot even tell from his grammar 
something like a proper context for whether he "really" wants to know "what" 
difference is or is just telling us that we 
such a sentence? In other words: does shouldn't even try to find out. 
Confronted with the question of the 
philosophy have a proper context, a difference between grammar and 
rhetoric, grammar allows us to ask the 
proper place and a rigorously question, but the sentence by means of 
which we ask it may deny the very 
determined frame? possibility of asking. For what is the use 
of asking, I ask, when we cannot even 
authoritatively decide whether a 
Perhaps, in an attempt generally to question asks or doesn't ask? 
delimitate the different, internally 
conflicting texts of an author or the texts in the history of philosophy, one 
will appeal to something like the proper 
J. Culler, 0 n i nte ntio n of an author or of philosophy. But how 
Deco ns tru c t ion, pp. 127-
28: My intention is the sum are we supposed to get on the track of such a 
of further explanations I 
might give when questioned unique intention? What if it appears that this 
on any point and is thus less 
an origin than a product, less intention changes and shifts? 
a delimited content than an 
open set of discursive 
possibilities linked to the Perhaps that one will go for something like an 
consequences of iterable acts 
and to contexts that pose ultimate and basic intuition, which could be 
particular questions about 
those acts. grasped in and of itself, apart from any 
supplementary exposition. But what, alors, if 
that intuition appears to crumble away, in an 
Cf. Nietzsche's use of 
unsurveyable network of texts? What -come to think of the word f o I g I i c h, 
Werke. Driller 
it- about those texts that parody the philosophical Band, p. 844: Es gibt 
vielerlei Augen. Auch 
formulas that are supposed to bear witness of an die Sphinx hat Augen-: 
und folglich gibt es 
honest, real interest in truth? vielerlei 
>>Wahrheiten<<, und 
folglich gibt es keine 
If Hegel is quoted -is that still Hegel or already a Wahrheit. 
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caricature, a parody? 
Perhaps one could say that all that which is part of the external frame is 
totally unimportant and superfluous: the only thing that matters is what is 
expressed through it' apart from any 
Eperons/SApurs, p. 58: La 
supplementary enframing. Yet the question <<w!ritis>> ne serait qu'une 
surface, elle ne deviendrait 
then is whether such a literal, naked verite profonde, crue, 
desirable que par I' effet d' un 
signification would still be able to appeal and not, voile: qui tombe sur elle. 
rather, lose its appealing or signifying strength 
Fr. Nietzsche, D i e and become . . 'f' ms1gm 1cant, froblicbe Wissenscbaft, making no difference 
Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe, at all. 
section 4: Wir glauben nicht Supposing, however, that the naked does 
mehr daran, dass Wahrheit 
not lose its pertinence 
noch Wahrheit bleibt, wenn 
man ihr die Schleier abzieht. 
-why is it, then, that time and time again we have to revisit the text and read 
it to the letter, which is to say: to direct our attention precisely to all sorts of 
details and supplementary inscriptions that cannot be translated or 
integrated in a general signification, an originary intention or ultimate 
intuition? And if a text as such were indeed but a superfluous cloth -why is 
it, then, that no one is willing to replace a text by Hegel with a commentary 
that explains better and more clearly what Hegel himself once wanted to say? 
Is it that important, then, that a text bears Hegel's signature? 
When it comes to demarcating a philosophical oeuvre one inevitably has to 
fall back upon extrinsic criteria. A text is part of 
the philosophical oeuvre of an author on the 
ground of the signature it bears, that is to say: on 
the basis of a causal connection with his or her 
handwriting. Data and biographical details too 
are important when it comes to ascribe a text to a 
J. Culler, On Deconstruc-
t i o n , p. 194: (To sign 
something is to attempt to 
detach it from a context and 
by so doing to give it a unity. 
The signature has [ ... ] the 
structure of a parergon, 
neither wholly inside nor 
outside the work.) 
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philosophical authorl9. Yet the contingency of the data and the materiality 
of the signature are criteria that, as such, do not have anything whatsoever 
to do with the reason why we attach so much importance to the distinction. A 
text can be part of philosophy on account of particular words, phrases and a 
style of writing. Needless to say, this may be dependent on the institution in 
which texts are read20: for much of what is regarded as philosophy proper at 
the Sorbonne is disgarded as (bad, of course) literature in Oxford. That a text 
is recognizable philosophically is always in part determined by the ritual of 
writing which is arbitrary in respect to the ideal to which philosophy would 
like to conform. The outcome is that the very distinction always already 
bears the traces of an arbitrariness and contingency that resists 
interiorization: the distinction becomes fragile and vulnerable. And that is 
why uberhaupt we can be attached to it. 
Derrida's deconstruction is not a destruction. He does not destroy the 
distinction between philosophy and nonphilosophical discourse. Derrida 
does not say that the distinction makes no sense, and he does not deny that 
there are criteria for making the distinction. But these criteria remain 
arbitrary and are not themselves completely transparent and rational; they 
are part of the external frame, of the ritual of philosophy. Derrida respects 
the distinction and loves the distinction. He treats the philosophical 
institution, the text with its signature, its biographical and bibliographical 
indentations, with an enormous respect, modesty and diffidence. Each 
19 Cf. for instance the debate as to whether the middledutch copy of De Imitatione 
Christi was written before or after the 'original' (Thomas A Kempis) started 
circulating; see the lnleiding to De Middelnederlandse Vertaling van De 
lfnitatione Christi (Qui sequitur) van Thomas A Kempis. 
20 Imagine my surprise as I found out that Jean Baudrillard's America was stored in 
the Travel section of the bookshop on campus! 
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reading involves the required reserve and scrupulous questioning: what is 
his place and where is the peculiar place of philosophy? He loves the 
distinction, and that is why he submits himself to the ritual of philosophy. 
He loves the philosophical frame. But he loves it as one can only and truly 
love a ritual, that is to say: no longer in the name of an ultimate truth. One 
does not love a ritual because it is the expression of something else. The 
meaning of a ritual cannot be traced back to something that lies outside or 
behind the rituat21. There is no transcendental signified that could stop the 
repetition of the ritual from ever losing its meaning. The ritual signifies a 
break with the ordinary profane frame of the everyday. It institutes a 
distinction with an absence that could not possibly enter into presence. At 
the same time the ritual transgresses the very distinction that it institutes. 
Derrida submits himself to the ritual of a philosophical text, out of respect for 
the institution. Nowhere is philosophy so vulnerable and hence so 
fascinating as in its external frame. Through that frame le sublime et le 
ridicule, the cosmic and the comic, the philosophical and the literary, 
philosophy proper and improper decoction are always already intimately 
related. The very distinction is impure. Philosophy, as a ritual, transgresses 
of itself its own borders. But then, that is why philosophy can remain 
meaningful or lose its meaning. Derrida challenges the frame of philosophy 
for love of philosophy, for love of the ritual of philosophy. 
21 Cf. R. Scruton, Emotion and Common culture; H. de Montherlant, La jtte a /'ecart. 
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